M&A/PE Quarterly - Q3 2026
M&A/PE Quarterly | October 8, 2026
- Implied Covenant Requires Buyer Deliver Information Needed to Effectuate Seller-Protective Earnout Mechanism—Winton
- Buyer Had No Right to Terminate Merger Agreement Rather than Respond to HSR Second Request—Verisk
- Buyer’s Equivocation on MFW Renders It Unavailable; CFO Faces Liability for Directing Financial Advisor to Use Revised Projections—Via Renewables
Other Decisions and Developments of Note
- Interpreting New Section 144 Safe Harbor for the First Time, Chancery Lets Fiduciary Claims Survive Against Conflicted Directors, But Stresses the “Extreme Facts”—Dodiya
- Board Cannot Reject Activist’s Director Nominations Under Advance Notice Bylaws for Failure to Disclose Information Not Expressly Required by the Bylaws—Empery
- Buyers Had to Pay Holdback Amount Tied to “Unfavorable” Litigation Ruling, Whether Sellers Were Damaged or Not—Kentucky Downs
- Delaware Law Permits LLC Members to Waive Statutory Inspection Rights—Bengson v. Elevate
- In Upholding MLP Conflicts Committee’s Approval of GP-Affiliated Sponsor’s Take-Private, Chancery Stressed Committee’s Good Process—Thomas v. Am. Midstream
- Chancery Emphasizes Expert Resolving Working Capital Disputes Must Follow Specific Terms of the Parties’ Agreement—Viasat
- Consents Removing Director, Obtained After Declaring Removal was Effective, Were Valid—Freiberg v. Xonar Tech
- Delaware’s Officer-Consent Statute Did Not Cover a “Chief Strategy Officer”—Altigen
- Third Party’s Stock Purchase of an Indirect Parent Company Did Not Constitute a “Change of Control” as Defined in the Asset Purchase Agreement—Castle Tire
- Fried Frank M&A/PE Briefings Issued This Quarter
- Selected Other Fried Frank Briefings Issued This Quarter
Implied Covenant Requires Buyer Deliver Information Needed to Effectuate Seller-Protective Earnout Mechanism—Winton
In Winton v. The North Highland Company LLC (Sept. 18, 2026), the Court of Chancery ruled that, under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, North Highland Company LLC (the “Buyer”), which acquired The Bridge Strategy & Technology Consulting, LLC (“The Bridge” or the “Company”) from the Company’s equity holders (the “Sellers”), has to provide the Plaintiff (who is the “Seller Representative”) with information he needs to make “operational” a post-closing earnout mechanism in the parties’ agreement (the “Agreement”).
The Agreement provides for an earnout tied to gross profits, including from “Qualifying Projects.” “Qualifying Projects” is defined, in part, based on the revenues from the project being primarily related to specified services. The Agreement requires that, during the earnout period, before the Buyer contacts any Company client to propose a project, the Buyer and the Seller Representative have to “mutually agree” whether the project constitutes a “Qualifying Project.” The Seller Representative claimed that the Buyer does not, before contacting Company clients, provide him with the information he needs to determine whether a project is a Qualifying Project. The Buyer claimed that the only information rights the Seller Representative has are the rights set forth in the Agreement with respect to the earnout statement the Buyer must provide at the end of the earnout period. The court agreed with the Seller Representative and ordered that specified information by provided by the Buyer to the Seller Representative on a specified schedule.
Key Points
- The implied covenant may be invoked to impose obligations needed to effectuate seller-protective earnout provisions. The court held that, although the Agreement did not expressly provide the Seller Representative any information rights in connection with the project classification process, the implied covenant would fill that contractual gap, to avoid “the contractual process [being] thwarted.”
- A mutual agreement requirement does not necessarily constitute a veto right. The Buyer argued that, based on the mutual agreement clause, a project will constitute a Qualifying Project only if the Buyer and the Seller Representative mutually agreed that it does, and therefore the Buyer does not have to notify the Seller Representative of proposed projects that the Buyer considers not to be Qualifying Projects. The court disagreed, holding that the mutual agreement clause does not provide “a substantive veto” right for the Buyer, but, to the contrary, provides the Sellers with a “verification exercise” to protect against the Buyer unilaterally determining which projects constitute Qualifying Projects.
- The decision highlights the potential that a buyer’s right to run the business post-closing and the seller’s earnout-related rights may conflict. The Agreement granted the Buyer the right to run the Company post-closing in its sole discretion, notwithstanding anything in the Agreement to the contrary. The court interpreted the verification mechanism regarding Qualifying Projects as not interfering with the Buyer’s “operational discretion.” The court wrote: “[The Buyer has the right to] operate[] its—which projects to pursue, staff, or continue. But, if the Buyer initiates a project that satisfies the Qualifying Project criterion, the [verification] process is triggered.” The Buyer’s “operational discretion is undisturbed by this verification step.” Its effect is “simply [that the Buyer] cannot withhold its agreement based on extra-contractual criteria.
- The decision underscores the importance of precise, detailed drafting of earnout-related provisions—including how seller-protective provisions will interact with the buyer’s right to run the business post-closing; and what parameters or standards (if any) apply for providing or withholding consent where there is a mutual agreement requirement.
