Delaware Supreme Court Validates Forfeiture-for-Competition Provision in a Partnership Agreement
M&A/PE Briefing | January 30, 2024
In Cantor Fitzgerald v. Ainslie (Jan. 29, 2024), the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery’s decision that a “forfeiture-for-competition” provision in a limited partnership agreement was unenforceable because it was unreasonable. More importantly, the Supreme Court held that forfeiture-for-competition provisions in partnership agreements—which condition receipt of future payments on non-competition—are not subject to review for reasonableness at all.
Key Points
- The Delaware Supreme Court held that the forfeiture-for-competition provision was enforceable without regard to its reasonableness. The Supreme Court described traditional noncompete provisions—which by their terms purport to prohibit a person from competing (and are enforceable by specific performance)—as restraints on trade that are enforceable only if reasonable. By contrast, the Supreme Court stated, forfeiture-for-competition provisions (which are not enforceable by specific performance) essentially present a person with a financial choice whether to compete and forgo specified financial benefits from the partnership or not to compete and thus retain the specified benefits. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded, forfeiture-for-competition provisions in a partnership agreement that condition the payment of benefits to former partners on their not competing are not restraints of trade—and, therefore, like contract terms generally, are enforceable without review as to their reasonableness.
- It remains to be seen how broadly the decision will be applied. The Delaware Supreme Court cited Delaware’s adherence to freedom of contract principles generally, but it emphasized that the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (DRULPA) is expressly designed to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and the enforceability of partnership agreements. Accordingly, the Supreme Court stated, when parties agree to a forfeiture-for-competition provision in a limited partnership agreement, the court should enforce their agreement—absent unconscionability, bad faith, or other extraordinary circumstances. Notably, the Supreme Court did not address pure employment agreements or other types of agreements. We would note that the analysis with respect to limited partnerships under DRULPA should apply equally to limited liability companies under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act. It remains to be seen whether the decision will be applied to pure employment agreements.
- Partnerships and LLCs—the structures most frequently used by asset management firms for their most productive employees—should consider seeking protection from competition by former partners and members through forfeiture-from-competition provisions. The incentives and disincentives offered by these provisions now may provide more protection from competition by former partners and members than traditional noncompetes for which specific performance can be sought. This is particularly the case given the recent trend of the Delaware courts (and other recent legislative and regulatory developments) reflecting movement away from broadly enforcing traditional noncompetes.
Background. Cantor Fitzgerald’s limited partnership agreement (the “LP Agreement”) imposed on partners who withdraw from the partnership (i) a traditional non-compete provision, with restrictive covenants applicable for two years following the withdrawal, prohibiting the partner from engaging in activities competitive with the partnership, and (ii) a “forfeiture-for-competition” provision, which conditioned payout of the withdrawn partner’s capital account on the partner’s not having engaged in competition with the partnership over the four-year payout period. Six employees of a Cantor affiliate, who were also managing partners of Cantor, voluntarily terminated their employment and withdrew as partners. Thereafter, Cantor determined that each of them was ineligible for a payout of their capital accounts because each had engaged in competition with Cantor within one year following their termination of employment. The forfeited payouts ranged from about $100,000 to $5 million.
These individuals filed suit in the Court of Chancery, arguing that the forfeiture-for-competition provision was unenforceable and seeking enforcement of their right to distribution of their capital accounts. The Court of Chancery ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor. The defendants appealed. Numerous business advocacy groups submitted an amicus brief urging reversal of the Court of Chancery’s decision on the basis that it unnecessarily eroded certainty with respect to contract enforceability. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court overturned the lower court decision and remanded the case for a determination whether there is any genuine issue of material fact as to whether the former partners actually engaged in a competitive activity.
Discussion
Forfeiture-for-competition provisions typically do not prevent an executive from leaving to work for a competitor but instead condition the payment of certain post-employment benefits on the employee’s not engaging in post-employment competition with the employer. The forfeited post-employment benefits typically include various types of deferred compensation and/or severance. The Cantor Fitzgerald LP Agreement provided that a withdrawn partner who engaged in competition with the partnership during the four-year period following withdrawal would forfeit the partner’s entitlement to (i) payout of his or her capital account, which contained the partner’s profit share, as well as any “High Distribution Units” the partner had purchased and (ii) amounts payable under any “Grant Units” the partner had earned.
Traditional noncompete provisions, by contrast, typically purport to prohibit an executive from competing, and thus limit his or her ability to move firms and earn a living performing services similar to those provided to the prior employer. Delaware courts have considered these provisions a restraint of trade and will enforce them only if the court determines they are reasonable—that is, they must be reasonable in geographic scope and temporal duration, advance legitimate economic interests of the party seeking enforcement, and survive a balancing of the equities. The Delaware courts, in recent decisions, have indicated a more exacting approach than in the past, often finding noncompetes to be overbroad in scope or duration, and therefore unenforceable. Also, the Delaware courts have refused to redline noncompetes to strike their problematic aspects—with the result that, if the noncompete is deemed to be overbroad, it is unenforceable in its entirety.
Jurisdictional split regarding forfeiture-for-competition provisions. Some jurisdictions view forfeiture-for-competition provisions as restraints of trade similar to traditional noncompete provisions, and some jurisdictions do not (the latter are often referred to as “employee-choice jurisdictions”). With the Ainslie decision, Delaware has now joined the ranks of the employee-choice jurisdictions—at least in the context of partnership agreements (and, presumably, LLC agreements). The rationale for viewing forfeiture-for-competition provisions as restraints of trade is that their purpose is identical to that of traditional noncompetes (i.e., to deter competitive employment), and also that a threat of economic loss from competing restrains trade similarly to how a flat prohibition on competing does. Conversely, the rationale for not viewing forfeiture-for-competition provisions as restraints of trade is that, unlike traditional noncompete provisions, they do not prohibit competition but, rather, provide the employee with a choice to compete and give up a financial benefit from the former employer (often with the new employer offering to offset that loss) or not to compete and not give up the financial benefit from the former employer.
