Where Things Stand at the End of 2024
M&A/PE Quarterly | January 7, 2025
In this Fried Frank Quarterly, we present our fifth annual end-of-the-year summary of “Where Things Stand” in the M&A/PE world.
2024 has been a watershed year for Delaware corporate law.
The Court of Chancery issued several decisions that some market participants viewed as upending longstanding, common corporate practices. The decisions led to amendment of the Delaware General Corporation Law, and have stimulated debate at some Delaware corporations about potentially reincorporating to another state. More broadly, the Delaware decisions this year have indicated a generally more technical approach to judicial interpretation of the DGCL and contracts; continued increased judicial skepticism of corporate controllers; and, arguably, somewhat less deference to board decisions.
Below, we discuss key 2024 developments with respect to the following:
We want to wish all our clients and friends the very best for the coming year.
New DGCL amendments
In DGCL, In a trio of seminal decisions—Moelis (Feb. 23, 2024); Activision (Feb. 29, 2024); and Crispo (Oct. 31, 2023)—the Court of Chancery appeared to apply a stricter interpretation of, and to require stricter adherence to, technical requirements of the DGCL than in the past. In response, the Delaware legislature promptly enacted amendments to the DGCL to better align the statute with market practice in certain areas. The amendments became effective (prospectively and generally retroactively) as of August 1, 2024. Notably, however, with respect to Moelis, the Court of Chancery has issued decisions raising doubt as to whether the amendments adopted in response to that decision will be effective for their stated purpose of broadly permitting the granting of governance rights in corporate agreements, as discussed further below.
Discussion of reincorporating from Delaware
Moelis, Activision, Crispo, and certain other decisions—such as Tornetta v. Musk (Jan. 30 and Dec. 2, 2024)—have stimulated discussion at some Delaware corporations about potentially reincorporating to another state, where the courts may apply lower standards of fiduciary duties for directors and controllers (and also lower annual franchise fees). Our research indicates, however, that there has not been much in the way of reincorporations—since 2021, only eight Delaware corporations, all of them controlled companies, have reincorporated (six to Nevada and two to Texas).
Importantly, in Palkon v. Maffei (“TripAdvisor”) (Feb. 20, 2024), the Court of Chancery held that reincorporation to a state with lower fiduciary standards is subject to entire fairness review—because the stockholders’ “litigation rights” are diminished through such a reincorporation while the directors and any controller obtain the material non-ratable benefit of decreased potential personal liability for fiduciary breaches. The court suggested that, to satisfy entire fairness, some kind of compensation must be provided to the stockholders. The appeal of TripAdvisor is pending, and, if the decision is upheld, it may be unlikely that there would be any increased interest in reincorporation, particularly among non-controlled companies. See our Briefing, Chancery Decision Heightens Litigation Risk Associated with Reincorporation from Delaware.
Governance rights in stockholder agreements—Moelis
In Moelis, the Court of Chancery held that extensive governance rights granted in a stockholder agreement, rather than in the corporate charter, were facially invalid, as they violated DGCL Section 141(a), which mandates that Delaware corporations be managed by the board unless otherwise provided in the charter.
In response, the Delaware legislature enacted new DGCL Section 122(18), which provides that, notwithstanding Section 141(a), governance rights may be granted in any corporate agreement, so long as the provisions do not violate any other laws or the corporation’s charter. The practical effect of the new Section awaits further judicial development, however.
Notably, in Wagner v. BRP Group (May 28, 2024) and Seavitt v. N-Able, Inc. (July 25, 2024), the Court of Chancery indicated that, although new Section 122(18) permits the granting of governance rights notwithstanding Section 141(a), many such rights may nonetheless still be facially invalid on the basis that they would violate other sections of the DGCL and/or charter provisions. In addition, the appeal of Moelis is still pending—as the DGCL amendments by their terms do not apply retroactively to stockholder agreements subject to litigation filed before August 1, 2024. See our articles, Uncertainty on Governance Rights in Stockholder Agreements Continues Pending a Decision in the Appeal of Moelis; and Practice Points on Stockholder Governance Rights After Moelis and Wagner.
Board approval of merger agreements—Activision
In Activision, the Court of Chancery declined, at the pleading stage, to dismiss claims that the already-closed merger between Activision Blizzard and Microsoft was invalid. The plaintiff claimed that some of the procedures followed by Activision’s board to approve the merger agreement, while reflecting common practice, did not comply with certain technical requirements for the approval of merger agreements set forth in the DGCL. The court also declined to dismiss the claim that, as the merger was invalid, the board had committed an unlawful conversion (i.e., theft) of the plaintiff’s shares. See our article, Key Delaware Decision in Activision Upends Standard Board Practices for Approving Mergers.
In response, amendments to the DGCL were enacted providing that: (i) a board can approve a draft merger (or other) agreement that is in “substantially final form” (Section 147)—which means, according to the amendment Synopsis, that all of the “material terms” are set forth in the draft or otherwise known to the board; (ii) disclosure schedules to a merger agreement are not deemed to be part of the agreement for purposes of the DGCL (and so do not have to be attached to the draft approved by the board) (Section 268(b)); (iii) the charter of the surviving corporation of a cash-out merger need not be included in the merger agreement (Section 268(a)); and (iv) the merger proxy notice can incorporate by reference the description of the merger agreement in the proxy statement (Section 232(g)).
