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Russia Ukraine War Anniversary Prompts Strongest EU Sanctions To Date

International Trade and Investment Alert™ | March 9, 2023

Authors: Dr. Tobias Caspary and Romain Girard

Introduction

On February 25, 2023, the EU issued its tenth sanctions package against Russia. The tenth package follows on the anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2023. These new measures are the strongest to date by the EU, and showcase an increasing willingness to punish third countries assisting Russia’s war effort. In particular, the EU made use of powers (recently obtained in the eighth package[1]) to impose sanctions on entities and transactions outside Russia, where they facilitate circumvention of the EU rules.

The EU’s tenth package comprises three new measures and the extension of existing trades bans:

  1. New and unprecedented prohibition on any Russian national sitting on the boards of critical infrastructure owners/operators.
  2. New and unprecedented reporting obligation both introducing a new deadline for reporting and also extending the reporting obligation to activities that took place before a listing was in effect.
  3. Unprecedented addition of third-country nationals and entities to transaction ban list and asset freeze list.
  4. Extension of goods export/import restrictions – covering approx. EUR 11.4 billion of trade (or about 10% of EU/Russia exports, based on FY21 figures) —as well as further restriction on media outlets, and restrictions on the oil and gas industry.
Timeline of Russian Sanctions

The tenth package follows the previous eighth (October 2022) and ninth (December 2022) packages. However, whereas these two prior packages were aimed at extending the scope of sanctions (by introducing further bans on services), the tenth package focuses more on circumvention issues, indicating that the Commission is keen to close down loopholes and increase potential for enforcement.

A.  Restricting Russian board participation in key infrastructure companies

The tenth package prohibits any Russian national or any Russian resident to hold any posts in the governing bodies of three types of entities: (i) critical entities, (ii) EU critical infrastructure (ECI), and (iii) critical infrastructure.[2]

These entities are specifically defined by reference to the existing EU frameworks[3] on critical entities. These regimes work by providing criteria under which member states can designate certain critical infrastructure providers as critical entities or ECIs[4] provided that they are designated under national law.[5] The member state then must notify these entities of their designation.[6]

There is, however, greater uncertainty around the third category: critical infrastructure.[7] Unlike critical entities/ECIs, “critical infrastructure” is not a specific list of known/designated entities, and the wording of Article 5o does not provide further guidance on how companies should determine whether they fall in scope. One potential category of such entities will be “critical entities” or “ECI” that met the test for critical infrastructure but did not have the cross-border impact required to be designated as ECIs. However, this may still leave an area of uncertainty for certain entities operating in sectors typically targeted by these regimes such as utilities, energy, and transport.

Therefore, the consequence may be that, to favor compliance, Russian nationals on any large company board may now face strong scrutiny.

B.  New reporting obligation

The tenth package introduces an unprecedented reporting obligation[8], which now requires all persons under EU jurisdictions (“EU Operators”)[9] to:

  • report information about assets within the EU which have been subject to any move, transfer, alteration, use of, access to, or dealing in the two weeks preceding the listing of that sanctioned person; and
  • make such reports (as well as any other reports under Article 8) to the national authorities in the EU member state within two weeks of acquiring the information.

Both the inclusion of a deadline and a retroactive look-back period for the reports will present practical challenges for EU Operators. For example, one concern is neither the law nor the existing guidance actually explains who is the addressee of the reporting obligation; i.e. what is the required extent of information obtained for the reporting obligation to trigger? Some national regimes[10] caveat the obligation by a requirement that the information be obtained “in the course of business,” but the EU has no such caveat. One potential reading of the reporting obligation is that it is limited to those EU Operators who have access to the information which is required to be provided, namely: (i) information identifying the sanctioned person, including their name, address, and VAT registration or tax identification number; (ii) the amount or market value of such assets; and (iii) information on the type of assets, their quantity, location, and other relevant features. Further EU guidance will be required to clarify this point.

C.  The unprecedented addition of third-country nationals and entities to transaction ban list and asset freeze list

The tenth package designated, for the first time, third-country individuals, not directly involved in the conflict. Typically, asset freezes are imposed following specific designation criteria that target actors directly involved in a conflict—such as politicians, government/military officials—as well as their associates (e.g. subsidiaries or family members).[11] As previously noted,[12] the EU extended this reach to include (i) businesspersons and (ii) “any person facilitating infringements of the prohibition against circumvention of the provisions of the [EU’s Russia sanctions].”

Now, the EU uses these extended powers to designate, for the first time, four Iranian individuals involved in the “elaboration and supply” of drones and their components used by Russia has been designated as subject to asset freezes.[13] Similarly, an entity registered in the United Arab Emirates (SUN Ship Management (D) Ltd.) was designated, marking the first time that an entity registered in the United Arab Emirates has been designated under the EU’s Russia/Ukraine programmes.[14]

The new package also designated an additional 86 individuals and 33 entities, including Russian banks such as Alfa-Bank JSC, Rosbank and Tinkoff Bank, to the EU’s asset freeze measures, which now apply to a total of 1,473 individuals and 205 entities.

D.  Extending the goods export and import restrictions

Additional goods export and import restrictions were introduced by the tenth package. By the Commission’s estimations, this captures approximately EUR 11 billion of trade.[15] The latest bans and restrictions come on top of the EUR 32.5 billion worth of exports that the EU has previously sanctioned. The export bans from the EU’s tenth sanctions packages account for almost half (49%) of its exports to Russia in 2021.