Background. On January 14, 2025, North Highland (the U.S. operating entity of a global change management consulting firm) acquired the Company (a technology consulting firm). The purchase price consisted of $90 million in cash, payable at closing; an equity rollover of $40 million; and a contingent earnout payment of up to $50 million. The earnout payment is based on gross profits, including from projects that are “Qualifying Projects.” The Agreement requires that, before North Highland approaches a Company client to propose a project, North Highland must notify the Seller Representative, and they must mutually agree whether the project is a Qualifying Project.
Post-closing, North Highland allegedly “used its exclusive control over internal systems to withhold information the [S]eller [R]epresentative needed to identify Qualifying Projects, [which] prevented him from participating in the bargained-for notification and classification process.” North Highland, allegedly, “unilaterally excluded projects based on extra-contractual carve-outs.” The Seller Representative brought suit to enforce the notification and classification mechanism. Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will, after a two-day expedited trial, held that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that North Highland provide to the Seller Representative the information necessary to make the Agreement’s “notification and classification process operative.”
Discussion
The mechanism at issue. The earnout is based on “Gross Profit.” The Agreement defines Gross Profit as “Gross Revenue minus Cost of Goods Sold…, plus Cross Sale Gross Profit.” It is through Cross Sale Gross Profit that North Highland’s operations outside The Bridge business unit can contribute to the earnout. Cross Sale Gross Profit is defined as 100% of the gross profit of North Highland and its subsidiaries (other than The Bridge) that is derived from (i) sales by North Highland and it subsidiaries (other than The Bridge) of products and services to any client of The Bridge (i.e., North Highland’s cross-sales of its products to The Bridge clients) and (ii) any Qualifying Project. A “Qualifying Project” is defined as a project that is new, is initiated by North Highland and its subsidiaries (other than The Bridge), and that primarily (based on revenue) involves the delivery of technology or data analytics services. The Agreement requires that, at a specified stage (“Stage 3”) of North Highland’s internal process for proposing potential projects, before a Company client is contacted with a request-for-proposal (“RFP”), North Highland must notify the Seller Representative and they must mutually agree whether the proposed project “constitutes a Qualifying Project.”
Access to information. The Agreement does not address how the Seller Representative is to access North Highland’s internal systems and information to identify and classify potential Qualifying Projects. North Highland argued that no information must be provided because the Agreement does not provide for it. The court emphasized that, without information, the Seller Representative cannot participate in the mechanism that protects it against unilateral control by the Buyer relating to which projects will constitute Qualifying Projects. The court held that, “to prevent the frustration of the parties’ bargain,” North Highland must report to the Seller Representative biweekly, to identify projects then entering into or moving through Stage 3, and to “provide…the [information] necessary for the Seller Representative to determine whether a project is a Qualifying Project.” The court wrote: “North Highland cannot…wield[] its exclusive control over its systems to arbitrarily withhold the sole means of effectuating [the process required by the Agreement].”
The court held that the information that must be provided is “far more limited” than what the Seller Representative was seeking. North Highland must provide “pricing-tool output showing the revenue allocation between technology or data analytics services and other services. It need not provide the complete pricing tool or portions containing highly confidential information that are extraneous to the Qualifying Project determination.” Also, the court stated that this “procedure must not…create unnecessary delay in North Highland’s sales process.” The court noted that about 750 opportunities are in Stage 3 at any given time, 30 to 40 new opportunities enter Stage 3 each week, and a project may move from Stage 3 to Stage 4 within hours. “Given that pace, the Seller Representative cannot hold up North Highland’s process by failing to respond promptly once information is delivered.” The court ordered that the implementing order establish response deadlines for the disclosures, address incomplete or materially revised disclosures, and provide a procedure for time-sensitive projects.
Plain text reading of “Qualifying Product.” North Highland argued that Qualifying Projects were intended to be projects for which The Bridge is cross-selling its services to certain North Highland customers. North Highland pointed to the title of the section, “Cross Sale Gross Profit,” as evidence that it was cross-selling that was contemplated. The court stressed, however, that the term’s definition lacks any requirement that The Bridge participate in any way in a project for it to be a Qualifying Project. North Highland also argued that the parties had extra-contractual agreements that carve out certain types of projects. The court again ruled that the plain text of the definition in the Agreement controlled, as “the language is clear and unambiguous.”
Mutual-agreement clause. North Highland emphasized that the mutual-agreement clause imposes no limitation on the criteria it can consider in determining whether to provide its agreement. It argued that it could withhold its agreement based on, for example, operational factors “such as capacity, skill sets, and business continuity.” The court, however, emphasized the text of the provision, which refers to mutual agreement on whether a project “constitutes” a Qualifying Project. The court wrote: “The plain meaning of ‘constitute’ is to make up, form, or compose. The mutual-agreement step is thus a verification exercise in which the parties apply the single, revenue-based criterion [in the Agreement’s definition of Qualifying Project] to the facts of a given project. It is a procedural mechanism, not a license for North Highland to withhold classification based on extra-contractual operational considerations.”
The court rejected North Highland’s argument that the court’s reading “renders the mutual agreement clause itself superfluous” because the process is triggered at a time that a project has not yet generated actual revenue, so it cannot be determined at that time whether it constitutes a Qualifying Project. The court stated that the mutual-agreement step serves the practical purpose of requiring the parties to verify projected revenue composition and staffing assumptions before an RFP is submitted. “This reading gives the clause independent effect without subsuming the definition it qualifies.”
