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Chancery Decision Scrutinizes Sponsor and Financial Advisor Conflicts Arising Under the Up-C Structure—FBM

M&A/PE Briefing | June 24, 2024

In Firefighters’ Pension System v. Foundation Building Materials, Inc. (May 28, 2024), the Delaware Court of Chancery, at the pleading stage of litigation, declined to dismiss claims challenging the $1.37 billion sale of Foundation Building Materials, Inc. (the “Company”), to an unrelated third party in an arm’s-length transaction (the “Merger”), after the Company had gone public in an Up-C initial public offering (the “IPO”). In connection with the IPO, the Company’s private equity fund sponsor, which controlled the Company both before and after the IPO (the “Sponsor”), had entered into a customary tax receivable agreement with the Company (the “TRA”). Under the TRA, the Sponsor was entitled to terminate the TRA upon a change of control of the Company, and in such event to receive an early termination payment (the “ETP”), calculated as the present value of the payments that the Sponsor would have received over the full term of the TRA, under certain assumptions favorable to the Sponsor.

In a 148-page opinion, Vice Chancellor Laster found it reasonably conceivable (the standard for non-dismissal of claims at the pleading stage) that the decision to sell the Company was influenced by the Sponsor’s desire to receive the ETP. The court applied entire fairness review, as it viewed the receipt of the ETP as a non-ratable benefit to the Sponsor (i.e., a benefit not shared by all of the Company’s public stockholders). Applying that standard, the court held that the Sponsor, its representatives on the Company’s Board of Directors (the “Sponsor Directors”), and the Company’s CEO (collectively, the “Sponsor Defendants”) may have breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty to the minority stockholders. In addition, applying an enhanced scrutiny standard, the court held that the independent directors on the Board’s Special Committee (the “Special Committee Directors”) may have breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty. The court also held that the plaintiff sufficiently pled, at the motion to dismiss stage, that the financial advisors to the Board and to the Special Committee (the “Board Financial Advisor” and the “Special Committee Financial Advisor,” respectively) may have aided and abetted the fiduciary breaches.

Key Points

  • The court continues its increased focus on controllers’ and financial advisors’ potential conflicts of interest in M&A transactions—in this case, in the context of a sale of the company following its Up-C IPO. While tax receivable agreements with early payment provisions on change of control of the company have been commonly used in Up-C IPOs, de-SPAC transactions, and other sponsor-backed IPOs, the conflicts identified in this case have rarely been addressed by the court.

  • We note that the case may be distinguishable based on a number of factors. The court may have viewed the alleged conflicts in this case as especially problematic given: (i) that the Sponsor Defendants allegedly only began pursuing a sale of the Company after legislation was enacted that would reduce the stream of contractual payments the Sponsor could expect to receive under the TRA; (ii) the Sponsor Defendants allegedly were “fixated” on the Sponsor receiving the ETP; (iii) the Special Committee allegedly was formed well after the sale process was underway, never addressed the Sponsor’s potential conflict, was passive, and was deferential to the Sponsor; (iv) the value-maximizing option for the Company and the minority stockholders allegedly was remaining independent; (v) the Financial Advisors’ fees were tied in part to the Sponsor’s receiving the ETP; and (vi) the Company’s disclosure allegedly was inadequate with respect to the TRA and the Financial Advisors’ fees.

Background. In 2015, the Sponsor acquired the Company in a going-private transaction. Eighteen months later, the Sponsor took the Company public in an Up-C IPO. Post-IPO, the Sponsor owned shares representing 65.4% of the Company’s outstanding voting power, and the Board was comprised of ten members (six being principals or employees of the Sponsor, one being the Company’s CEO, and three being nominally independent). In connection with the IPO, the Sponsor and the Company entered into the TRA (which was publicly filed). On January 1, 2018, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (the “Tax Act”) became effective, reducing the federal corporate income tax rate, which reduced the value of the Company’s tax assets by 40% and thus reduced the payments that the Sponsor would receive under the TRA—allegedly, making a sale of the Company and receipt of the ETP a more attractive option for the Sponsor than continuing the Company as an independent entity and receiving lower amounts under the TRA.