We note that the amendments do not provide guidance as to what terms may be considered to be material for purposes of determining whether a draft agreement is in substantially final form. Also, the amendments do not address whether a side letter extending a merger agreement drop-dead date may, as the court in Activision suggested, constitute an amendment of the agreement (which, if so, could be invalid if occurring after stockholder approval of the agreement). We note also that, to avoid any issue with respect to valid authorization of an agreement, a board may want to ratify its approval of a draft agreement after the final agreement is signed.
Lost-merger-premium damages—Crispo
In Crispo, the Court of Chancery called into question the enforceability of so-called Con Ed provisions in merger agreements. These provisions, which have long been common in merger agreements, state that, in the event of impermissible termination of the agreement, the damages recoverable by the target company can include any lost merger premium. The court reasoned that the target company cannot recover lost premium damages because the merger consideration is payable to the stockholders, not the target company, and the stockholders almost invariably are not third-party beneficiaries of the agreement. See our article, Possible New Approaches to Con Ed Provisions in Merger Agreements—In Response to Crispo.
In response, the DGCL was amended to provide that a right to lost merger premium damages can be enforced through a stockholders’ representative appointed at the time the stockholders approve the merger agreement. The amendments do not indicate whether the target company itself could be appointed as the stockholders’ representative, nor provide guidance as to issues that may arise in connection with the appointment of a stockholders’ representative in the public company context.
MFW
In In re Match Group (Apr. 4, 2024), the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed that entire fairness review presumptively applies in any suit where a controlling stockholder stood on both sides of a transaction with the corporation and received a material non-ratable benefit. The decision thus rejected an effort among a group of prominent commentators to limit MFW’s applicability to the squeeze-out merger context in which MFW itself was decided. See our article, Important MFW Developments.
In Match, the transaction at issue was a reverse spinoff by a parent company of its controlled subsidiary, where both the parent and its subsidiary were controlled by the parent’s chairman and largest stockholder. The Court of Chancery had found that the transaction met the MFW requirements for business judgment review and dismissed the case. See our article, Chancery Court Finds Conflicted Controller Spinoff Met MFW Prerequisites. That decision was overturned by the Supreme Court.
Importantly, the Supreme Court also clarified in Match that, in the context of a conflicted controller transaction, compliance with the MFW prerequisites (i.e., approval by both an independent special committee of directors and a majority of the minority stockholders) is the only route for obtaining business judgment review. Finally, and importantly, the Supreme Court established, for the first time, that MFW will not be satisfied unless all (rather than just a majority) of the directors on the special committee approved the transaction.
Executive compensation for a controller—Tornetta v. Musk
Executive compensation traditionally has been considered the paradigm context for judicial deference to a corporation’s board. In Tornetta v. Musk (Jan. 30, 2024) (“Tornetta I”), however, the Court of Chancery entirely voided the $56 billion (now worth over $100 billion) 10-year pay package the Tesla board, comprised of independent directors, and Tesla’s unaffiliated stockholders, had approved for Musk. In less than six years, Musk had exceeded the specified 10-year financial targets set forth in the plan, growing the company by $600 billion (a thirteen-fold growth in the company’s market capitalization) over that period.
The court found that Musk was Tesla’s controller (“at least” with respect to the pay package); viewed the pay package as a material non-ratable benefit to Musk; and thus applied entire fairness review. The burden of proving entire fairness was on Tesla—because, in the court’s view, the board was controlled by Musk; and the stockholder vote was not fully informed because it suggested the pay package was negotiated by independent directors.
The court found that Tesla did not meet its burden of proving that the pay package—the largest ever awarded in the history of public markets—was entirely fair. The court concluded that Tesla did not establish that the process was fair, as the controlled board had simply capitulated to whatever Musk wanted. And the court concluded that Tesla did not establish that the price was fair, in large part because the compensation appeared not to serve as incentive for retention and performance given that Musk already was incentivized through his ownership of 21.9% of Tesla’s stock.
After Tornetta I was issued, the unaffiliated stockholders, provided with additional disclosures, voted again on the pay package and ratified it (while also approving the company’s proposed reincorporation to Texas). Tesla then requested that the Court of Chancery revise its decision that the pay package be rescinded.
In a decision issued Dec. 2, 2024 (“Tornetta II”), the court rejected revising the rescission for four reasons, each of which alone, the court stated, was a sufficient basis for the rejection. The court held that: (i) there is no procedural basis on which the outcome of an adverse post-trial opinion can be undone by a stockholder vote; (ii) common-law ratification is an affirmative defense, and as such cannot be raised for the first time after a post-trial opinion; (iii) a stockholder vote standing alone cannot ratify a conflicted-controller transaction; and (iv) the second Tesla stockholder vote was not fully informed, as Tesla’s disclosure indicated that the stockholders’ approval would be a comprehensive cure-all, absolving directors of fiduciary breaches and restoring the pay to Musk, whereas, the court stated, at best, effective stockholder ratification only would have shifted the burden of proof in establishing whether the package was entirely fair. (Of note, the court awarded plaintiff’s counsel a fee of $345 million.)