Practice Points
- Earnout provisions should be clear, specific and contextualized for the specific business and situation. Winton highlights that, when a seller-protective mechanism is provided in the parties’ agreement, the parties should consider being specific about the details with respect to information or other rights required for or relating to the mechanism. They also should consider being specific about whether and how such a mechanism affects the buyer’s right to run the business post-closing. The business persons, experts, and lawyers with the greatest understanding of the specific business and situation should be included in the drafting process to help ensure that scenarios likely to occur, and/or likely to have a material impact, are addressed. Where there may be ambiguity, parties should consider providing in their agreement, statements of their intent with respect to certain provisions or the interaction among provisions, or hypothetical examples of how certain provisions would apply under specific scenarios.
- Earnout parties should consider carefully the seller’s information rights, including during the earnout period. A seller should consider what information rights it will need, not only to verify the earnout statement, but during the earnout period. A buyer should consider that, to the extent a seller cannot participate in mechanisms set forth in the parties’ agreement without obtaining certain information from the buyer, it may be advantageous to set forth specifically when the buyer will provide the information and which information will be provided, rather than facing the risk that the court may make those determinations under the implied covenant.
- Parties providing a mutual-agreement requirement should consider specifying the standards for providing or withholding consent. Parties could consider a broad statement of intention with respect to when consent must be provided (or can be withheld); specifying a general standard for providing (or withholding) consent, such as good faith, reasonableness, or sole discretion; specifying the specific criteria that can be considered in determining whether to provide (or withhold) consent; and/or specifying particular circumstances under which consent must be provided (or can be withheld).
Buyer Had No Right to Terminate Merger Agreement Rather than Respond to HSR Second Request—Verisk
In Verisk Analytics, Inc. v. Exactlogix, Inc. (Aug. 13, 2026), the Court of Chancery held that Verisk’s termination of its $2.35 billion merger agreement (the “Agreement”) to acquire AccuLynx was invalid. The agreement did not permit termination by a party whose “willful conduct” was the “primary cause” of the failure of a closing condition to be satisfied. The court found that, although Verisk tried to satisfy the requirements under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, and in fact wanted to acquire AccuLynx, it was Verisk’s decision to terminate its “enhanced integration” discussions with a competitor of AccuLynx that led the FTC to issue a second request that prevented the HSR period from expiring before the agreement’s outside date.
Key Points
- Verisk did not act in bad faith or fail to use reasonable efforts to obtain HSR clearance. In fact, the court noted that this was not the typical case where a buyer with second-thoughts was creating regulatory obstacles or delay in an effort to get out of its agreement, and the court noted that Verisk made extensive efforts to obtain HSR clearance. Indeed, the FTC’s concerns were raised based on a novel “market reset” theory that it developed when it learned that Verisk had terminated enhanced integration discussions for a supplier-customer relationship with an AccuLynx competitor. Verisk had tried to convince the FTC that the theory was unfounded and the FTC should not issue a Second Request, and, once the second request was issued, that the FTC should find it satisfied based on information Verisk produced under a “quick look agreement.” The court noted that Verisk met with the FTC nearly 30 times; hired experienced legal advisors, expert economists, and a government affairs firm to advocate for FTC clearance; and spent nearly $8 million in legal fees to review roughly four million documents from 16 custodians under the quick look agreement.
- The court ordered specific performance, including that Verisk continue to use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain HSR clearance. Given the specific performance order, it is unclear whether Verisk now must engage with the FTC without an outside date, so long as it is commercially reasonable to do so. We note also the complexities involved in reengaging with the FTC more than eight months after discussions with the agency ended. For example, Verisk will have to produce documents from the period when the parties thought the deal was dead; the FTC will have to determine how such documents influence its investigation; and Verisk and the seller will have to cooperate with each other in the process after having been engaged in acrimonious litigation.
Background. Verisk (an insurance data and technology company) agreed to acquire AccuLynx (a cloud-based roofing business platform) for $2.35 billion. The Agreement required Verisk to use “commercially reasonable efforts” to obtain FTC approval under the HSR Act. The Agreement did not permit termination by a party that was in material breach of the Agreement, or whose failure to comply with its covenants in the Agreement or “other willful conduct” was “the primary cause” of a closing condition not being satisfied. When the parties entered into the Agreement, they anticipated no significant antitrust issues.
While Verisk was in discussions with AccuLynx, Verisk was also negotiating with ServiceTitan (a competitor of AccuLynx) to provide it with an integration with Verisk’s software. Six days after the Agreement to acquire AccuLynx was signed, Verisk notified ServiceTitan that, due to the “change in direction” as a result of its deal to acquire AccuLynx, Verisk was ending the negotiations with ServiceTitan. The FTC had learned from ServiceTitan about the cessation of negotiations with Verisk. The FTC repeatedly asked Verisk if it had terminated discussions with any AccuLynx competitor. Versik’s outside counsel, who was unaware of the discussions with ServiceTitan, repeatedly answered no. The FTC became focused on a “market reset” theory of competitive harm, centering on the possibility of Verisk plans to integrate with AccuLynx competitors after the merger. Verisk and AccuLynx were in agreement that “this theory was unusual, unsupported by any real-world examples or empirical evidence, and likely would not have provided a basis to stop the deal.” But Verisk’s email terminating its discussions with ServiceTitan “provided the FTC with tangible evidence that its concerns were more than theoretical.”
