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Client memorandum | February 13, 2024

Author: Nihal Patel

On February 6, 2024, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted final rules to “further define” the terms “dealer” and “government securities dealer” used in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).[1] The new rules are designed to address an SEC concern that certain firms, particularly “principal trading firms” (or “PTFs”) organized as funds or proprietary traders, are acting as “de facto market makers” without registering with the SEC as a “dealer” and being subject to the various obligations that entails (discussed further below).[2] The good news for market participants is the rules are significantly less expansive than the proposal. The bad news is they still leave a great deal of uncertainty and classify as “dealing” a variety of activities previously thought by many market participants to be non-dealing “trading” activities.

The Rules in a Nutshell

The new rules, which are intended to be supplemental to existing SEC interpretations of what constitutes “dealer” activity,[3] require registration for firms that engage in a “regular pattern of buying and selling securities that has the effect of providing liquidity to other market participants” by: (1) regularly expressing trading interest at or near the best available prices on both sides of the market for a security and that is communicated to other market participants or (2) earning revenue primarily from capturing bid-ask spreads or trading incentives offered by trading venues to liquidity providers. The rule excepts from its scope (i) persons that own or control total assets of less than $50 million, (ii) registered investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (e.g., mutual funds) and (iii) central banks, sovereign entities, or international financial institutions. (A full text comparison of the adopted rules against the proposed rules is included as an attachment to this memorandum.)

The adopted rules remove several controversial aspects of the 2022 proposal.

  • First, the SEC removed a prong that would have captured firms “routinely making roughly comparable purchases and sales of the same or substantially similar securities in a day” and conceded that the proposed factor would have captured more than the dealing activity it intended to address.[4]
  • Second, the SEC removed aspects of the rule that would have required aggregating positions across multiple legal entities. The provision, however, was replaced by new anti-evasion provisions that prohibit: (1) evading registration by engaging in activities that indirectly would meet the relevant factors or (2) evading registration by disaggregating accounts.
  • Third, the SEC did not adopt a proposal that would have captured, for government securities only, firms that transact over $25 billion in government securities over a specified measuring period.

Each of these three aspects of the proposal inspired significant pushback by commenters, including that the first prong did not include having an intent to engage in the business of providing liquidity to others, that the second prong would have involved complicated and potentially unworkable questions of aggregation and that the SEC does not have the statutory authority to adopt the volume threshold in the third prong.[5]

Discussion of the Rules

Effect of Providing Liquidity. A key aspect of the new rules is that they capture persons who act as liquidity providers, whether or not that is the primary intended aim of the person’s business. A person can be a “dealer” under the new rules by engaging in activity that has the effect of providing liquidity to the market, even if the person has the primary aim of making a profit on pricing discrepancies in markets. This determination remains (as the SEC repeatedly acknowledges) a facts-and-circumstances assessment under the new rules. The analysis has become increasingly difficult over the years, as the ease of communication methods and new marketplaces have blurred the lines between the classic “middle man” liquidity-providing dealer and persons engaging in large volumes of transactions for their own trading desires. On the one hand, a person might look at a trading market and say “I can make money by providing a service to others by buying and selling around the market price and collecting a spread or fee for my efforts.” Another person might say “There are people who want to sell securities for less than I can sell to someone else and people who want to buy securities for more than I can buy from someone else. I can make some money by buying from the first group of people and selling to the second.” The SEC is effectively saying, so long as there is sufficient regularity to the second person’s activity, that person should be regulated in the same manner as the first person. The fact that intent—essentially, whether the person is seeking to facilitate the trading activities of others—is not relevant to the analysis was further emphasized by the SEC in its argument that the absence of “customers” should not be viewed as a necessary factor for whether a person is a “dealer.”[6]

Regularity. The SEC states that the new rules are intended to preserve longstanding interpretations that persons whose “liquidity provision is only incidental to their trading activities” are not “dealers.” However, it is difficult to square that statement with fact that the new rules (in a departure from existing interpretations) specifically capture persons who transact with the effect of providing liquidity,[7] regardless of whether it is their primary trading objective or only incidental to it. Instead, the SEC focuses significantly on the amount of activity as determinative under the new rules. The rules use “regularly” as the standard (rather than proposed “routinely”), and the SEC said that it is meant to distinguish “isolated or sporadic expressions of interest” but is something less than “continuous.”[8] Determining what is “regular” will also involve looking at the relevant security being traded. The SEC discussion around this point distinguishes certain “one-off” activity, but leaves a fairly broad unknown area between that and “regular.”