The Tornetta decisions have surprised market participants. The court rescinded a pay package for an executive who achieved unarguably extraordinary growth for the company and whose retention was viewed as critical to the future growth of the company; and the pay package was twice approved by the stockholders, who were informed not only by the company’s disclosures but also by the extensive information revealed through the litigation. We would note that it is uncertain what the judicial result would have been had the burden of proof with respect to entire fairness of the pay package instead been on the plaintiffs to prove unfairness of the pay package; had the company considered and/or submitted evidence by independent experts indicating that the pay was fair; and/or had there been less extreme facts relating to the process, the price, and the perceived level of Musk’s control over Tesla’s board.
Tesla, which in the interim has reincorporated to Texas, has stated that it will appeal.
Tornetta II reinforces the applicability of MFW to all conflicted controller transactions, including determining pay for a controller-executive, and establishes that stockholder ratification of a board action — at least in the controller context, but potentially in others — will not be effective if obtained after a post-trial decision rejecting the board action.
Together, the Tornetta decisions: underscore the court's view that executive compensation should involve an active negotiation process rather than capitulation to the executive, no matter how valuable the executive is; suggest judicial skepticism as to the unique value of a superstar CEO such that it would justify such an extraordinary level of compensation; highlight continued judicial skepticism toward corporate controllers generally in the context of self-interested transactions; and underscore the need for vigilance in corporate governance matters, particularly in the controller context.
Controller fiduciary duties when voting shares to block board action
In Sears Hometown and Outlet (Jan. 24, 2024), the Court of Chancery, for the first time, clearly established that, when a controller exercises its stockholder-level voting power “to alter the status quo,” even if the controller does not receive a non-ratable benefit, the controller has certain, albeit limited, fiduciary duties. Specifically, their duties in this context are not to “harm the corporation knowingly or through grossly negligent action.” Prior to this decision, it was clear that controllers, when using their influence over the board and management to cause the corporation to act, have fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of the corporation and its stockholder—but there were conflicting lines of authority as to whether fiduciary duties apply to a controller when acting solely as a stockholder.
The decision clarifies that, while controllers exercising stockholder-level power have the fiduciary duties described above, they do not have the higher-level duty that a board has—and that controllers have when they “step into the boardroom” and try to influence directors—to act affirmatively to promote what they believe is in the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders. We note that the limited fiduciary duties the court established in Sears Hometown—which most typically would arise when the controller, without a self-interest component, disagrees with the board about how to preserve or create corporate value—appear to be fairly easily satisfiable. See our article, Law360 Del. Dispatch: Clarification on Fiduciary Duties of Controllers.
Who is a controller
The Delaware courts have continued to take a broader view than in the past as to who may be deemed a controller—conducting in each case a facts-intensive, holistic analysis that considers all potential sources of a minority stockholder's influence to determine if the stockholder had control generally or with respect to the transaction at issue. The court’s focus is on whether the stockholder controlled the board—either generally or with respect to the transaction at issue. In recent cases, the court has found directors not to be independent of an alleged controller where they have had long-standing business relationships, personal ties of “respect, loyalty, and affection,” and/or the director anticipates the possibility of future board appointments by the controller.
In some cases in recent years, the Court of Chancery has stated that a holding of around just 20% in and of itself may be a strong factor indicating control, given that it provides a meaningful leg-up on stockholder votes (particularly as not all stockholders vote) and provides for a significant voice in the boardroom. In Tornetta I (discussed above), the court found that Elon Musk, although only a 21.9% stockholder of Tesla, was a controller (at least with respect to his pay package) in light of his extraordinary influence as a “superstar” chief executive and the board’s (and others’) extreme deference to him.
The court’s conclusions as to control continue to be dependent on the particular factual context, however. In Sciannella v. AstraZeneca (July 2, 2024), the court found that AstraZeneca, a 26.7% stockholder of Viela Bio, was not a controller even though AstraZeneca had total operational control of the company through support agreements and its control over management. It did not have control over the board, however, the court concluded—as its blocking rights related mostly to stockholder actions rather than board actions; it had designated just two of the eight directors; and its control over management did not indicate control over the board. In addition, the court viewed AstraZeneca as not having acted like a controller—as it had never exercised its blocking rights, and neither it nor its director-designees had sought to dominate the board, which was comprised primarily of independent directors. See our article, Chancery Finds 26.7% Stockholder Was Not a Controller.
Advisor conflicts
The Delaware courts have continued their sharp focus of recent years on conflicts of interest, including those of financial and legal advisors.
Materiality. In one case, the Delaware Supreme Court indicated a possibly lower bar than previously for materiality with respect to the disclosure of conflicts. The Supreme Court emphasized the stockholders’ likely subjective point of view relating to a buyer’s investments in a sell-side advisor’s funds although those investments represented only .001% of the total assets the advisor managed. The Supreme Court’s tone was notable, as it stressed that the courts seek “transparency” and “full disclosure of [advisors’] compensation and potential conflicts.”