Verisk initially tried to resolve the FTC’s concerns, providing a limited response to the Second Request. After the FTC conveyed that it would require full compliance, Verisk sent an email to AccuLynx that it was terminating the deal. AccuLynx sued, alleging that Verisk improperly terminated the agreement because Verisk’s termination of its discussions with ServiceTitan had been “willful conduct” and was the “primary cause” of the FTC’s second request that ultimately ran out the clock on the Agreement past the outside date. The court agreed with AccuLynx, and ordered Verisk to specifically perform the Agreement, including by using commercially reasonable efforts to obtain clearance required under the HSR Act and to close the Merger if the FTC approves the transaction.
Discussion
The Agreement language regarding Verisk’s termination right:
- Section 9.1(f): The Agreement can be terminated by Verisk, “if the Transactions have not been consummated on or before November 26, 2025 (the “Termination Date”); provided that [Verisk] shall not be entitled to terminate this Agreement pursuant to this Section 9.1(f) if [Verisk]’s knowing and willful breach of this Agreement has prevented the satisfaction of the [closing] conditions to the consummation of the Transactions set forth in Section 8.2.”
- The last sentence of Section 9.1: “Notwithstanding anything else contained in this Agreement, the right to terminate this Agreement under Section 9.1 shall not be available to a party (a) if such party is then in material breach of its obligations hereunder or (b) if such party’s failure to fulfill its obligations or to comply with its covenants under this Agreement, or other willful conduct, has been the primary cause of, or primarily resulted in, the failure to satisfy any [closing] condition.”
The court’s interpretation of “willful conduct” in the last sentence of Section 9.1. The court noted that, where parties to an agreement have not defined “willful conduct,” the court’s interpretations have not always been consistent. Interpreting the phrase here, the court stressed the juxtaposition of “knowing and willful breach” earlier in Section 9.1(f) with “willful conduct” in the last sentence of Section 9.1. That contractual structure, the court reasoned, “demonstrates that the parties intended ‘willful conduct’ to require less than ‘willful breach.’” The last sentence of Section 9.1 “ratchets down the required mental state, prohibiting termination not only when a terminating party has intentionally breached the Merger Agreement, but also when the party has engaged in any voluntary and intentional conduct that caused a condition to fail.” Thus, the court concluded, in this case, “willful conduct” requires only that the act was “voluntary and intentional,” not that it was wrongful or in bad faith.
“Primary cause.” The parties did not address the meaning of “primary cause” in the Agreement or at trial. The court noted, first, that the Agreement language tracks the common law prevention doctrine, under which “a party may not escape contractual liability by reliance upon the failure of a condition precedent where the party wrongfully prevented performance of that condition precedent.” When the prevention doctrine is invoked, the court stated, “it is not necessary to show that the condition would have occurred but for the lack of cooperation. It is only required that the breach have contributed materially to the non-occurrence” (emphasis added). The court noted further, however, that the Agreement language differs from the prevention doctrine by both decreasing the mental state required (as discussed above) and increasing the required showing for causation from “contributing materially” to being “the primary cause” of the failed condition.
Verisk argued that its termination of discussions with ServiceTitan was not the primary cause of the FTC’s decision to issue the Second Request, as the FTC had other substantive concerns from the outset of its review. The court stressed, though, that “ServiceTitan was the only AccuLynx competitor who had numerous calls with the FTC, the only competitor that received a subpoena, and the only competitor with whom the FTC engaged on critical dates throughout the process.” The court found there was substantial evidence that, more likely than not, Verisk’s email terminating discussions with AccuLynx was the primary cause of the FTC’s concerns, which led it to insist on full compliance with the Second Request, which led to the deadline for HSR clearance being missed.
Specific performance. Verisk argued that it would be inequitable to order specific performance where there was not evidence of any bad faith or intentional misconduct on its part. The court wrote: “But the parties specifically agreed in the [Agreement] that a party could not terminate if its own willful conduct was the primary cause of the failure to satisfy a condition. It is not inequitable to hold the parties to their bargain.” Verisk also argued that specific performance should not be available because damages would provide adequate relief. The court wrote: “But this court has not hesitated to order specific performance in cases of this nature where sophisticated parties…have stipulated that specific performance would be an appropriate remedy in the event of breach.”
Practice Points
- Parties should consider carefully the specific standards to be set forth in their agreement.
- “Willful conduct” versus “willful breach.” The parties’ agreed standard will be interpreted by the court in context, based on a reading of the agreement as a whole and the specific facts and circumstances. In general, however, as Verisk highlights, “willful breach” or “willful misconduct” may on their face suggest a requirement that the conduct at issue was in bad faith, while “willful conduct” may capture any conduct, bad faith or not, and even conduct that may be commercially reasonable. Further, parties may want to consider specifying whether “willful” means any conduct that was voluntary and intentional, or only conduct that was intended to thwart the deal.
- Causation. Parties should consider the differences between “a material contribution,” a “proximate cause,” “a primary cause,” “the primary cause,” and a “but-for (or sole) cause” standard. Further, they should consider whether the standard will apply to a “failure to satisfy” a condition or the “prevention” of a condition, as the latter may suggest an intention to track the common law prevention doctrine, while the former may not.
