Supreme Court Again Takes Up Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement Actions
Client memorandum | April 24, 2026
On April 20, 2026, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in Sripetch v. SEC to resolve a circuit split regarding whether the SEC must prove investor harm to obtain disgorgement in enforcement actions. The Petitioner in Sripetch asks the Court to follow the Second Circuit’s determination that the SEC must show pecuniary harm to investors in order to obtain disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. Section 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7). The case is meaningful because disgorgement awards obtained by the SEC have consistently surpassed penalties awards, with an increase in total disgorgement money awarded each year.[1]
Key Points from Oral Argument
- The Justices seemed poised to reject the Petitioner’s position and affirm the SEC’s authority to disgorge ill-gotten gains without proving pecuniary harm.
- Some Justices appeared open to future arguments that the Seventh Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury trial when the SEC seeks disgorgement and will not return the ill-gotten gains to the affected investors.
The SEC’s Authority to Disgorge Ill-gotten Gains
In the 24 years since Congress first authorized the SEC to seek disgorgement under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Supreme Court has revisited the disgorgement issue three times. The Court’s most recent ruling on SEC disgorgement—its decision in 2020 in Liu v. SEC, 591 U.S. 71 (2020)—paved the way to the current case.[2] In Liu, the Court held that “equitable relief,” as defined in 15 U.S.C. Section 78u(d)(5), provides for an equitable remedy, not a penalty, and is therefore subject to certain limitations.[3] The Court reasoned that because Section 78u(d)(5) provides for “equitable relief,” and disgorgement is an equitable remedy, it must be consistent with equity principles and therefore limited to providing “fair compensation for the person wronged.”[4] In other words, the SEC may disgorge ill-gotten gains when the disgorgement award “does not exceed a wrongdoer’s net profits and is awarded for victims.”[5]
Shortly after the Liu decision, Congress amended Section 78u(d) by adding subsections (d)(3)(A)(ii) and (d)(7) (collectively, the “Post-Liu Amendments”), which permit the SEC to seek disgorgement for any “unjust enrichment” gained by violating the securities laws.[6] Unlike the statutory language interpreted by Liu, subsection (d)(7) does not include either “equitable relief” or “for the benefit of investors.”[7] It instead provides that “[i]n any action or proceeding brought by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may order, disgorgement.”[8] Subsection (d)(3)(A)(ii), in turn, “require[s] disgorgement under paragraph (7) of any unjust enrichment by the person who received such unjust enrichment as a result of such violation.”[9] The Post-Liu Amendments immediately applied to all pending and future enforcement actions.[10]
The Circuit Split: Whether the SEC Must Show that Investors Suffered Pecuniary Harm Before Seeking Disgorgement
A circuit split developed soon after the Post-Liu Amendments, with courts disagreeing on whether the SEC must show that victims suffered pecuniary harm before a court can order disgorgement.
On the one hand, three circuits have held that no evidence of pecuniary harm is required for the SEC to obtain disgorgement.
- In Hallam v. SEC, the Fifth Circuit determined that the Post-Liu Amendments authorize disgorgement in “a legal—not equitable—sense” and “[i]n doing so, it ratifies the pre-Liu disgorgement framework.”[11] For this reason, the Fifth Circuit believed that subsection (d)(7) permits the SEC to seek disgorgement without the traditional equitable limitations imposed by Liu.[12] The Fifth Circuit provided two reasons for its holding. First, “Section 78u’s text now twice distinguishes between disgorgement and equitable remedies,” and accordingly, “the obvious implication [from the Post-Liu Amendments] is that ‘disgorgement’ is not ‘equitable relief.’”[13] And second, Congress’s “decision substantially to amend [Section 78u] six months” after Liu is “consistent with a desire to curtail the Court’s decision” in Liu.[14]
- In SEC v. Navellier & Associates., Inc. and SEC v. Sripetch, the First and Ninth Circuits also affirmed disgorgement orders where the victims suffered no pecuniary harm, generally reasoning that disgorgement was designed to deprive wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains.[15] Notably, neither the First Circuit nor the Ninth Circuit substantively addressed the Fifth Circuit’s statutory construction of the Post-Liu Amendments in Hallam.