De-SPACs. In Firefighters’ Pension v. Foundation Building Materials (May 31, 2024), the Court of Chancery declined to dismiss claims challenging the de-SPAC merger of a company with an unrelated third party in an arm’s-length transaction, based on potential conflicts of interest of the controller-sponsor and the financial advisors that the court viewed as inherently arising out of the standard Up-C structure the company had utilized for the merger. Specifically, the court viewed the sponsor as conflicted due to the early termination payment it would receive under its standard tax receivables agreement upon a sale of the company; and the court viewed the financial advisors as conflicted because their fees were in part (although not significantly) ties to the sponsor’s receipt of the early termination fee. See our Briefing, Chancery Decision Scrutinizes Sponsor and Financial Advisor Conflicts Arising Under the Up-C Structure.
Buyer aiding and abetting liability
In recent years, the Delaware court have expanded the potential for buyers to be liable for aiding and abetting sell-side breaches of fiduciary duties. Importantly though, in Mindbody Stockholder Litigation (Dec. 2, 2024), the Delaware Supreme Court overturned the Court of Chancery’s decision that the private equity buyer in that case was liable for aiding and abetting the target CEO’s fiduciary breaches in connection with materially flawed disclosure in the company’s proxy statement.
The Court of Chancery had held that the CEO breached its fiduciary duties relating to disclosure, as the proxy statement did not disclose that, in the company’s sale process, the CEO, who believed the buyer would retain him after the sale, had provided the buyer with a head start in the process and had passed information to the buyer during the process. The court found the buyer liable for aiding and abetting the CEO’s disclosure violations because the buyer was contractually obligated to review the proxy statement and inform the target company of inaccuracies; the buyer knew of the inaccuracies in the disclosure but did not inform the target company; and the buyer thus had exploited for its own advantage the CEO’s conflict of interest.
The Supreme Court, while upholding the Chancery’s holdings as to the CEO’s breaches, held that the buyer’s contractual obligation to the company with respect to review of the proxy statement did not create a fiduciary obligation to the target stockholders; and that, absent a duty to the target’s stockholders, the buyer’s inaction—that is, its passive awareness of the omission of facts—did not constitute substantial assistance in the CEO’s disclosure. The Supreme Court suggested that the result could have been different if the buyer had drafted any of the misleading disclosures or had deceived the drafters of the proxy statement in any way.
Notably, the plaintiffs had not claimed that the buyer aided and abetted the other sale process violations. The Supreme Court noted that neither it nor the lower court passed judgment on whether the interactions between the CEO and the buyer during the sale process constituted active participation in exploiting the CEO’s conflict of interest and thus could have supported an aiding and abetting claim.
The Supreme Court decision reaffirms that there is still a high bar for plaintiff success on buyer aiding and abetting claims. A plaintiff must establish that the buyer knowingly participated in the sell-side fiduciary breaches by creating, exacerbating or exploiting the breaches for its own benefit, at the expense of target stockholders. And importantly, with respect to disclosure violations, even where the buyer has a contractual obligation to review and comment on the proxy statement, its inaction in not informing the target company of possible inaccuracies will not constitute aiding and abetting—at least, we would note, where the target company already knew of the inaccuracies.
Earnouts
Historically, Delaware courts almost invariably held in favor of buyers on claims that the buyer did not use sufficient post-closing efforts to achieve an earnout. The 2024 decisions, however, continue the court’s trend in more recent years of sometimes finding in favor of the sellers on these claims.
In Fortis v. Johnson & Johnson (Auris) (Sept. 4, 2024), the Court of Chancery awarded the seller damages of $1 billion after finding that the buyer’s post-closing actions—which caused the acquired product, a surgical robot, to compete and then combine with the buyer’s pre-existing robot—breached the inward-looking efforts standard set forth in the parties’ agreement that required the buyer to accord the product the same treatment it provided its other medical products with priority status.
In SRS v. Alexion (Sept. 5, 2024), the Court of Chancery found that the buyer’s post-closing termination of the development program for the antibody it had acquired breached the outward-looking efforts standard set forth in the parties’ agreement that required the buyer to use the same efforts a typical biopharmaceutical company would use for a similar product at a similar stage of development under similar circumstances. The court concluded that, although the buyer had received new data raising safety concerns about the antibody, a hypothetical typical company would have gathered more data rather than terminate the program. Overlaying the court's analysis was the particular factual context, with the buyer itself having been acquired during the earnout period and its acquiror having publicly promised outsized merger synergies from that acquisition. The court viewed this acquiror’s idiosyncratic need to achieve the synergies as the real reason the buyer terminated the program. See our Briefing, Chancery Finds That Buyers Breached Their Efforts Obligation—Auris and Alexion.
By contrast, in Himawan v. Cephalon (Apr. 30, 2024), the Court of Chancery held that the buyer did not breach its contractual obligation to use commercially reasonable efforts to achieve an earnout. The court, emphasizing that the agreement expressly granted the buyer complete discretion over post-closing operations, interpreted the efforts standard as being both subjective and objective—meaning that if a reasonable actor when faced with the same circumstances would go forward in its own self-interest, then the buyer was contractually obligated to do the same. The court thus applied an objective standard of reasonableness in the context of the unique facts and circumstances applicable to this buyer. Notably, the court suggested that applying a purely objective standard (based only on what other companies had done or would do) would be inappropriate in the context of a drug development case, as each set of circumstances around drug development is inherently unique. See our article, Court Interprets an Earnout that Provides ‘Compete Discretion’ to the Buyer But Is Subject to an Efforts Obligation to Achieve the Earnout.