- “Willful conduct” versus “willful breach.” The parties’ agreed standard will be interpreted by the court in context, based on a reading of the agreement as a whole and the specific facts and circumstances. In general, however, as Verisk highlights, “willful breach” or “willful misconduct” may on their face suggest a requirement that the conduct at issue was in bad faith, while “willful conduct” may capture any conduct, bad faith or not, and even conduct that may be commercially reasonable. Further, parties may want to consider specifying whether “willful” means any conduct that was voluntary and intentional, or only conduct that was intended to thwart the deal.
- Parties should keep in mind the possibility of HSR second requests based on unexpected, even novel, theories of competitive harm. When parties enter into an agreement, they may expect no significant antitrust scrutiny for their deal, or may expect that the scrutiny will be focused on certain theories of harm. The parties may rely on that expectation in setting the standards of efforts and deadlines and other termination rights applicable to obtaining FTC approval. Parties should keep in mind, however, that the FTC may become focused on unanticipated (even unusual or arguably unsupportable) theories of competitive harm. Consultation with antitrust counsel is critical—both at the earliest possible stage to assess potential antitrust risks and possible theories of harm, and throughout the interim period pending closing to assess risk associated with what may seem to be routine decisions but may could create antitrust and/or delays for the deal.
- Parties should carefully consider their commercial actions after announcing a major M&A transaction. Merging parties’ customers, suppliers, competitors, and other stakeholders closely follow how a major M&A deal in their industry may affect their business. A party changing commercial course or taking action affecting stakeholders during a pending merger is likely to be noticed and could meaningfully affect the deal's regulatory review—whether through customer, supplier, or competitor complaints to the antitrust agencies, in a response to agency outreach, or when the reviewing agency uncovers the conduct in materials submitted during the investigation.
- Parties should not consider specific performance to be a boilerplate provision. Parties should consider carefully whether and when specific performance will be available as a remedy, and, if so, whether specific parameters will apply in certain situations (for example, relating to regulatory of financing conditions, or only at specific stages of those processes). The parties should consider carefully how their agreement provisions relating to efforts standards, deadlines, and termination rights (including termination fees) interact with one another.
Buyer’s Equivocation on MFW Renders It Unavailable; CFO Faces Liability for Directing Financial Advisor to Use Revised Projections—Via Renewables
In In re Via Renewables, Inc. Merger Litigation (Aug. 12, 2026), the Court of Chancery, in a letter opinion, denied a motion to dismiss claims of breach of fiduciary duties by Via’s controlling stockholder (the “Controller”), the directors acting on a special committee (the “Committee”), and the Chief Financial Officer, in connection with their approval of a take-private merger with the Controller (the “Merger”). The safe harbor protection for conflicted-controller transactions, under amended DGCL Section 144, was not available because the Merger occurred before the amendments were effective. The court held that protection from liability was not available under the common law MFW framework, as, at a minimum, the “ab initio” requirement for MFW applicability was not met. The claims therefore survive.
Key Points
- A buyer’s equivocation as to whether it will impose MFW-required deal conditions may lead to MFW protection being unavailable. As is well-established, for MFW business judgment review to apply to a conflicted-controller transaction, the transaction must have been conditioned, ab initio (i.e., from the outset), on approval by both a special committee of independent directors and the minority stockholders. The ab initio requirement means that the conditions must have been imposed by the buyer at the “germination stage” of the proposed transaction, before “economic horse-trading” has begun. In this case, the Controller equivocated as to whether he would be imposing the minority stockholder vote condition. He referenced “expectations” and “intentions” regarding a minority stockholder vote condition; but he refused to provide clarification when the Committee asked for it. The court concluded that by the time it was clear that the Controller would impose the condition, although his initial offer had been formally withdrawn, the parties had engaged in substantive economic negotiations. The court held that business judgement review under MFW was therefore unavailable and the more stringent entire fairness standard will apply.
- Management must exercise caution when providing revised projections to a special committee’s financial advisor. The court found it reasonably conceivable, at the pleading stage of litigation, that the Chief Financial Officer provided to the Committee’s financial advisor, and directed the advisor to use for its fairness analysis, a set of revised company projections—without the Committee having approved his doing so. On that basis, the court rejected dismissal of the claim against the CFO for breach of his fiduciary duties.
- The decision highlights the difficulties in meeting MFW prerequisites for business judgement review for conflicted-controller transactions—and thus the benefits of structuring such transactions, when possible, to meet instead the requirements for protection under the new DGCL Section 144 safe harbor (which, for example, does not include an “ab initio” requirement).
Background. Via (a retail energy services company), after having experienced its strongest performance ever in 2021, faced various hardships, including Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, after which, in 2023, the company effected a reverse stock split and suspended dividends. Before these events, Via’s stock traded at about $60 per share, and afterward at about $8.46 per share. In September 2023, the Controller proposed the take-private Merger; and the Board formed the Committee. The Committee repeatedly asked the Controller to include in his proposal the conditions required for MFW protection. When pressed about the conditions, the Controller formally withdrew his offer. But shored up his financing; and he and the Committee continued to negotiate over a possible merger. Ultimately, the Controller provided a draft merger agreement that included the MFW conditions. The Committee’s financial advisor issued a fairness opinion. The Committee approved the Merger. A stockholder meeting held to vote on the Merger was adjourned because the Merger did not receive approval from enough minority stockholders; but, when it was reconvened a month later, the Merger received 51% approval. The Merger closed in October 2024.
At the pleading stage, after briefing and oral argument, Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick rejected the motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims.