In early 2018, the Board commenced a sale process, led by the Sponsor Directors. “Well after” the sale process began (and price negotiations with bidders had been underway), the Board created the Special Committee, comprised of the Company’s three independent directors, to address the issues created by the prospect of an ETP (although, at that time, none of the bidders had expressly referenced the ETP). In 2020, the Company agreed to the Merger (which represented a 24% premium to the Company’s pre-announcement closing price). The Special Committee recommended and the Board approved the Merger. The Sponsor delivered written consent for stockholder approval of the Merger. On closing of the Merger, the Sponsor received the ETP. The plaintiff-stockholder brought suit on behalf of a putative class of minority stockholders. 

Discussion 

The Up-C IPO structure. The Up-C structure is commonly used in connection with sponsor-backed IPOs. It enables investors in an entity structured as a limited liability company or partnership for tax purposes (as most private equity funds’ portfolio companies are) to go public while preserving many of the tax benefits of a traditional partnership. In addition, ultimately, the pre-IPO investors can liquidate their partnership units by selling them to the public in exchange for public shares (on a one-to-one basis), and then the TRA specifies the percentage of the resulting tax savings enjoyed by the company (because of the exchange) that is allocated to the sponsor and the percentage of the resulting tax savings that is allocated to the company (frequently, 85% and 15%, respectively). After the Up-C IPO, pre-IPO investors (if they have not elected to exit the investment entirely) remain in effective control of the business through their voting control over the public company. 

The TRA and the ETP. Under the Company’s TRA, the Sponsor was entitled to a payment equal to 90% of any benefit the Company received from using any tax asset generated while the Company had been privately held. In the event of a change of control of the Company after the IPO, the Sponsor had the right to terminate the TRA and receive the ETP. The ETP was to be calculated as the present value of all the tax benefit payments the Company would have had to make over the term of the TRA, using a discount rate and assumptions that the court viewed as favorable to the Sponsor. Before the Tax Act, the Company estimated that over the 15-year term of the TRA the Company would pay the Sponsor about $190-220 million under the TRA. In 2017, the Company estimated that the Tax Act would cut those amounts by about one-third. When the Merger closed, the Sponsor received an ETP of $74.8 million (plus a payment of $8.6 million for tax benefits used). 

The court applied the entire fairness standard of review. Entire fairness applies to a transaction when a controller’s interests diverge from those of the minority stockholders, including when a controller receives a non-ratable benefit in the transaction; or when a transaction is approved by a board not comprised of a majority of independent and disinterested directors. In this case, the court stated, “the decision to pursue and approve the Merger presents a straightforward scenario that satisfied both triggers.” The court stated that, although the Sponsor and the minority stockholders all received the same merger consideration for their shares, “[o]nly [the Sponsor] received the [ETP], meaning that [the Sponsor] received a non-ratable benefit.”

The plaintiff sufficiently pled that the Sponsor Defendants may have breached their fiduciary duties. Applying the entire fairness standard, the court found it reasonably conceivable that the Sponsor Defendants acted self-interestedly by initiating a sale process and approving the Merger so as to secure for the Sponsor the ETP as well as the consideration for its shares. The court found it reasonable to infer, based on the plaintiff’s allegations, that the Sponsor Defendants only began pursuing a sale after the Tax Act reduced the stream of contractual payments the Sponsor could expect to receive; and that the “value-maximizing” option for the Company and its minority stockholders would have been for the Company to continue to operate as an independent entity and pay lesser amounts to the Sponsor under the TRA. The court wrote: “In other words, it is reasonable to infer that faithful fiduciaries would not have sold the Company at all.”