Caremark
The 2024 Caremark decisions reflect a return to the court’s historical emphasis on the difficulty of success for plaintiffs on Caremark claims. Notably, in Walgreens (discussed below), the court expressly discouraged the “reflexive filing” of Caremark claims following corporate mishaps. Importantly, however, the factual context in these most recent cases arguably was not so egregious as to present a real test of the court's overall approach to Caremark cases. Although there is a high bar to Caremark liability, we would expect it is likely that the court would continue to find potential liability in cases that involve egregious facts following the occurrence of an extreme corporate trauma.
Of note, in Bricklayers Pension v. Brinkley (Centene) (July 12, 2024), the court found that a board did not breach its Caremark duties although it had deferred to management in dealing with the Company’s serious, longstanding regulatory compliance problems. In certain previous Caremark cases, the court has stressed that Caremark requires board-level oversight of compliance risks and that reliance on management alone to deal with critical compliance risks and problems is insufficient. Centene, however, indicates that the extent to which reliance on management may be sufficient for fulfillment of Caremark duties depends on the context. The court found it reasonable in this case to infer that the board knew what steps management was taking to address the problems (even though there was no record establishing as much); and the overall context was not so extreme that the board was unreasonable in accepting management’s assurances that the problems “were being handled.” See our article, Law360 Del. Dispatch: Director Caremark Claims Need Extreme Facts.
Antitrust
Kroger-Albertsons merger. The planned $24.6 billion merger pursuant to which Kroger was to acquire Albertsons was enjoined based on antitrust concerns. Albertsons then terminated the parties’ merger agreement, and filed suit against Kroger in the Court of Chancery. Albertsons claims that, post-signing, Kroger had a typical case of buyer’s remorse; and then, to derail the deal, willfully breached its merger agreement obligation to use best efforts to obtain the antitrust approvals needed to close the deal. Albertsons is seeking the $600 million reverse termination fee (RTF) delineated in the merger agreement, as well as all legally available damages (including the lost merger premium). It is expected that Kroger will counterclaim, asserting that Albertsons breached the Merger Agreement and is not entitled to the RTF.
While Albertsons’ allegations may or may not be found to be true, they prompt consideration as to how a target company can best protect itself against the possibility that a buyer may regret having agreed to a deal, and then may seek to derail the deal by not timely and effectively seeking the necessary regulatory approvals. See our Briefing, Practice Points Arising from Albertsons’ Claims Against Kroger for Breach of their Merger Agreement.
New HSR rules. The Federal Trade Commission, with the concurrence of the Department of Justice, issued final changes to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. The new HSR rules, which are set to go into effect February 10, 2025, significantly expand the documents and information parties must include in their filings. Together with the 2023 Merger Guidelines, the new HSR rules are among the most ambitious efforts by the Biden administration to reshape U.S. antitrust merger enforcement. As a result of the new rules, parties to potential transactions will need to consider HSR requirements earlier in the deal process; and frequent filers will be well served to work with counsel to maintain larger repositories of HSR-related information that can be leveraged when new filing obligations arise. Similarly, the expanded requirements to submit ordinary course of business plans and reports, drafts of transaction-related documents shared with directors, and explanations of the deal rationale and competitive and customer-supplier relationships between the parties to a transaction, will put a premium on thoughtful document management. In particular, parties should ensure that transaction-related and ordinary course documents accurately reflect the markets and competitive dynamics. See our Briefing, FTC Overhauls HSR Filing Process.
HSR violations. The FTC announced a settlement of charges that an investor violated HSR Act reporting obligations in connection with open-market purchases of Wells Fargo stock. In a departure from historic practice, the FTC imposed a fine of almost $1 million, notwithstanding that the violation appears to have been inadvertent and there was no allegation that the investor had previously violated the statute. The FTC thus signaled that it may bring enforcement actions for first time, inadvertent HSR violations where the agency deems the violation to be the result of inexcusable negligence—however, it is uncertain what the approach of the FTC will be under new leadership in the Trump administration. See our Briefing, FTC Fines Investor for Inadvertent First-Time Violation of the HSR Act.
Incoming Trump administration. We expect that the antitrust agencies, under new leadership, are likely to revert to a more traditional approach to mergers than has been the case under the Biden administration, with less focus on novel theories of harm such as impact on labor and product bundling and less scrutiny of private equity investing strategies. We expect that the new HSR rules likely will become effective; the 2023 Merger Guidelines may be revised or withdrawn in whole or in part; and the antitrust agencies may be more receptive to structural and behavioral remedies than was the case under the Biden administration. Generally, there may be more predictability and transparency in enforcement approaches from the antitrust agencies and less emphasis on deterring M&A. We also expect the agencies to continue to enforce Section 8 of the Clayton Act (a focus under the Biden administration), which prohibits a person from serving as an officer or director of competing companies.
Corporate charters
Incorporation by reference. In N-Able (July 25, 2024) (discussed above), the Court of Chancery held, for the first time, that a charter cannot incorporate by reference the substantive provisions of a stockholder agreement or other private agreement. The court reasoned that, notwithstanding DGCL Section 102(d)—which permits charter provisions to be “made dependent upon facts ascertainable” outside the charter—permitting incorporation by reference of a private agreement would undermine the public nature of a charter, and, because private agreements can be amended without a stockholder vote, would deprive stockholders of their right under the DGCL to vote on amendment of the charter. The court stated that even a publicly available private agreement could not be incorporated by reference into the charter.