Discussion
The Controller equivocated on imposing the MFW conditions. In September 2023, the Controller submitted a proposal to Via’s board of directors (the “Board”) take the company private for $10.50 per share. The proposal did not include the MFW conditions. The Committee’s advisors repeatedly requested that the Controller impose the MFW conditions. The advisors shared with the Controller an analysis of minority voting trends to convince him to agree to add the conditions. The Controller then withdrew his offer and “shored up financing.” On November 15, the Controller submitted a new proposal at $9 per share. That proposal stated that the Controller “anticipated” the Board would form a special committee and he “intended” to condition any merger on a successful majority-of-the-minority stockholder vote. When the Committee sought clarification, the Controller would not confirm or deny that his proposal was or would be conditioned on the majority-of-the-minority vote.
On November 28, the Controller sent the Committee a draft merger agreement that did not include the majority-of-the-minority condition. On November 29, the Committee’s legal counsel referred to the condition as a key issue still to be resolved. On December 7, the Committee sent a response draft merger agreement to the Controller, proposing a price of $12.65 per share and adding the minority stockholder vote condition. On December 15, the Controller rejected the Committee’s price counteroffer, but sent the Committee a revised draft agreement that included the condition. The court concluded that was “the first point in time at which [the Controller] agreed to impose the condition.”
The court found it reasonably conceivable that MFW’s ab initio requirement was not met. By December 15, the court noted, the Controller had made two offers and lowered his price, and the Committee had made a counteroffer after consulting with its financial advisor. The controller had equivocated on MFW and refused to respond to the Committee’s request for clarification; and had sent a draft merger agreement without the condition. In addition to negotiating price, the parties “had proceeded to negotiate…[a] go-shop period, and [the Controller]’s ability to use his stock as collateral.” All of this had occurred “while the Committee’s legal counsel considered the majority-of-the-minority condition a key concept that still needed to be addressed.” The court wrote: “By the time [the Controller] acceded to including a version of the majority-of-the-minority condition on December 15, it is reasonably conceivable that the deal had moved passed germination and onto economic horse trading.”
Exculpation was not available. The court noted that the Committee directors’ dismissal arguments relied exclusively on MFW. The directors did not raise any separate defense that the claims against them were exculpable (and therefore dismissible under Cornerstone) based on the directors being independent. (We note that the claims against the Controller were unexculpable because, based on his self-interest in the Merger, the claims implicated the duty of loyalty, which cannot be exculpated.)
The CFO may have breached his fiduciary duties by directing the Committee’s financial advisor to use revised projections, without Committee authorization to do so. The Committee’s financial advisor (the “Advisor”) had prepared initial financial analyses around December 7, based on management’s then most recent projections prepared around October 31. Those projections suggested that the Controller’s initial $9-per-share offer was inadequate. Management, led by the CFO, then prepared new, lower projections, which the CFO presented to the Committee on December 21. Four days later, the Advisor used the December 7 analyses to review the Controller’s December 25 offer of $10.25 per share, and concluded that it could not provide a fairness opinion. On December 27, the Committee negotiated the Controller up to a price of $11 per share. That evening, the CFO formally directed the Advisor to use the revised projections to prepare its fairness opinion. Two days later, the Advisor delivered a fairness opinion based on the revised projections from the CFO. The Committee approved the Merger that same day.
The court found it reasonably conceivable that the CFO “acted at least with reckless indifference” when he lowered projections and then, apparently without the Committee’s authorization, directed the Advisor to use those projections, which favored the Controller. The court concluded that the CFO may not have had authorization from the Committee because the minutes from Committee meetings “did not reflect that the Committee approved the use of the revised projections at the December 21 meeting or at any other time.” (We note that, unlike directors, officers cannot be exculpated for breaches of the duty of care.)
The CFO may have breached his fiduciary duties also by issuing a misleading proxy statement. The merger proxy statement did not mention the Controller’s failure to agree to the MFW conditions until December 7, nor the timing of the revised projections. Because the CFO was an officer and a signatory to the Merger Agreement, it was “reasonably conceivable that he participated in drafting and releasing the Proxy Statement” that was misleading.
Practice Points
- A controller should be clear as to whether and when he is or is not invoking a majority-of-the-minority condition. Equivocation, or other attempts to reserve making a decision on imposing the MFW conditions, may lead to MFW being unavailable on the basis that the conditions were not imposed at the outset of the process, before economic horse-trading began. If an offer without MFW conditions is withdrawn and subsequently a new offer is made with the MFW conditions, there is a risk that, in determining whether the MFW ab initio requirement was met, they will be viewed as the same offer if substantive discussions continued between the two offers.
- If management revises projections downward during a sale process: The reasons for the revisions should be made clear to the board and its financial advisor. As Via Renewables highlights, management should not direct a board’s or special committee’s financial advisor to use revised projections as the basis for a fairness determination unless and until the board or committee has authorized the advisor to use the revised projections.
- Defendant directors should assert an exculpation defense when it may be available. Exculpation for claims that implicate the duty of care (and not the duty of loyalty) can be a powerful defense that may be available even when MFW (or other protections, such as DGCL Section 144 safe harbors) may not be available.
- Officers should be aware of their potential liability for flawed disclosure. Officers should keep in mind that, unlike for directors, DGCL Section 102(b)(7) provides for exculpation for officers only in connection with direct claims brought against them by stockholders. Exculpation does not bar derivative claims brought against officers (i.e., claims brought by or in the right of the corporation itself).
