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UK Merger Control: a more business-friendly approach looming

International Trade and Investment Alert™ | March 31, 2025

Authors[1]: Tobias Caspary, Neda Moussavi, Valeri Bozhikov, Paschalis Lois

In recent years, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) has earned a reputation among businesses and practitioners for its expansive—and often unpredictable—approach to asserting jurisdiction over transactions. Unlike many of its global counterparts, the CMA’s jurisdiction is not dependent on mandatory filing thresholds. While merger filings remain, at least on paper, voluntary, in practice a proactive outreach to the CMA has become increasingly standard. This is because the CMA may assert jurisdiction over transactions where, among other factors, the parties overlap in the supply or purchase of goods or services in the UK (irrespective of how small or arbitrary the overlap is), and where the acquirer obtains as little as a 15% stake in the target.

Pre-Brexit, this discretion was tempered somewhat: larger, international, deals that involved high UK revenues typically fell within the European Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction under the EU’s “one-stop-shop” regime, while the UK still reviewed deals with local effects[2]. Post-Brexit, however, the CMA has firmly established itself as a parallel regulator to the Commission in international deals, with a rather assertive enforcement record and a growing number of cases diverging from outcomes reached by other leading regulators. This trend was only expected to accelerate following the introduction of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 on 1 January 2025, which further broadened the CMA’s ability to investigate mergers—including those with limited UK nexus or no competitive overlap in UK markets[3].

Yet, in the last couple of months, the situation has appeared less grim, with a sense of cautious optimism emerging. With a renewed political focus on positioning the UK as “open for business,” the government has signalled an appetite to recalibrate the CMA’s approach. The abrupt dismissal of the CMA’s Chair in January 2025 and the appointment of Doug Gurr — a former Amazon executive — in his place, underscores a desire for more business-friendly leadership. In March 2025, the CMA announced several initiatives aimed at restoring confidence in the merger regime: a new “Mergers Charter” signalling a more pragmatic and efficient approach to reviews; a consultation on its remedies policy; and a commitment by the CMA to clarify its jurisdictional scope.

  1. CMA’s track record – a source for deal uncertainty and the path forward

Since Brexit, between 2020 to 2024, the CMA has opened formal investigations in more than 200 merger cases, and has reviewed over 3,000 transactions for potential intervention[4]. While CMA involvement as an independent regulator in some large deals was to be expected[5], its role as a parallel reviewer is not always driven by material effects on UK markets. Instead, parties often engage with the CMA out of caution—seeking to mitigate the risk of late-stage intervention that could trigger delays and disrupt deal timelines.

Volume is not the only concern. The CMA has also become more assertive in its enforcement, with a growing number of cases diverging from outcomes reached by other leading regulators, including the European Commission and U.S. agencies. This divergence—particularly in global tech and digital markets—has introduced additional risk for in-house counsel managing cross-border transactions, raising legitimate questions about regulatory alignment, predictability, and proportionality[6]. It has also resulted in the UK emerging as a pivotal regulator in global M&A, even in cases where the transaction involves no meaningful UK revenue, assets, or operations. While this may serve the CMA’s policy goal of preserving potential future competition, it has introduced significant uncertainty for dealmakers.

Whilst the UK is a voluntary, non-suspensory regime, meaning that transacting parties do not require CMA approval prior to completing their transaction, the CMA can assert jurisdiction when (i) there is a ‘relevant merger situation’, which arises i.a., when a party acquires ‘material influence’ over another, and (ii) certain jurisdictional thresholds are met, including the somewhat nebulous ‘share of supply’ test. This test requires that both parties supply or acquire the same goods or services in the UK, and post-transaction hold at least 25% of those goods and services in the UK.

Indeed, the CMA has not hesitated to make full use of the discretion afforded by its legal framework—particularly through the share of supply and material influence tests—to review, and in some cases block, mergers with limited or speculative UK nexus (e.g., limited UK market activity[7], non-controlling shareholdings[8], and pipeline or potential competition theories[9]).

All this uncertainty in a jurisdiction that prides itself on its pro-business environment, strong commercial heritage, and commitment to fostering innovation, necessitated a shift. The change started with the replacement of CMA’s Chair, the introduction of the new Mergers Charter and the launch of the consultation on CMA’s remedies policy. Most importantly, even UK Chancellor Rachel Reeves called for legislative changes making the CMA faster and more predictable. Following this, the CMA has signalled it intends to seek stakeholder input on clarifying the ambit of the ‘material influence’ and ‘share of supply’ tests (expected June 2025).