Accordingly, Delaware corporations should review their charters to determine if there are incorporations by reference which ultimately may not be effective; and, with respect to new charters, drafters should carefully consider, and preferably eliminate or minimize, the inclusion of references to external documents.
Amendment of charter. In Gunderson v. Trade Desk (Nov. 6, 2024), the Court of Chancery provided a reminder that, where a charter requires a supermajority (or other special) vote to amend or repeal the charter, that vote requirement does not extend to an amendment or repeal effected through a corporate transaction, unless the charter provision explicitly states that the vote requirement applies to amendment or repeal of the charter whether by merger, consolidation, conversion or otherwise. See our article, Supermajority Requirement Inapplicable in the Context of a Reincorporation to Nevada.
Amendment of LLC agreements
In Campus Eye v. DiDonato (Aug. 30, 2024), the Court of Chancery held that an LLC agreement amendment that was effected in connection with a merger—for the purpose of removing a person as the manager of the LLC—was valid and enforceable notwithstanding that the LLC agreement required the consent of the manager for amendments. The court reasoned that the LLC agreement did not prohibit the merger; the Delaware LLC Act expressly permits amendment of an LLC agreement by merger unless the agreement expressly provides that amendment by merger will not be effective (which this agreement did not); and the manager was owed no fiduciary duty, nor had any contractual right, to remain as the manager.
The decision highlights that minority investors in LLCs should seek to ensure that the amendment provision of the LLC agreement expressly states that the requirements set forth in that provision apply to amendments accomplished in connection with a merger.
General partner good faith
Thomas v. American Midstream GP, LLC (Dec. 17, 2024) serves as a reminder of the benefits and limitations, in master limited partnership (MLP) agreements, of safe harbor provisions and presumptions relating to good faith when the general partner engages in conflicted transactions. The decision highlights that, while a safe harbor based on approval by a conflicts committee generally will protect the general partner against liability when it obtains the committee’s approval, the general partner may not be shielded from liability if the committee approval does not meet the specific requirements for such approval set forth in the MLP agreement.
In American Midstream, the plaintiff, a former minority unitholder in the MLP, claimed that the general partner breached its duty to act in good faith when it approved a merger between itself and the MLP. The MLP agreement provided that, with respect to a conflicted transaction, there was a rebuttable presumption that the general partner acted in good faith if a Conflicts Committee provided Special Approval of the transaction. Also, there was a rebuttable presumption that, if Special Approval was sought, the Committee acted in good faith in making its decision. Finally, there was a general provision (not specifically relating to conflicted transactions) that there was a conclusive presumption that the general partner and the Committee acted in good faith if it relied on an advisor.
The Committee, relying on its financial advisor’s fairness opinion with respect to the merger, granted the Special Approval. The plaintiff, in an earlier proceeding, had raised issues about the validity of the Special Approval. In this most recent proceeding, therefore, the general partner focused on being entitled to a conclusive presumption of good faith on the basis that he had relied on the advisor’s fairness opinion. The general partner also contended that the Committee was entitled to the conclusive presumption of good faith because it relied on the fairness opinion, resolving the earlier contested issues relating to the Special Approval.
The Court of Chancery rejected granting the general partner summary judgment. The court stated that Delaware precedent interpreting similar provisions has held that, in the context of a conflicted transaction, a specific provision offering only a rebuttable presumption based on special approval controls over a general provision offering a conclusive presumption based on reliance on an advisor. As, therefore, the general partner was entitled only to a rebuttable presumption of good faith, the claim could not be dismissed at the pleading stage.
Also, the court held that, in any event, reliance on the advisor’s fairness opinion did not trigger a conclusive good faith presumption for the general partner—because the general partner did not actually rely on the fairness opinion, only the Committee relied on it (as was reflected in the advisor’s engagement letter that prohibited reliance by anyone but the Committee), and the Committee was not acting for the general partner. Finally, the court held that the MLP agreement did not afford the Committee a conclusive presumption of good faith based on its reliance on an advisor, as the more specific provision providing a rebuttable presumption in the context of a conflicted transaction applied.
The decision highlights the importance of the specific drafting of the partnership agreement. It underscores, further, that: (i) a safe harbor that depends on committee approval may not lead to dismissal of claims at the pleading stage, based on allegations that the approval did not conform to the requirements set forth in the partnership agreement; (ii) conclusive presumptions of good faith lead to far different outcomes than rebuttable presumptions, particularly with respect to the possibility of dismissal of claims at the pleading stage; and (iii) an agreement should make clear whether general provisions (such as a conclusive presumption of good faith if relying on an advisor) are or are not also applicable in the context of conflicted transactions.
“Dual hat” issue
In Icahn Partners v. deSouza (Jan. 16, 2024), the Court of Chancery, in a letter opinion, ruled that an Ichan employee whom Icahn, following an activist campaign against Illumina, had appointed to Illumina’s board, was not entitled to share confidential Illumina information with the Icahn funds.