The Court of Chancery decision. The Court of Chancery held that Cantor Fitzgerald’s forfeiture-for-competition provision in its LP Agreement was a restraint of trade and so had to be evaluated for reasonableness. It found that the provision was unreasonable, largely due to its four-year duration, and therefore was unenforceable.
The Supreme Court decision. The Supreme Court overturned the Court of Chancery’s decision. First, the Supreme Court rejected the view that the forfeiture-for-competition provision was a restraint on trade that should be evaluated for reasonableness, as the provision only established a condition precedent to certain payments from Cantor Fitzgerald to the withdrawn partners. The court stressed that the former partners had voluntarily agreed to that condition when they entered the partnership; and that the they made a voluntary choice to forego these payments when they decided to engage in competition with the partnership. The Supreme Court noted that, while a traditional non-compete may “effectively deprive[] [a former employee] of his livelihood” by prohibiting him from being employed in “his chosen profession,” a forfeiture-for-competition provision involves a financial choice by the former employee either to obtain the contingent post-employment financial benefit from the former employer or to be employed by a competitor (which may be, as it was in this case, “highly remunerative”). Similarly, the Supreme Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the forfeiture-for-competition provision was a penalty in the form of a liquidated damages provision enforcing an unenforceable non-compete restriction. The Supreme Court reasoned that the forfeiture-for-competition provision was not like the payment of a penalty for competing, but rather “was returning a supplemental benefit for breaching the terms of a bargain.”
Primacy of the freedom to contract. The Supreme Court emphasized that the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act is expressly designed “to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of partnership agreements.” Also, the Supreme Court noted that, while the forfeiture-for-competition provision redounded to the plaintiffs’ detriment once they left Cantor Fitzgerald and the provision was enforced against them, it had redounded to their benefit when enforced against other departing partners during the plaintiffs’ tenure as partners—further underscoring the error in “imposing [the court’s] notion of reasonableness” on such a provision.
Open issues. We note the following open issues:
- Enforceability of forfeiture-for-competition provisions outside the context of partnership agreements. It is uncertain whether the decision extends to forfeiture-for-competition provisions in pure employment agreements or other types of agreements, although presumably is should extend to LLC agreements. Certainly, the more sophisticated the parties involved and the less there is any issue of adhesion or imbalance in negotiating leverage in entering into the agreement, the more compelling the argument, based on Ainslie, that a forfeiture-for-competition provision should be enforceable.
- Potentially distinguishing features of this case. It is uncertain whether the same judicial result would obtain if certain factors the court noted in this case were different in a future case. While we do not believe former partners would be successful in distinguishing a future case from Ainslie on these bases, they might try to argue that a different result should obtain where, for example, the partner was for some reason very restricted in its opportunities to engage in employment that was not competitive with the partnership and/or was not being highly compensated in his or her new employment (which, the partner would contend, would undermine his or her “choice” under the forfeiture-for-competition provision). In addition, if a forfeiture-for-competition provision is substantially broader than the one at issue in Ainslie (for example, with a much broader scope or duration, a much greater financial forfeiture, or possibly forfeiture of non-incentive-based compensation) plaintiffs might argue that, notwithstanding Ainslie, the provision should be evaluated for reasonableness.
Practice Points
- Partnerships and LLCs should consider seeking protection from competition through forfeiture-for-competition provisions. Based on recent developments disfavoring enforcement of traditional noncompetes, and the Ainslie decision’s enforcement of a forfeiture-for-competition provision, the latter should be considered when protection against competition from former partners or members is sought.
- In drafting a forfeiture-for-competition provision:
- Do not use language suggesting that the forfeiture is a penalty. The Delaware Supreme Court expressly distinguished the forfeiture-for-competition clause from a liquidated damages or penalty clause; thus it is important to maintain that distinction in agreements going forward.
- Consider including supplementary language to clarify and emphasize that the provision is intended to provide the partner with a choice and to operate and as a condition precedent to payment of the specified financial benefit.
- The choice of law provision requires special attention—as the judicial approaches tend to be very state-specific and in many jurisdictions there has been a reluctance to enforce a choice of law provision where there is the appearance of a conflict between the law of the chosen state and the law of the forum state.
- If both a forfeiture-for-competition provision and a traditional noncompete provision are included, the interaction between them requires special attention—for example, how the choice of remedies provision (including seeking injunctive relief) applies to each must be considered.
- Potential limitations of forfeiture-for-competition provisions. As a practical matter, these provisions may not always operate to provide as much protection as a traditional noncompete provision, if enforceable, would. For example, the benefit to be forfeited may turn out to be too small to provide any real incentive not to compete (and its value likely will not be knowable until such time as the employee leaves). Even if the benefit to be forfeited is sufficient to provide a real incentive not to compete, the subsequent employer may choose to reimburse the employee for the forfeiture; and/or offer high enough remuneration that the forfeiture becomes less consequential. Also, the subsequent employment may be so attractive for other, possibly non-financial, reasons that the forfeiture is not compelling. On the other hand, however, in situations where the financial forfeiture is very significant, a forfeiture-for-competition provision may provide the most effective disincentive to competing.
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