Additional export bans

The restrictions target both (i) more goods subject to a licensing requirement (e.g. sensitive advanced technologies that could strengthen Russia’s military efforts in Ukraine) and (ii) more entities to whom it is prohibited to provide such goods (i.e. a licence cannot be granted):

  • Ninety-six additional entities associated with Russia’s military to a list of companies to who it is prohibited to trade in sensitive components—including, for the first time, seven Iranian entities (Paravar ParsCompany, Qods Aviation Industries and Shahed Aviation Industries) that have been using EU components and providing Russia with military drones to attack civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. These additions demonstrate the EU’s intention to broaden the scope of its designations in order to restrict Russia.
  • Existing export bans were extended to curtail Russia’s “alternative engineering solutions”—such as using consumer appliance parts to equip its vehicles[16]. The list of goods[17] now also includes items such as: snowmobiles, golf cars, and other specialist vehicles; binoculars, compasses, and spectrometers; and pumps, welding machines, machine parts, and machinery for use in an industrial capacity.

Additional import bans

The new import bans consist of further high-revenue Russian goods: (i) bitumen and related materials such as asphalt; and (ii) synthetic rubber and carbon blacks.[18]

Discussions on the approach to import bans on synthetic rubber delayed the agreement between member states.[19] While Poland argued that the quotas were too high, the Commission ultimately sided with Italy and retained the proposed quota of 560,000 metric tons; thus, allowing European car tire producers to find alternative suppliers. However, the European Commission has stated it would set up a monitoring mechanism to report the inflow of rubber products from Russia on a monthly basis.[20] If this reporting finds irregularities, then the Commission will set up further restrictive measures.

Finally, the latest package (i) extends the import ban on iron and steel products to capture export or iron and steel and (ii) strengthens the existing restriction on oil and gas (by banning transhipment and storage). Rationale behind the introduction of the export ban is due to the Commission’s desire to curtail use of EU goods to enhance Russia’s industrial capacities.[21]

Conclusion

The anniversary of the war is a significant geopolitical event. It is, therefore, appropriate that the tenth package is one of the most intensive and comprehensive packages of EU sanctions to date. Aside from capturing new goods, the EU is focused on compliance and enforcement. Its new rules on reporting will prove particularly burdensome for financial institutions that have not yet fully exited Russian markets. Additionally, the new reporting obligations will raise practical questions for EU Operators on: (i) how they can track and diligence the retroactive/look-back assessment for frozen assets, and (ii) the extent of the information required to trigger a reporting obligation. Similarly, the new prohibition on having Russian nationals on the boards of certain European entities will passively result in additional compliance costs for EU operators.

Although the tenth sanction package has not targeted any further bans on services, this is not excluded for the future. In fact, Ukraine’s President has already called on western allies to prepare for the next round of sanctions[22] and, specifically, to target more of the Russian economy. The tenth sanctions package enhances the EU’s efforts to restrict Russia’s military efforts and impose consequences on third-country actors. However, proposals such as sanctioning certain employees of the state nuclear company Rosatom, banning Russian diamond imports, or banning Russian nuclear energy were omitted from the package and will most probably be the focus of discussions surrounding the eleventh sanctions package. According to the latest statistics published in March 2023, EU trade with Russia in 2022 was down by more than 50% compared to 2021;[23] however, this means there is still room for further trade prohibitions.



[1] See our alert on this here.

[2] See new article 5o of Regulation 833/2014, as introduced by Regulation 2023/427.

[3] Directive 2008/114/EC, which is in effect until October 2024, and then Directive 2022/2557 which will replace it.

[4] These are intended to be equivalent terms: “critical entity” is the term under the current regime, and will be replaced by “ECI”.

[5] Article 5o Regulation 833/2014, as introduced by Article 1(12) Regulation 2023/427.

[6] See Article 4 of Directive 2008/114/EC; and Directive 2022/2557.

[7] Defined as “an asset, system or part thereof located in Member States which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions”. The definition will shift to “an asset, a facility, equipment, a network or a system, or a part of an asset, a facility, equipment, a network or a system, which is necessary for the provision of an essential service” under the new regime in 2024.

[8] See Article 8 Regulation 269/2014, as introduced by Article 1(5) Regulation 2023/426.

[9] This includes EU nationals, EU residents, EU entities, and non-EU entities conducting business in the EU.

[10] See, for example, the UK regime.

[11] In that sense, it is not unprecedented to see third-country nationals or entities being listed, where they are affiliated (either through corporate links, or family ties) to a person who is directly involved in the conflict and themselves listed. See for example the case of Swiss and UK entities being listed under the EU’s Iraq sanctions.

[12] See here.

[13] Council of Europe press release, February 25, 2023, available here.

[14] Although rare, designation of third-country nationals and entities is not unprecedented itself. However, such listings typically involves subsidiaries or family members of individuals or entities that are directly involved (and often also subject to sanctions themselves).

[15] This is estimated to account for approximately 10% of EU-Russia exports, based on FY21 figures from the European Commission.

[16] See report by Washington Post, dated May 11, 2022.

[17] See new Part C of Annex XXIII to Regulation 833/2014, as introduced by Annex VI to Regulation 2023/427.

[18] See new Part C of Annex XXI to Regulation 833/2014, as introduced by Annex VI to Regulation 2023/427.

[19] See report by Politico, dated February 25, 2023.

[20] See report by Politico, dated February 25, 2023.

[21] See Recital 7, Regulation 2023/427.

[22] See report by National World, dated February 26, 2023.

[23] See report by Eurostat, dated March 03, 2023.


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