A long line of cases has established that a director can share confidential or privileged company information with the stockholder that designated the director to the board if: (i) the stockholder, either through its voting power or contractually, has the right to designate a director; or (ii) the director is a controller or fiduciary of the stockholder (and thus, having only “one brain,” could not segregate information from his or her thought process when fulfilling fiduciary duties to both the company and the designating stockholder).
In this case, the court found that, with respect to (i), nomination and ultimate election of the director was not the equivalent of holding a contractual right to designate, or having the ability to exercise voting power to elect, a director; and, with respect to (ii), the Icahn-affiliated entity’s employment did not create a dual-fiduciary-with-just-“one brain” situation, because the employment did not create a fiduciary relationship with or influence over the Icahn Funds and, even if it had, an employment-based fiduciary relationship would not take precedence over the fiduciary duties owed to the company by a director.
We note some complexity inherent in the court’s distinction between nominating and designating a director. In many agreements containing governance rights (including, for example, activist settlement agreements), a stockholder is granted the right to designate nominees to the board, with the company bound to recommend such nominees for election.
Entire fairness
The Court of Chancery has continued its recent trends relating to the entire fairness standard—reinforcing that the standard, although stringent, actually is capable of being satisfied, and that fair price may predominate over fair process (i.e., notwithstanding that the standard requires a “unitary analysis” of fairness of the price and the process, entire fairness may be satisfied if the price is fair even if the process was unfair).
For example, in Walker (discussed above), while the court found that the forbearance agreement that the company entered into with its creditor was not entirely fair, the court held that the subsequent consensual foreclosure of the company was entirely fair. The directors who approved the foreclosure had carefully considered over several months the company’s financial situation, the terms of the foreclosure, and the lack of viable alternatives; and the foreclosure was financially fair given the company’s difficult financial circumstances
Non-competes
FTC. In April 2024, the Federal Trade Commission issued a final rule prohibiting non-compete agreements with employees. In August 2024, a Texas federal court issued a nationwide injunction against the rule. The FTC appealed, and litigation is ongoing. It is uncertain how the incoming Trump administration will approach the issue of non-competes, but we expect that the FTC will not pursue the appeal and will drop the underlying ban on non-competes. However, as state legislatures may continue to focus on the issue of restrictive covenants in employment agreements, employers should keep informed about state laws that may prohibit or limit non-compete agreements. See our Antitrust Alert, Court Strikes Down FTC’s Proposed Ban on Non-Competes.
Forfeiture-for-competition. The Delaware courts continue their recent trend of more closely scrutinizing non-compete provisions to determine their reasonableness with respect to geographic scope, duration, existence of a legitimate economic interest, and appropriate balancing of the equities. However, in Cantor Fitzgerald v. Ainslie (Jan. 29, 2024), the Delaware Supreme Court held that forfeiture-for-competition provisions in partnership agreements—which condition receipt of future payments on non-competition—are not restraints on trade; and, therefore, unlike standard non-compete provisions (but like other contractual provisions generally), they are not subject to judicial review as to their reasonableness. See our Briefing, Delaware Supreme Court Validates Forfeiture-for-Competition Provision in a Partnership Agreement. In a later decision (Dec. 18, 2024), the Delaware Supreme Court clarified that this so-called “employee choice doctrine” with respect to forfeiture-for-competition provisions is not restricted to the limited partnership context.
Blue penciling. Where restrictive covenants are found to be overbroad or otherwise unreasonable, the Delaware courts typically have rejected blue penciling the provisions to make them more reasonable and therefore enforceable. However, in Labyrinth v. Ulrich (Jan. 26, 2024), the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that blue penciling may be warranted under limited circumstances. The Supreme Court found that blue penciling was warranted under the “unique circumstances” of this case, where the employee personally had negotiated the overbroad restrictive covenants and he may have held the upper hand in the negotiations.
By contrast, in Sunderland Energy v. Jackson (Dec. 10, 2024), the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the Court of Chancery’s refusal to blue pencil restrictive covenants against the company’s employee-minority member. The court rejected the employer’s contentions that blue penciling overbroad restrictive covenants was historically commonplace under Delaware law; that blue penciling was warranted given the egregious facts of the case; and that the lower court should have deferred to the provision in the company’s LLC agreement that called for blue penciling the covenants. The Supreme Court stated that blue penciling is warranted only where—unlike in this case—there was an equality of bargaining power between the parties, such as where the language of the covenants was specifically negotiated, valuable consideration was exchanged for the restriction, and/or the language was agreed in the context of the sale of a business. Also, he Supreme Court concluded that the LLC agreement’s blue penciling provision was permissive only. The Supreme Court expressly declined to establish a bright-line rule as to when blue penciling is appropriate; and indicated that such a rule would more appropriately be established by the Delaware legislature.
SPACs
While the SPAC boom of the early 2020s is dead and the structure is no longer frequently utilized, SPAC-related litigation continues, as many de-SPAC-ed companies have performed poorly and the Delaware courts have sustained claims against SPAC fiduciaries in numerous cases. This year, the Court of Chancery issued In re Hennessy Capital (May 31, 2024; upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court Dec. 16, 2024), which will significantly hamper plaintiffs in SPAC litigation; but, on the same day, issued Firefighters’ Pension v. Foundation Building Materials (May 31, 2024), which will buttress plaintiffs.