In contrast, the Second Circuit has held that subsection (d)(7) is intended to codify, not curtail, Liu. In SEC v. Govil,[16] the Second Circuit reasoned that subsections (d)(5) and (d)(7) “authorize[d] disgorgement that is equitable relief” and that such relief must be “awarded for victims,” which “in turn requires a finding of pecuniary harm.”[17]
Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Sripetch sought and was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court on whether the SEC may seek equitable disgorgement under Section 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing that investors suffered pecuniary harm.[18]
Summary of the Briefing
The two sides take opposing positions on whether, in seeking disgorgement, the SEC must show pecuniary harm to investors.
As the Petitioner, Sripetch, sees it, the equity principles articulated in Liu confirm that disgorgement’s core purpose is compensatory and, therefore, it requires a showing of pecuniary harm to a victim. In agreement with the Second Circuit, the Petitioner argues that Congress codified these equity principles—and, importantly, their limitations—when it amended Section 78u(d) to give the SEC specific authority to seek “disgorgement.”
The SEC, on the other hand, argues that the plain meaning of “disgorgement” and the surrounding text of Section 78u(d) demonstrate that disgorgement is not a remedy conditioned on a showing of pecuniary harm to investors. As the SEC sees it, Congress did not codify Liu’s equitable definition of disgorgement; rather, it clarified that the SEC can disgorge wrongdoers of any “unjust enrichment,” which is not necessarily a compensatory remedy. And Congress certainly did not impose a pecuniary harm requirement in the text despite having the opportunity to do so.
Key Issues
1. The Primary Purpose of Disgorgement
The first key issue before the Court is whether disgorgement’s primary purpose is to compensate victims for their losses or to strip the ill-gotten gains from wrongdoers. The Petitioner’s view is that disgorgement’s core equitable purpose is compensatory—to “restore the status quo . . . by returning property to its owners.”[19] If the SEC does not restore the status quo by returning funds to investors, disgorgement becomes an impermissible penalty. It follows that the SEC cannot seek disgorgement without showing pecuniary harm because the “return of funds presupposes pecuniary harm.”[20] The SEC, on the other hand, argues that the “essential function” of disgorgement is “to strip wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains, not to compensate victims for monetary losses.”[21] Conditioning disgorgement on a showing of pecuniary harm “would be inconsistent with disgorgement’s nature and purpose” because a wrongdoer can obtain ill-gotten gains without “inflicting monetary harm on victims.”[22]
2. Whether Disgorgement is a Legal or Equitable Remedy
The second key issue is whether disgorgement has been converted from a purely equitable remedy to a legal remedy under subsections (d)(3)(A)(ii) and (d)(7). The Petitioner argues that disgorgement is an equitable remedy with a compensatory purpose under Liu, and that “Congress’s immediate enactment both ratified Liu and cemented its traditional common-law understanding . . . without expansion, clarification, or change.”[23] The SEC, however, argues that the “Petitioner’s reliance on Liu is misplaced” because Liu “invoked specific statutory language” regarding “any equitable relief” from Section 78u(d)(5), which is not found in subsections (d)(3)(A)(ii) and (d)(7).[24] Because subsection (d)(3)(A)(ii) invokes “unjust enrichment,” Congress instead incorporated the traditional rule that “a defendant’s ‘enrichment’ may be ‘unjust’ if it results from the defendant’s violation of legal rights or duties, whether or not the violation causes pecuniary harm to others.”[25]
Takeaways from Oral Argument
Overall, the Justices appeared skeptical of the Petitioner’s position that the SEC’s failure to prove pecuniary harm would transform disgorgement from a compensatory remedy into a penalty. Justice Barrett, for example, asked why disgorgement “look[s] like a penalty” if “all you’re taking away is the ill-gotten gains?” Justice Jackson similarly wondered why disgorgement acts as punishment if the SEC is simply taking from the defendant what he unlawfully gained. On the other hand, the Justices appeared more open to the SEC’s position that disgorgement “does nothing more than prevent[] the defendant from profiting by his own wrongdoing,” and is, therefore, unlike a civil penalty, which is intended “to make the defendant worse off than he would be if he hadn’t committed the violation.” Additionally, Justice Kavanaugh appeared open to the argument made in an amicus brief by several scholars that, as a historical matter, the remedy of disgorgement in fact focused on removing the wrongdoer’s ill-gotten gains rather than resolving the victim’s harm.