  1. The Mergers Charter

In March 2025, the CMA published their Mergers Charter introducing the CMA’s four “clear principles and overarching expectations”[10] on how it will engage with businesses during merger reviews:

  • Pace – faster pre-notification and straightforward Phase 1 reviews: the CMA will aim to conduct reviews as quickly and efficiently as possible and streamline reviews to focus on areas of concern. To this end, the CMA indicated[11] that it was looking to introduce a new ‘key performance indicator’ that will aim to complete the pre-notification phase of a merger review within 40 working days (rather than the current average of 65 working days) and straightforward Phase 1 cases to 25 working days (from the current 35 working days target).

  • Predictability – revisiting jurisdictional thresholds and better engagement with merging parties during review procedure: the CMA will look to improve the predictability of the merger control regime by clarifying the scope of its jurisdiction—specifically, the circumstances under which it considers transactions in scope for review. To that end, the CMA will launch a consultation seeking feedback on improving transparency on the (currently vague) jurisdictional thresholds (described below). Separately, the CMA will invite increased direct engagement between investors and the CMA in merger procedures (as opposed to current channelling through advisors) to streamline communication and accelerate the review process. 

  • Proportionality – more mergers will be cleared, with remedies if necessary, rather than prohibited with the CMA reducing intervention in global deals: the CMA will look to use its (broad) intervention powers proportionately to ensure that as many of the deals as possible which raise competition concerns are cleared with effective remedies, rather than prohibited. Significantly, the CMA has signalled that it would not look to intervene in multi-jurisdictional mergers where the intervention by other regulators could also address issues in the UK markets in question. This is a welcome development coming on the back of CMA divergence from other regulators in recent high-profile deals[12].

  • Process – open conduits to contact the CMA: the CMA will ensure that processes are clearly understood, engage proactively and open-mindedly during merger reviews and ensure parties are cognisant of progress of the relevant review.
  1. CMA’s consultation on the remedies process – a more pragmatic approach forward

The CMA’s consultation on the remedies process, in the spirit of the four principles outlined in the Mergers Charter, has one goal - making the remedies process more business friendly:  

  • Relaxing the ‘clear cut’ and ‘capable of ready implementation’ standards in Phase I cases to one that is more pragmatic in each case: currently, during Phase 1, the CMA needs to determine whether the merger has more than a fanciful chance of leading to a substantial lessening of competition (i.e. a low bar). If so, the CMA must undertake an in-depth review, unless, among other things, the parties offer remedies that are (i) ‘clear cut’ i.e., removing all doubts that the transaction could substantially lessen competition, and (ii) ready to be implemented, i.e., the remedy cannot be particularly complex. The implication of the proposed reform is that parties may be able to move away from rigid divestment remedies to more practical ones on a case-by-case basis. In a similar, and positive vein, the CMA is looking for feedback on whether ‘carve out’ remedies i.e., the divestment of parts of businesses, may be enough in certain cases.

  • Behavioural remedies’ increasing importance in merger reviews: to-date the CMA’s go-to remedies have been structural in nature, due to the practical difficulties in implementing, and monitoring behavioural remedies (e.g., licensing requirements, price caps). The CMA, motivated by the recent Vodafone/Three decision where the CMA used a package of different behavioural remedies comprising a long-term commitment to invest in the sector, is now looking for market feedback on whether behavioural remedies have a bigger role to play in merger proceedings.

  • More efficient remedies process by considering parallel actions of other regulators: the CMA is signalling that it may seek to align, rather than diverge, from the remedies accepted by other regulators in global transactions. Divergent remedies in international deals can severely stifle the transaction’s timeline and be hard to implement. As such, the CMA’s shift in this approach is welcomed.

  • The focus on rivalry gains and consumer benefits before imposing remedies: the CMA is also seeking feedback on whether the CMA is doing enough to recognise the potential efficiencies that transactions may create, both in terms of competition or ‘rivalry enhancing efficiencies’ (e.g., by reducing marginal costs and thus potentially increasing price competition), and in terms of consumer positive outcomes (e.g., improved quality). Globally, merger authorities tend to look at efficiencies as an ‘after thought’, without influencing an authority’s decision once it reaches that point. The reintroduction of a dialogue on efficiencies signals a more business-oriented approach on the CMA’s part.
  1. The substantive changes – revisiting the share of supply and material influence threshold

As discussed, a key source of legal uncertainty in UK merger control lies in the ambiguity of the thresholds used to establish jurisdiction. The first limb of the test—whether a ‘relevant merger situation’ has arisen—can be triggered when one party acquires ‘material influence’ over another, a concept that is deliberately open-ended. If that threshold is met, jurisdiction then depends on whether certain criteria are satisfied, one being the ‘share of supply’ test. Both limbs afford the CMA significant discretion in practice, often giving rise to unpredictability around whether a transaction may be subject to review:

  • Material influence: the test is vague and does not hinge on specific % thresholds. Rather it can be met whenever an acquirer gains the ability to ‘materially influence’ policy relevant to the behaviour of the target entity. A rule of thumb is 15% of the voting rights, but the CMA guidance makes clear that even less than this is in scope, and the threshold can also be met based on board representation, patterns of voting of other shareholders, or even financial arrangements (such as loans) where they make the target dependent on the acquirer.