Trading Interest. The SEC declined to revise the phrase “trading interest” (as used in the first prong of the new rules) to a clearer test (such as “firm two-sided quotations expressed on a continuous or near continuous basis”), and said that the term was intended to capture other methods of “effectively mak[ing] markets,” such as streaming quotes, RFQs or order books.[9] Persons seeking price information, however, are not intended to be captured and the SEC specifically stated that advisers acting as a fiduciary for clients would not be picked up by this prong unless acting for the account of the advisor itself (or the advisor’s benefit).[10] The SEC emphasized here again that the test is intended to be broader than the traditional “holding oneself out to customers” and that a person can be found to be regularly expressing trading interest even if the person doesn’t make itself publicly known as a liquidity provider.[11]

Hedge Funds. A number of news reports have highlighted the idea that “hedge funds” will be required to register as “dealers” under the proposal.[12] This is a misguided or at least incomplete way of looking at the new rules. It is true that the SEC specifically rejected requests to exclude private funds and advisors from the scope of the rules,[13] however that does not necessarily suggest that large groups of hedge funds will be required to register. First, the rules are activity based and not (subject to the very limited exceptions) based on the type of entity that transacts.[14] A firm trading proprietary money or even an individual could be captured by the rules. Second, we believe that most hedge funds taking directional positions should not be impacted (regardless of volume or leverage); however, given the facts-and-circumstances nature of the new rules, market participants (including hedge funds) will need to carefully determine, with limited guidance to go on, whether their activities are captured under the new rules.[15]

Crypto Assets. There were numerous submitted questions on the proposal as to the impact on crypto or digital assets. In responding, the SEC essentially repeated the aphorism that a “security” is a “security” and declined to make any specific accommodations or exceptions in applying the rule to persons transacting in crypto assets that are otherwise “securities” for purposes of the Exchange Act.[16]

Dissents and Challenge Risk

The rules were adopted by a 3-2 vote, with Commissioners Hester M. Peirce and Mark T. Uyeda dissenting.[17] Each provided lengthy and reasoned dissents. Ms. Peirce said the rule “defines dealer in a way that is inconsistent with the statutory framework within which it sits and will distort market behavior and degrade market quality.” She argues that the rules “obliterate” the dealer/trader distinction, notwithstanding the SEC arguments that the rules are consistent with longstanding interpretations. Ms. Peirce’s dissent also contains a series of questions to the SEC Office of General Counsel and Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, strongly suggesting that the adopted rules fail to consider a number of material issues and that the economic analysis is incomplete. Mr. Uyeda echoed a number of the comments from Ms. Peirce and called the rules “problematic” and lacking in “any limiting principle,” thereby creating a potential for “arbitrary and capricious government action.” He also said that the SEC’s analysis of the application of the rules to private funds “makes the final rules arbitrary and capricious.”

Each of the dissents clearly suggests routes to a challenge of the rules in court. In particular, the dissenters argue that the SEC economic analysis is flawed and incomplete and Mr. Uyeda twice uses the administrative law magic words “arbitrary and capricious” to describe the rules.[18] It would not be surprising to see a court challenge of the new rules, particularly given that a number of SEC rulemakings and other actions have been (successfully) challenged in recent years.[19]

Next Steps

The SEC provided a one-year compliance date from the effective date of the final rules (itself being 60 days after the rules are published in the Federal Register). Essentially, this means that firms required to register as a result of the new rules will need to do so by roughly May of 2025. The SEC cautioned that the compliance period is solely for market participants affected by the final rules and does not apply to firms that engage in “dealing” otherwise. As discussed above, it is difficult to square this logic with the SEC view that the rules are consistent with past interpretations on the dealer/trader distinction.[20] However, the likely intent of the compliance period is that activity that is “dealing” under the new rules (but not under existing rules and interpretations of what is “dealing”) has a one-year compliance period, while there is no compliance period for any other “dealing” activity.

One year is not a long time for the changes that may be required for businesses to register. Firms that are concerned as to whether their activities are captured by the new rules should immediately begin assessing those activities. Given that whether the rules apply depends on the particular facts and circumstances, firms will need to carefully determine what activities (and what level of those activities) rise to the new standard for when registration is required. Further, in contrast to, e.g., swap and security-based swap dealing, there is no de minimis or “ramp up” or similar state after one commences engaging in activity that is “dealing.” Once a person’s activities are captured by the new rules,registration is immediately required.[21] In effect, (subject to the one-year compliance period) persons contemplating engaging in business covered by the rules should be prepared to submit a registration application and comply with relevant “dealer” rules well in advance of engaging in that business.