Justice Sotomayor, meanwhile, laid out two grounds on which the SEC might prevail—first, that disgorgement is an equitable remedy that has never required proof of pecuniary harm, and second, that subsection (d)(7) does not require proof of pecuniary harm because it sets forth a form of disgorgement premised on an invasion of a legal right, not purely equitable principles. Justice Sotomayor pointedly stated to the Petitioner’s counsel, “[A]ssume you’re losing. Which of the two arguments would you like to lose under?” Interestingly, several Justices also questioned whether disgorgement, as used in subsections (d)(3)(A)(ii) and (d)(7), has lost its equitable nature and become a legal remedy—a view that would carry potential collateral ramifications, as noted below.
Expanding upon Justice Sotomayor’s potential second ground, some Justices appeared worried about issues that could arise if the SEC does not transfer disgorged money to victims. While minimally briefed and not determinative to the question presented, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Gorsuch wondered whether defendants would have a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial if the SEC does not return disgorged funds to victims, under SEC v. Jarkesy (which held that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial when the SEC seeks civil penalties).[26]
Justice Gorsuch, in particular, expressed concern that if the SEC does not return disgorged funds to investors, the equitable remedy would become a legal penalty, and “trigger the Seventh Amendment.” Although the SEC argued that subsections (d)(3)(A)(ii) and (d)(7) permit disgorgement without routing the disgorged funds to investors (and without a right to a jury trial), Justice Gorsuch described this argument as “pretty perilous.” In the end, however, Justice Gorsuch appeared content that the Court could answer the question presented while reserving the Seventh Amendment question for a future case.
[1] SEC Enforcement FY2025 Results Signal Shift in Priorities in Direct Critique of Prior Administration, Sidley (Apr. 9, 2026), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2026/04/sec-enforcement-fy2025-results-signal-shift-in-priorities-in-direct-critique-of-prior-administration; see also Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2025 (Apr. 7, 2026), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2026-34 (stating that the SEC obtained $10.8 billion in disgorgement for violations of securities laws and $7.2 billion in civil penalties in FY 2025).
[2] The first Supreme Court decision addressing disgorgement held that the statute of limitations for such relief is five years. See Kokesh v. SEC, 581 U.S. 455 (2017).
[3] Liu, 591 U.S. at 79, 85.
[4] Id. at 80.
[5] Id. at 74 (emphasis added).
[6] The amendments also extended the statute of limitations for disgorgement to 10 years for scienter-based violations under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 206(1) of the Advisers Act of 1940.
[7] See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(7).
[8] Id.
[9] Id. § 78u(d)(3)(A)(ii).
[10] William M. (MAC) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 6501(b), 134 Stat. 3388, 4626.
[11] 42 F.4th 316, 338 (5th Cir. 2022).
[12] See id. at 338–41.
[13] Id. at 340.
[14] Id. at 341.
[15] 108 F.4th 19 (1st Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2777 (2025); 154 F.4th 980 (9th Cir. 2025).
[16] 86 F.4th 89, 106 (2d Cir. 2023).
[17] Id. (internal citations omitted).
[18] Sripetch v. SEC, 223 L. Ed. 2d 499 (Jan. 9, 2026).
[19] Brief for the Petitioner at 12, Sripetch v. SEC, No. 25-466 (Feb. 23, 2026).
[20] Id. at 17 (quoting Govil, 86 F.4th at 103).
[21] Brief for the Respondent at 10, Sripetch v. SEC, No. 25-466 (Mar. 25, 2026).
[22] Id.
[23] Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 16, 21.
[24] Brief for the Respondent, supra note 21, at 11, 27; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(A)(ii), (d)(7).
[25] Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
[26] 603 U.S. 109, 120–21 (2024).
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