  • Share of supply: confusingly, the ‘share of supply’ test does not follow a precise market definition – it is much broader than that and the CMA may apply it whenever it determines that there is a reasonable description of group of goods or services that both parties to the transaction buy or sell in the UK[13]. The wide discretional ambit of these tests creates transaction uncertainty, especially since the CMA has the power to exercise its right to review even after closing.

To mitigate jurisdictional uncertainty and reduce the risk of post-completion intervention, parties frequently opt to submit voluntary briefing papers to the CMA. This process is intended to secure informal guidance without triggering a formal investigation. However, while such submissions may offer some comfort, they come with limitations. Preparing briefing papers can be both time-consuming and costly—not only for the parties involved, but also for the CMA in terms of administrative resources. Moreover, they do not provide definitive legal certainty: the CMA expressly reserves the right to initiate a formal review at a later stage, even after a briefing paper has been considered.

CONCLUSION

The CMA’s proposed changes to the UK merger control regime, as signalled through its new Mergers Charter and upcoming consultations on jurisdictional thresholds and remedies, promise clear benefits for businesses. By clarifying vague jurisdictional tests like the 'share of supply' and 'material influence'—the CMA will reduce uncertainty, enabling parties to confidently predict and plan merger outcomes. Furthermore, the CMA’s push for greater proportionality and pragmatism in the remedies process, including an increased openness to behavioural remedies and nuanced carve-out solutions, will likely lower regulatory friction and costs.

The drive towards faster pre-notification and a streamlined Phase 1 review will also shorten timelines, reducing the disruption of lengthy assessments. Finally, the CMA’s intention to align with remedies agreed in other jurisdictions reflects a forward-thinking and coordinated approach to global mergers, ensuring that parties are not unduly burdened by conflicting international regulatory requirements.



[1]           This article was drafted with the assistance of Serena Comyns, a trainee solicitor at Fried Frank.

[2]           See, Fox/Sky (2018), Tesco/Booker (2017), and John Wood/Ame (2017)

[3]           See, “A new day for UK merger control - a practical take on the new Digital Markets, Competition and Consumer Act 2024”, 17 December 2024, available here.

[4]           Since 2020, the CMA has opened formal investigations for around 40-50 transactions, and reviewed in excess of 600-800 transactions, each year. See, for example, CMA’s Annual Report and Accounts 2023 to 2024 for the last financial year of the CMA where it reviewed more than 900 mergers, and opened formal investigations in 54, here,

[5]           See, Hitachi/Thales (2023); Sika/MBCC (2022); and Veolia/Suez (2022).

[6]           See, Cargotec Corporation/Konecranes Plc (2022) and Microsoft/Activision (2023).

[7]           See, Roche/Spark Therapeutics (2019) where the CMA asserted jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that Spark had no UK revenues; or Sabre/Farelogix (2020) where the CMA asserted jurisdiction on the basis that both parties provided software solutions used by UK airlines, even though Farelogix had no direct UK customers.

[8]           See Amazon/Deliveroo (2020) where the CMA asserted jurisdiction on the basis that Amazon’s proposed acquisition of a minority stake (c.16%) in Deliveroo conferred material influence over the company.

[9]           See Meta/Giphy (2022) in which the CMA found that, notwithstanding Giphy’s no UK revenues at the time of the deal, the parties overlapped in the supply of, inter alia, GIFs and the whole case was built on theories of harm around innovation and potential competition.

[10]          See, Mergers Charter, 12 March 2025, available here.

[11]          See, “New CMA proposals to drive growth, investment and business confidence”, 13 February 2025, available here.

[12]          See e.g. Sabre/Farelogix (2020), Meta/Giphy (2022), Cargotec/Konecranes (2022), Microsoft/Activision (2023) (eventually cleared with remedies).

[13]          See e.g. Sabre/Farelogix (2020), and Roche/Spark (2019), both cases where the CMA asserted jurisdiction where the target had no revenues in the UK.


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