Dealer registration imposes a highly burdensome set of requirements. A dealer is subject to the full scope of the SEC broker-dealer regulatory regime and will also be required to register with FINRA and be subject to its rules. These include extensive compliance programs, conduct requirements, registration of personnel and more. Perhaps most notably, registrants would become subject to capital regulation under SEC Rule 15c3-1. Broker-dealer capital regulation significantly limits the risk that a regulated firm can undertake and will severely limit (or make impossible) a wide variety of strategies engaged in by hedge funds, PTFs and other market participants, particularly those that take directional and/or leveraged positions in less liquid assets. Firms that engage in strategies that are captured by the new rule will need to analyze the feasibility of registration and how to restructure their business in a regulated environment - e.g., the ability to move activities outside of the United States or to move non-“dealing” lines of business into separate vehicles so as to avoid having those activities subject to dealer requirements.[22]



[1]      The rules were adopted by a 3-2 vote; the dissents are covered in further detail below.

[2]      See Adopting Release at 14.

[3]      See Adopting Release at 9 (highlighting existing factors relevant for determining “dealer” activity). Though phrased as “supplemental,” the new rules in effect amend past interpretations of the term “dealer.”

[4]      Adopting Release at 30.

[5]      A full list of the comments on the proposal is available here. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP commented on the proposal on behalf of certain registered investment advisers to private funds.

[6]      Adopting Release at 23.

[7]      Adopting Release at 25. See also Commissioner Peirce dissent (suggesting the rules “obliterate” the dealer/trader distinction).

[8]      Adopting Release at 35-36.

[9]      In the Adopting Release (though not the rule itself), the SEC defines “trading interest” as “(i) an ‘order’ as the term is defined under [Exchange Act Rule 3b-16(c)] or (ii) any non-firm indication of a willingness to buy or sell a security that identifies the security and at least one of the following: quantity, direction (buy or sell), or price.” Adopting Release at 41.

[10]     Adopting Release at 42. The statement came in response to concerns, raised by SIFMA AMG, that advisers’ fiduciary duties may require them to submit “trading interest” throughout the day. Though not clear from the discussion, it is likely that the SEC intended its response to speak to persons who gauge prices as a means for satisfying best execution duties to clients rather than situations where the client itself (including a fund, where relevant) transacts in the manner captured by the rules (e.g., with the frequency contemplated in the second prong).

[11]     The SEC also made clear that making the interest available to market participants does not mean making it available to all market participants, but was intended to be more than one participant. Adopting Release at 49.

[12]     See, e.g., Bloomberg, Hedge Funds Trading Treasuries to Be Tagged Dealers by SEC (Feb. 6, 2024).

[13]     See Adopting Release at 64-72. See also Commissioner Peirce dissent (calling the decision not to scope out private funds “puzzling”) and Commissioner Uyeda dissent (calling the lack of more detailed analysis of private fund regulation “arbitrary and capricious”).

[14]     The SEC specifically rejected requests to exclude from the scope of the new rules investment advisers and private funds and said that existing regulatory requirements applicable to those entities were not sufficient for the risks of dealer activity. Adopting Release at 22-24.

[15]     Note, for example, that the release cites numerous commenters raising questions about “arbitrage” strategies under the new rules, but the SEC statements responding to these comments do not directly engage with whether and when such strategies would be permissible under the new rules.

[16]     Adopting Release at 22-23, 43-44, 76-81.

[17]     The supporting statements of Chairman Gary Gensler, Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw and Jaime Lizárraga are available here.

[18]     See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (standards for court review of agency actions under the Administrative Procedure Act).

[19]     See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A. v. SEC (5th Cir. No. 23-60255) (Oct. 31, 2023); Grayscale Investments, LLC v. SEC (D.C. Cir. No. 22-1142) (Aug. 29, 2023); CBOE Futures Exchange, LLC v. SEC (D.C. Cir. No. 21-1038) (July 28, 2023); Jarkesy v. SEC (5th Cir. No. 20-61007) (May 18, 2022) (cert granted No. 22-859); Nat’l Assn. of Private Fund Managers v SEC (5th Cir. 23-604710 (pending challenge).

[20]     See also SEC, Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration at Section 2(2), Who is a “Dealer” (highlighting factors relevant to distinguishing “dealers” from “traders”).

[21]     There is an inherent tension in the immediate registration requirement and the use of “regularly” in the new rules. As noted above, the SEC guidance on the meaning of “regularly” is limited and based on facts and circumstances, but there could be circumstances in which a person engages in isolated or limited non-regular activities that later develop into “regular” activities subject to the rule. Once the relevant activities become “regular,” registration is immediately required.

[22]     A multi-strategy firm that engages in trading activity covered by the rule as well as other non-“dealing” activities would generally benefit from conducting those other activities outside of a capital-regulated business and not subject to the plethora of other compliance requirements applicable to broker-dealers.


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