The plaintiff sufficiently pled that the Special Committee Directors may have breached their fiduciary duties. The Committee was created to address the conflict of interest arising from the ETP; was charged with determining whether a sale was advisable; and was given the power to say “no” to a sale. The court wrote: “Despite those powers and its charge, the committee was passive. Its members repeatedly went months without convening, including during busy periods when the [Sponsor]’s representatives were negotiating the terms of a sale. The committee also took specific actions that smack of deference to the [Sponsor].” The court stated that the Special Committee “did astoundingly little, approved an inherently conflicted compensation arrangement for their financial advisor, and acted as if a sale of the company was a fait accompli.” At the same time, however, the court stated that the complaint just “barely” asserted a non-exculpated claim against these directors and acknowledged that “[e]xculpation remains a strong defense, and the special committee defendants may be entitled to judgment in their favor at a later stage.” (We note in this respect that the difference between the pleading stage standard for non-dismissal of claims—i.e., reasonable conceivability—and post-trial standards is critical.)

The plaintiff sufficiently pled that the Financial Advisors may have aided and abetted the Sponsor Defendants’ fiduciary breaches. The Financial Advisors’ contingent success fees were tied in part to the Sponsor’s receipt of the ETP. The court viewed that arrangement as aligning the Financial Advisors with the Sponsor’s interests rather than the minority stockholders’ interests. In addition, with respect to the Board Financial Advisor, the court noted its “deep” and “long-standing” relationship with the Sponsor and its affiliates—having received, from 2016 to 2018, almost $73 million in fees for services provided to them, plus another almost $6 million from the Company for services provided to it. The court wrote: “The potential sale of the Company provided [the Board Financial Advisor] with another opportunity to demonstrate its value to [the Sponsor] and audition for future engagements from a repeated M&A and capital markets player.” With respect to the Special Committee Financial Advisor, the court stressed that the advisor had been engaged for the specific purpose of advising the Special Committee relating to the conflicts arising from the ETP. The court wrote: “It is one thing to pay contingent compensation to the financial advisor charged with securing the best deal reasonably available. It is another thing to pay contingent compensation to the financial advisor who is supposed to be willing to tell the special committee that the deal should not happen. Because of that different role, a special committee’s financial advisor should not receive contingent compensation…[and] certainly should not receive contingent consideration tied to the conflict that the special committee was created to address, using a compensation arrangement that the special committee and its counsel had flagged as problematic for the financial advisor representing the company.”

The court rejected the Financial Advisors’ arguments that including the ETP amount in the calculation of their success fees was immaterial. Inclusion of the ETP generated only an additional $448,000 for the Board Financial Advisor and $313,600 for the Special Committee Financial Advisor. The court noted, however, that the draft engagement letter the Board Financial Advisor initially sent to the Company did not include the ETP in the calculation of the success fee, and the Sponsor had added it in. The court wrote: “If [the ETP’s inclusion was immaterial], then why did [the Sponsor] revise the engagement letter to include it? At this stage, it is reasonable to infer that [the Sponsor] made the change believing it would affect [the advisor]’s behavior. If [the Sponsor] simply wanted [the advisor] to receive more money, [the Sponsor] could have nudged up the percentage. At the pleading stage, those pled facts make it reasonable to infer that the change was material to both [the Sponsor] and [the advisor].” With respect to the Special Committee Financial Advisor, the court wrote, if inclusion of the ETP was immaterial, “[O]nce again, why include it?”

Further, the court found that the complaint pled “facts supporting an inference that [the Special Committee Financial Advisor] acted consistent with the incentives that its engagement letter created.” Specifically, the court stated, the advisor “did not limit itself to preparing a valuation analysis for the Special Committee, as it now claims. To the contrary, during a meeting of the Board…, [it] criticized [three particular] bids, which contributed to the Board granting exclusivity to [the buyer];…[and it] treated the Company’s obligations under the [TRA] inconsistently by factoring them in for the high-end of the ranges in its valuations, while omitting them from the low-end of the ranges…–an approach that makes little sense.” The plaintiff asserted that this approach was taken to make the buyer’s bid “look better relative to the top-end of the ranges” and to “hid[e] the fact that when the [TRA] obligations were included, [the Advisor]’s methodologies generated valuations well below the Company’s trading price, which could have called into question the reliability of [the advisor]’s work[, while,] [c]onversely, excluding the ETP from the high end would have resulted in every valuation metric exceeding the deal price.”