Other Decisions and Developments of Note
Interpreting New Section 144 Safe Harbor for the First Time, Chancery Lets Fiduciary Claims Survive Against Conflicted Directors, But Stresses the “Extreme Facts”—Dodiya
In Dodiya v. Franklin (Aug. 26, 2026), the Court of Chancery, for the first time, interpreted DGCL Section 144’s new safe harbor for transactions involving conflicted directors or officers. Section 144, as amended last year, provides safe harbor protection from fiduciary liability in connection with such transactions if the transaction was approved by a majority of (i) the disinterested directors on the board or a special committee, acting in good faith and without gross negligence or (ii) the disinterested stockholders, in an informed vote. Vice Chancellor Lori W.Will held that the safe harbor was not available with respect to the conflicted merger at issue because the sale process was grossly negligent and the stockholder vote was not informed.
The court emphasized that the case presented an “extreme scenario” supporting an inference of gross negligence by the board of directors of Whole Earth Brands, Inc. (a public Delaware corporation) in connection with its take private by a private company that owned about 20% of the stock (the “Merger”), which was owned and run by the father of Whole Earth Brands’ CEO-director. In interpreting the new safe harbor, the court stated that Section 144’s requirement that a board acted in good faith and without gross negligence in authorizing the challenged transaction applies not just to the final authorization act but extends throughout the board’s process that led to its decision to authorize the transaction. The sale process flaws alleged in this case were not “ordinary sale process imperfections,” the court stressed, but reflected a “striking breakdown in corporate governance.”
The critical flaw was the board’s failure to put safeguards in place to prevent further leaks of information by the “deeply conflicted” CEO-director, who had leaked sensitive company and sale process information to his father, refused to commit to a confidentiality undertaking going forward, and refused to cooperate with internal and regulatory investigations relating to the leaks. The court indicated that, in cases involving less “extreme” facts, Section 144 will provide “a predictable path to safe harbor…, deliver[ing] the certainty its terms promise” against liability in connection with conflicted transactions.
The court confirmed that, notwithstanding the unavailability of Section 144 safe harbor protection, the disinterested directors were still entitled to common law defenses, including exculpation for gross negligence (a duty of care violation). The claims against the disinterested directors therefore were dismissed. The court did not dismiss the claims against the interested directors, as, based on their self-interest in the merger, the duty of loyalty was implicated, for which exculpation was not available.
Also of note are two disclosure-related holdings in the decision. The court held that the stockholder vote was not informed because the proxy statement falsely stated that the CEO-director was fully walled off from the process after the board learned of his leaks. The court concluded that the flawed disclosure was not the result of bad faith by the directors, however, as the proxy statement revealed other sale process flaws, which, the court stated, made it clear that the directors were not “intentionally hiding” the CEO-director’s continued access to sensitive information “to create a false narrative of an unblemished sale process.” Also, the court held that the stockholder vote requirement for compliance with DGCL Section 203 (Delaware’s anti-takeover statute) does not require an informed vote. The court stated that the “plain text” of the statute calls for a “vote,” not an “informed vote,” and the court would not read in to the statutory language common law requirements relating to the duty of disclosure.
Practice Point. The decision underscores the benefits the Section 144 safe harbor will offer when it is applicable. Whether under Section 144 or the common law, disinterested directors and officers generally do not face fiduciary liability unless they acted in bad faith. When Section 144 applies, allegedly conflicted directors and officers also will be protected from fiduciary liability so long as either (i) the board (or, if the board was not majority-disinterested, a special committee) conducted a process that was not grossly negligent or in bad faith, or (ii) the disinterested stockholders approved the transaction in an informed vote—in both cases, notwithstanding the conflicted directors’ self-interest and even if they acted with gross negligence or bad faith.
Board Cannot Reject Activist’s Director Nominations Under Advance Notice Bylaws for Failure to Disclose Information Not Expressly Required by the Bylaws—Empery
In ATG Capital Opportunities Fund LP v. Lane (“Empery”) (Aug. 28, 2026), the court held that the rejection, by the board of Empery Digital, Inc. (a digital asset treasury company), under the company’s advance notice bylaws, of the advance nomination notice submitted by ATG Capital, an activist stockholder, was not permissible. ATG, after acquiring a significant stake in Empery, submitted the nomination notice for a slate of nine directors. Empery’s board rejected the notice for disclosure deficiencies. ATG sued. Vice Chancellor Will concluded that Empery’s bylaws did not require the disclosures the board cited as missing from the nomination notice.
Empery’s rejection letter to ATG cited ATG’s failure to disclose in its notice that it was acting in concert with another investor. Empery contended that the coordinated activity between ATG and the other investor constituted an “agreement, arrangement, or understanding” (AAU) between them. As Empery argued, it is common that advance notice bylaws require disclosure of AAUs. However, the court noted, Empery’s bylaws did not expressly require disclosure of AAUs for nomination notices (although it expressly required they be disclosed for stockholder proposals), nor did they expressly require disclosure of a Schedule 13(d) group.
