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When a Minority Stockholder Has Truly “Outsized Influence,” Its Self-Interested Transaction May Be Subject to Entire Fairness Notwithstanding a Special Committee Process-- And Other Points from Controller Decisions Issued in 1Q 2018--Rouse, Tesla, Oracle, NEA

M&A/PE Briefing | April 11, 2018

In four decisions issued in March 2018, the Court of Chancery addressed controller-related issues. In one case (Rouse), the court found that a minority (33%) stockholder was not a controller; in two cases (Tesla and Oracle), the court found that a minority stockholder (22% and 28%, respectively) likely was a controller—in Oracle, notwithstanding that there was a special committee process designed to separate the stockholder from the board’s consideration of the transaction. Finally, in one case (NEA), the court reaffirmed that a controller cannot use its influence to cause the company to enter into a transaction that benefits the controller at the expense of the other stockholders (in NEA, a sale of the company to a third party buyer, allegedly at an unfairly low price in order to incentivize the buyer to acquire and invest in other portfolio companies of the VC firm-controller). In the attached Fried Frank M&A/PE Briefing, we discuss these decisions and the court’s concept of a minority stockholder with “outsized control,” summarize general principles relating to controllers, and offer related practice points.

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