There was no breach of fiduciary duties in connection with the Sponsor’s exercising its right to receive the ETP. Notably, the court indicated that the TRA was a valid contractual arrangement that contained provisions designed to compensate the Sponsor for the Company’s use of tax assets created while the Sponsor was the sole owner of the Company. The court stated: “The [Sponsor] had a contractual right to receive the payment…[and] was entitled to stand on its contract right.” As the TRA pre-existed the sale of the Company, payment of the ETP “[did] not divert merger consideration; it maintain[ed] the status quo.”

The sale process was reasonable. The court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the Board conducted an unreasonable sale process by focusing on the ETP. The court found that, while “debatable decisions” were made, they did not take the sale process outside the range of reasonableness “given [the Sponsor]’s substantial economic alignment with the stockholders as a whole.” The court emphasized that alleged fiduciary breaches, if they occurred, occurred in connection with the decision to sell the Company, not the sale process.

The court found that the plaintiff sufficiently pled that the directors may have breached their disclosure duties. The court found that the plaintiff sufficiently pled that the Company’s directors may have failed to disclose material information in the Information Statement relating to the Merger, and then may have failed to give stockholders sufficient time to consider the supplemental information provided to them. The court held that the standard of materiality for disclosure purposes is the same whether or not the minority stockholders will be voting on the transaction. The court found that the plaintiff’s allegations supported a reasonable inference that the Information Statement failed to disclose: (i) “the role that the [TRA] played in the sale process and the Merger” (including a failure to provide “meaningful information about the calculation of the [ETP] or why the payment was made”); (ii) that the Financial Advisors’ fees would be calculated in part based on an amount that included the consideration the Sponsor received under the TRA (although the aggregate fees for each advisor were disclosed); (iii) the Board Financial Advisor’s “deep relationship” with the Sponsor (although its less deep relationship with the Company was disclosed); and (iv) the relationship the legal counsel the Company engaged to advise the Board had with the Sponsor (although its lesser relationship with the Company was disclosed).

Practice Points

  • Market participants should be aware of the litigation risks associated with use of the Up-C structure. While the structure provides significant benefits, and the FBM decision may be distinguishable from other cases, parties should be aware of the potential conflicts associated with, and the recent focus of the plaintiffs’ bar on, use of the structure. 

  • A financial advisor, together with its legal counsel, should seek to structure fee arrangements to minimize conflicts of interests. Where the advisor represents a special committee considering a sale of the company that would trigger an early termination payment under a tax receivable agreement, the advisor should consider not tying its fee, even in part, to the sponsor’s receipt of the ETP. Careful consideration should be given to when disclosure of the separate elements of the fees may be prudent, rather than disclosure only of the amount of the aggregate fees. Also, note that a sponsor’s adding, rather than a financial advisor’s requesting, certain compensation potentially could lead the court to infer that that compensation is material (even if it is minimal in amount).

  • In connection with a decision to sell the company following its Up-C IPO: (i) the sponsor, company directors, and advisors should consider and address the conflicts created by an early termination payment under a tax receivable agreement; (ii) the sponsor should not be “fixated” on obtaining an ETP; (iii) the sponsor and the company’s board should consider, and document, the business reasons for the sale other than the sponsor’s receiving an ETP; and (iv) the special committee should be focused on protecting the interests of the minority stockholders, should not consider a sale of the company to be a fait accompli, should be proactive in connection with the sale process and negotiation of the sale terms, and should not simply defer to the sponsor. The special committee and the board should carefully consider the benefits and disadvantages, to the corporation and its stockholders as a whole, of selling the company versus continuing it as an independent company. We expect that future decisions in similar situations likely will be evaluated on a continuum, based on the strength of the record with respect to: the financial analysis supporting the value proposition for a sale of the company as opposed to its being maintained as an independent entity; the independence and efforts of the special committee and the board; the independence of the financial advisors and the structure of their fee arrangements; and the adequacy of the disclosure to the minority stockholders.

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