U.S. DOL Releases New Proposed Definition of Investment Advice Fiduciary
Client memorandum | November 1, 2023
Authors: Jeffrey Ross, Andrea L. Pollak
The U.S. Department of Labor has released its highly anticipated proposed fiduciary rule relating to the determination of a financial service provider’s fiduciary status under ERISA when rendering investment advice. The proposed rule purports to be more narrowly tailored than the short-lived Obama-era rule (the “2017/2018 Rule”), but would still greatly expand the definition of fiduciary investment advice from the currently applicable “five-part test,” which has generally been in effect since 1975.
The White House has touted the rule as targeting “junk fees in retirement products, potentially providing billions more in savings for those saving for retirement.” Further, according to the DOL, the proposed changes are intended to “ensure that ERISA’s fiduciary standards uniformly apply to all advice that retirement investors receive concerning investment of their retirement assets in a way that ensures that retirement investors’ reasonable expectations are honored when receiving advice from financial professionals who hold themselves out as trusted advice providers,” and to more closely align an investment advice fiduciary’s compliance obligations with the best interest obligations set forth in the SEC’s Regulation Best Interest and Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers.
Please see our previous Client Memoranda, DOL Issues Fiduciary Rule and ESG Guidance, Fifth Circuit Issues Mandate Vacating the DOL Fiduciary Rule, U.S. DOL Releases Final ERISA Fiduciary Rule, ERISA Fiduciary Rule: Some Quick Action Items, U.S. DOL Re-Proposes ERISA Fiduciary Rule, and DOL Proposes Significant Expansion of ERISA “Fiduciary” Definition in the Investment Advice Context, for further background regarding the 2017/2018 Rule and, more broadly, the DOL’s views on the definition of investment advice fiduciaries between 2010 and 2020.
This Client Memorandum provides our preliminary commentary with respect to the application of the DOL’s proposal to asset managers whose offerings to benefit plan investors focus primarily on institutional ERISA clients. We note that the proposed rule presents a host of additional complications for asset managers marketing to retail investors.
Existing Definition
Under ERISA, a person becomes a fiduciary to a benefit plan to the extent that the person (1) exercises discretionary authority or control regarding the management of a plan or its assets, (2) renders investment advice for a fee or other direct or indirect compensation with respect to any moneys or other property of a plan, or has authority to do so, or (3) has any discretionary authority or responsibility with respect to the administration of a plan.
In 1975, shortly after ERISA was enacted, the DOL published a regulation interpreting the second prong of the fiduciary test (relating to when a person would be considered a fiduciary based on the rendering of “investment advice for a fee”) known as the “five-part test.” Under the 1975 regulation, a person who provides investment advice to a plan for a fee is not considered a fiduciary under this prong unless each of the following five elements is satisfied: (1) the person must render advice as to the value of securities or other property or the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or other property, (2) on a regular basis, (3) pursuant to a mutual understanding with the plan, that (4) the advice will serve as a primary basis for the plan’s investment decisions, and that (5) the advice will be individualized based on the needs of the plan.
Proposed Changes
Definition of Investment Advice Fiduciary
In most relevant part, the DOL’s present proposal would alter the five-part test such that a financial services provider would be an investment advice fiduciary under ERISA if:
- the provider makes a recommendation (for a fee or other compensation) of any securities transaction or other investment transaction or any investment strategy involving securities or other investment property to a “retirement investor” (including a plan, plan fiduciary, plan participant or beneficiary, IRA, IRA owner or beneficiary, or IRA fiduciary); and
- the provider either directly or indirectly (e.g., through or together with any affiliate) makes investment recommendations to investors on a regular basis as part of its business, and the recommendation is provided under circumstances indicating the recommendation is based on the particular needs or individual circumstances of the retirement investor and may be relied upon by the retirement investor as a basis for investment decisions that are in the retirement investor’s best interest.
In addition, there are a number of more detailed definitional changes that generally have the effect of expanding the coverage of the rule.
Changes to Prohibited Transaction Exemptions
The DOL is also proposing amendments to Prohibited Transaction Exemptions (“PTEs”) 75-1, 77-4, 80-83, 83-1, and 86-128, in each case that would remove fiduciary investment advice transactions from the transactions covered. As a result, all investment advice fiduciaries would be held to the same conduct standards in administrative PTEs because only PTEs 2020-02 and 84-24 (each of which the DOL has also proposed to amend) would be available for transactions for which the fiduciary would receive compensation that would otherwise be prohibited.
Discussion
From a textual perspective, the proposal does not completely reimagine the structure of the existing regulation as the 2017/2018 Rule would have. That said, the proposal does appear to alter the existing framework in some very meaningful ways. Most notably:
- The “regular basis” prong of the old test, which previously examined the regularity of contact between advisor and client, now simply asks whether the advisor provides investment advice on a regular basis more generally as part of its business. The new analysis essentially eliminates this prong of the old test;
- The “mutual understanding” prong has been eliminated in favor of a more amorphous “circumstances indicating” standard; and
- “A primary basis” has become “a basis,” again, essentially eliminating this prong of the old test.
These changes have the collective effect of significantly lowering the bar for what would be considered fiduciary investment advice. And, in what could be a troubling development, the new proposal does not seem to have a carveout for advice rendered to sophisticated plan fiduciaries in the “sales” context as under the 2017/2018 Rule. In fact, some language in the DOL’s Fact Sheet, suggests that the proposal in part is intended to target “advice on an illiquid real estate investment involving hundreds of millions of plan assets”--a transaction that normally would be carried out by only the most sophisticated fiduciaries.
It remains to be seen whether the DOL’s proposal will adequately address its concerns with the existing five-part test without being overly broad or burdensome to advisors. Although headlines and press releases have suggested that the proposal is largely targeted at “junk” 401(k) fees, those soundbites do not convey the full picture. If the DOL’s proposal is finalized in this form, the new fiduciary rule may be every bit as significant as the 2017/2018 Rule and, in some respects, may make it even more difficult for certain institutional asset managers to do business.
Next Steps
Public comments are due within 60 days of publication of the proposed rule. The DOL anticipates holding a public hearing approximately 45 days after publication.
This communication is for general information only. It is not intended, nor should it be relied upon, as legal advice. In some jurisdictions, this may be considered attorney advertising. Please refer to the firm’s data policy page for further information.