SEC Pursues Both Corporate and Officer Liability in SolarWinds Cyber Breach Case
Client memorandum | November 14, 2023
Authors: Richard A. Powers, Ilan T. Graff, Jason Edelman, Madison Chajson
On October 30, 2023, the SEC charged the Texas-based software developer SolarWinds and its Chief Information Security Officer (“CISO”), Timothy G. Brown, with defrauding investors for a series of alleged misrepresentations related to the SUNBURST cybersecurity hack, which compromised SolarWinds’ “flagship” Orion product.[1] For executives and boards of directors, the allegations underscore the importance of having systems and controls in place to identify risks to “crown jewel” assets, and ensure that any public statements accurately reflect changes to security assessments.[2] For executives involved in developing or delivering such statements, the charges also reflect the SEC’s continuing emphasis on individual accountability for misconduct in corporate settings.[3]
I. SolarWinds’ Alleged Misrepresentations
As alleged, SolarWinds, a technology company that provides software to help manage information technology infrastructure, made a number of public statements about its cybersecurity practices that were sharply at odds with the assessments reflected in its internal communications. Public statements, including a “Security Statement” on the company’s website and S-1 and S-8 registration statements, repeatedly assured the public that SolarWinds adhered to sound cybersecurity policies. However, internal company documents cited in the complaint show lower level employees repeatedly raising concerns about SolarWinds falling well short of industry cybersecurity standards and expressing skepticism about representations made to the public and customers by more senior leadership. Specifically, SolarWinds internal records reported that it: 1) achieved less than half of the NIST cybersecurity framework standards than it publicly suggested it had achieved; 2) misrepresented itself as adhering to the Secure Development Life Cycle industry standard methodology for developing software used in its key products; and 3) falsely purported to maintain appropriate password protections and access control.[4] The SEC alleged that these misrepresentations not only constituted individual failures to disclose, but also cumulatively created a false public impression of the efficacy of SolarWinds’ cybersecurity infrastructure. The complaint also accuses SolarWinds of failing to fully and accurately disclose the impact of the SUNBURST cybersecurity hack in its December 2020 Form 8-K filing.[5]
II. CISO Charged
Brown’s central involvement in the state of SolarWinds cybersecurity and the company’s representations made him an SEC target. Brown was responsible for SolarWinds’ “ongoing security efforts, as well as security architecture within its products.”[6] Brown, per the SEC, was instrumental in crafting key representations that the company made about its cybersecurity, including the Security Statement from the company website, blog posts, podcasts, and press releases.[7] Before SUNBURST, Brown signed sub-certifications on which other executives relied regarding the state of SolarWinds cybersecurity when they made disclosures for their second initial public offering in 2018. As alleged, when he signed those sub-certificates, Brown knew or should have known about serious risks to the software that he did not disclose.[8] After the hack, Brown and other executives co-authored the 8-K disclosing the incident, but it was Brown who was responsible for confirming its “technical/factual accuracy.”[9] While Brown touted the security of the company’s products, during the hack he was aware of major security issues in the products, and neither he nor the company raised any red flags.[10] Despite his awareness of potential undisclosed risks during the hack, Brown made no efforts to properly correct the issues.
III. False Statements to Customers
The complaint highlighted a number of instances when SolarWinds employees, aware of the SUNBURST breach, lied to customers, including a federal agency customer, about their knowledge of the attack. The SEC also accused SolarWinds of lying to the same customers about the quality of its cybersecurity infrastructure to induce them to purchase additional products. The misrepresentations to customers, especially federal agencies, undoubtedly heightened the SEC’s concerns about SolarWinds’ actions.
IV. Internal Control Failures
In addition to misrepresentations about its cybersecurity infrastructure and the SUNBURST attack, the SEC also charged SolarWinds with failing to maintain the controls required to safeguard access to critical assets. As discussed above, the complaint alleged a number of misrepresentations made by SolarWinds about its security infrastructure, which allegations also evidence a failure to protect the “crown jewel” product responsible for 45% of SolarWinds’ 2020 revenue.[11] The SEC also alleged that SolarWinds’ internal reporting protocol for cybersecurity incidents did not ensure that key information would make its way to the necessary senior personnel, which resulted in “deficient disclosure controls.”[12]
V. Takeaways
Companies, especially those for whom cybersecurity is a core business function, should ensure that they protect access to “crown jewel” assets and establish clear reporting pathways for employees to elevate any concerns about weaknesses and vulnerabilities to senior leadership. The SEC will continue to prioritize individual accountability, so anyone involved in crafting or making public statements about material risks should focus on accuracy, both as it relates to particular incidents as well as the broader posture. Finally, this case is a reminder for companies to assess their compliance polices to ensure that clear reporting pathways for cybersecurity risks and public disclosures are in place and have clear support from senior leadership to promote a culture of accuracy and accountability.
[1] Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges SolarWinds and Chief Information Security Officer with Fraud, Internal Control Failures (Oct. 30, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-227.
[2] Chris Prentice, Jonathan Stempel & Raphael Satter, US SEC Sues SolarWinds for Concealing Cyber Risks Before Massive Hacking, Reuters (Oct. 30, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/legal/us-sues-solarwinds-court-records-2023-10-30/; see also Complaint at 2, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. SolarWinds & Brown, Civil Action No. 23-cv-9518 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2023).
[3] Speech, Gary Gensler, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Partners of Honest Business and Prosecutors of Dishonesty: Remarks Before the 2023 Securities Enforcement Forum (Oct. 25, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/gensler-remarks-securities-enforcement-forum-102523.
[4] Complaint, supra note 2, at 47-101.
[5] Id. at 185-191.
[6] Id. at 20.
[7] Id. at 39 and113.
[8] Id. at 175.
[9] Id. at 190.
[10] Id. at 155-159.
[11] Id. at 2.
[12] Id. at F(1)(b)(2) and 201-202.
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