MultiPlan claims. In Hennessy Capital, the Court of Chancery, for the first time, dismissed at the pleading stage common so-called MultiPlan claims, which allege inadequate disclosure to stockholders about a company’s future, post-merger prospects. The decision interrupts the string of successes plaintiffs have had in suits alleging MultiPlan claims. Further, the court expressed in the opinion strong skepticism toward the validity of MultiPlan claims generally. The decision was upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court. See our article, Court Indicates New Skepticism Toward SPAC Litigation.
Conflicts. In Foundation Building Materials, the court, at the pleading stage, declined to dismiss claims challenging an arm’s-length merger to a third-party buyer following the company’s Up-C IPO. The court emphasized potential conflicts of interest of the sponsor, which controlled the company both before and after the IPO, and of the company’s financial advisors. Notably, the court viewed the conflicts as inherently arising out of the commonly utilized Up-C structure.
Specifically, the court held that the standard tax receivables agreement (TRA), which entitled the sponsor to an early termination payment (ETP) in the event of sale of the company, rendered the sponsor-controller conflicted with respect to the sale. It was reasonably conceivable, the court concluded, that the sponsor-affiliated directors, in approving the sale, breached the fiduciary duty of loyalty, as the decision may have been influenced by the sponsor’s desire to receive the ETP; and that the independent directors may have breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty as well, as they did not address the conflict created by the ETP and generally were passive and deferential to the sponsor. In addition, the financial advisors to the board and the special committee may have aided and abetted the fiduciary breaches, as their fees were tied in part to receipt by the sponsor of the ETP. See our article, Court Scrutinizes Sponsor and Financial Advisor Conflicts.
We would observe that the court may have viewed the alleged conflicts in Foundation Building Materials as especially problematic because (i) the sponsor allegedly only began pursuing a sale of the company after legislation was enacted that would reduce the stream of contractual payments it could expect to receive under the TRA; (ii) the sponsor allegedly was “fixated” on the sponsor receiving the ETP; (iii) the special committee was generally passive and deferential to the sponsor; and (iv) allegedly, the value-maximizing option for the company was to remain independent and pay less to the sponsor under the TRA.
Indemnification
Director self-interest. In GB-SP v. Walker (Nov. 15, 2024), the Court of Chancery found that directors, by securing indemnification rights for themselves in connection with approving a foreclosure agreement with the company’s creditor, rendered themselves materially conflicted. As a result, the court reviewed the Plaintiff’s claim—that the directors breached their fiduciary duties in approving the Agreement—under the entire fairness standard. The court found that the foreclosure agreement was not entirely fair; that the directors therefore breached their fiduciary duties when they approved it; and that the creditor, an affiliate of a private equity firm, aided and abetted the directors’ fiduciary breaches.
The decision highlights that, although normally obtaining indemnification rights would not render directors self-interested—because indemnification is commonplace in corporate affairs and does not increase a director’s wealth—it can render directors self-interested under certain circumstances. Notably, the circumstances in this case were unusual, as the scope of the indemnification rights in the indemnity agreement extended beyond claims arising out of the foreclosure agreement, to cover also any claims brought by the company’s controlling stockholder (whether relating to the foreclosure agreement or not). When the directors sought the indemnification rights, they knew that they had breached the controller’s rights under a shareholders agreement, and knew that they could not obtain insurance that would cover liability for those breaches because the policy excluded claims from major shareholders. (The case also serves as a reminder of the potential for acquisition of a struggling company outside a regular sale process.) See our Briefing, Directors, by Securing Indemnification Rights, Were Rendered Self-Interested—GB-SP v. Walker.
Escrowed funds. In Reddy v. 2nd Chance Treatment Centers (Dec. 12, 2024), the Court of Chancery offered an important drafting lesson with respect to sale agreement escrow provisions relating to indemnification claims. The decision underscores that these provisions should be drafted to specify whether the buyer, when making an indemnification claim on escrowed funds, must state the amount (or an estimate of the amount) of the claim, even if the amount is unknown at the time. Otherwise, if the buyer makes an indemnification claim without specifying the amount because it is then unknown, it may be uncertain whether the entire remaining finds in escrow should be withheld to cover the claim or, instead, the entire funds should be released and (where the buyer submitted the notice of indemnification claim before the prescribed deadline) the buyer would have the right to seek indemnification against the seller later. In this case, the court declined to rule at the motion to dismiss stage, holding that a more fulsome record was required to determine whether the buyer acted unreasonably when it instructed the escrow agent to withhold the entirety of the escrow funds based on an indefinite indemnification amount.
Arbitration
In Coinbase v. Suski (May 23, 2024), the U.S. Supreme Court held that, where parties with multiple contracts that conflict as to whether disputes arising between the parties must be decided by an arbitrator or by a designated court, it is the court (not the arbitrator) that must decide whether the dispute at issue is to be decided by an arbitrator or the court. The Supreme Court reasoned that the critical inquiry in this situation is a fundamental contract interpretation issue—i.e., whether the parties agreed to arbitrate—which is an issue to be judicially decided. See our article, US Supreme Court Holds Arbitrability Is to be Decided by the Courts (Not the Arbitrator) Where the Parties Have Multiple Contracts that Conflict on the Issue.
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