The advance notice bylaws explicitly required disclosure of any other “participant” in the solicitation. The court concluded, however, that the investor was not a participant. The court cited federal case law under the proxy rules interpreting a “participant” generally as being an individual who financed the proxy context or participated in the solicitation. Based on the conclusion that the investor was not a participant, the court also rejected Empery’s argument that the investor had to be disclosed as a participant under the bylaw requiring disclosure of any information required to be disclosed in a proxy statement under Schedule 14A (Item 5b of which requires disclosure of participants). Finally, the court rejected Empery’s argument that Rule 14a-9, which prohibits false and misleading statements or omissions in proxy materials required that the activist disclose the information to comply with Schedule 14A. The court noted that Empery had cited in its rejection letter to ATG, as the reason for rejecting ATG’s nomination notice, the failure to disclose that the investor was a participant, and it could not “wait until trial to abandon that basis and advance a different theory of contractual noncompliance.”
Empery also contended that the nomination notice was deficient because ATG did not disclose that it had acquired a “massive short position” in Bitcoin ETFs to hedge its investment in Empery, and that ATG and the other investor had a plan to liquidate Empery’s Bitcoin holdings. The court found that the bylaws required disclosure of derivatives and short positions in Empery’s own stock, not hedging positions involving Bitcoin or cryptocurrency-related ETFs. The court, applying Coster/Unocal enhanced scrutiny, concluded that, even though the board may have identified a cognizable threat to corporate policy, its rejection of the activist’s nominees was not a reasonable and proportionate response to the perceived threat. “The Board could have informed stockholders of the evidence concerning [ATG]’s and [the other investor’s] relationship, their apparent views concerning Empery’s Bitcoin strategy, and the risks the Board believed a change in control presented. Those arguments could then have been tested through the electoral process,” the court wrote.
Practice Point. A board should review its advance notice bylaws to ensure state-of-the-art disclosure and others requirements are expressly set forth, including taking into account activists’ current strategies. If a notice fails to disclose information (even information that would be material to the stockholders), the court may find that the notice cannot be rejected unless the information omitted was expressly required under the bylaws. Empery highlights that, generally, boards should consider whether the company’s advance notice bylaws require disclosure of AAUs for both director nominations and stockholder proposals; and define a “participant” as a person coordinating with the nominating stockholder.
Buyers Had to Pay Holdback Amount Tied to “Unfavorable” Litigation Ruling, Whether Sellers Were Damaged or Not—Kentucky Downs
In Kentucky Downs Management, Inc. v. Kentucky Downs, LLC (Aug. 13, 2026), the Court of Chancery interpreted the parties’ contract provision that required the buyers, post-closing, to pay the sellers a $10 million purchase price holdback if, by a specified date, a “final non-appealable unfavorable ruling” was issued in a pending litigation that challenged the legality of the acquired company’s operations. A final, non-appealable ruling was issued, by the specified date, finding that the acquired company’s operations (“historical horse racing” (HHR) terminals) were illegal (the “Kentucky Supreme Court Ruling”). Following the Kentucky Supreme Court Ruling, the buyers continued the company’s operations, to avoid defaulting on their credit agreement. The buyers then successfully lobbied the state legislature for a change in law, as a result of which its HHR terminals were again legal. The parties did not dispute that the buyers suffered no injury from the Kentucky Supreme Court Ruling.
The sellers argued that the holdback amount had to be paid because the Kentucky Supreme Court Ruling was not “unfavorable” given that the buyers did not suffer any injury from it. The buyers argued that the holdback amount did not have to be paid because the actual impact of the Kentucky Supreme Court Ruling was irrelevant, as the parties had bargained for “a straight holdback based on the outcome of a specified risk event.” The court, in an earlier decision in the case, at the pleading stage of the litigation, had found that an amendment the parties entered into, revising the original holdback provisions, was ambiguous and both parties’ interpretations of the language were reasonable.
After a one-day trial, on a paper record, Vice Chancellor Natan A. Cook found that the sellers’ interpretation of the amendment was correct and the holdback amount had to be paid. The original sale agreement had required the buyers to fund the holdback amount into an escrow fund, which would be released to the sellers two years following the deal close, reduced by any indemnifiable losses incurred by the buyers as a result of any final, non-appealable unfavorable ruling in the specified litigation. Emails reflected that the buyers’ lenders then requested that the parties “eliminat[e] the holdback escrow concept and mak[e] it a straight obligation to pay $10,000,000 if the [specified litigation] [was] resolved favorably or if it [was] still outstanding in 2 years.” The court concluded that the parties’ amendment implemented that request—by “remov[ing] the indemnification framework and simply t[ying] the holdback to a final non-appealable unfavorable ruling in the [specified litigation].” The history leading to the amendment supported the sellers’ interpretation that the holdback amount had to be paid irrespective of whether the Kentucky Supreme Court Ruling injured the buyers. The court noted that the language of the amendment (specifically, the placement of “[a] comma and [use of a] participial phrase”), as well as testimonial evidence, also supported this interpretation.
Practice Point. When parties agree to a holdback, to be payable on the occurrence of a specified event, the agreement language should be clear as to whether the holdback will be payable whether or not the specified event causes harm to the buyer. Parties also should keep in mind that the court may look to the history leading to an agreement provision and/or its amendment (including through emails) to determine what the parties’ intent was at the time.
Delaware Law Permits LLC Members to Waive Statutory Inspection Rights—Bengson v. Elevate
In Bengson v. Elevate RCM Holdings, LLC (Aug. 10, 2026), the Court of Chancery held that LLC members can waive statutory inspection rights via a clearly expressed provision in an LLC operating agreement. The court concluded, first, that Section 18-305 of Delaware’s LLC Act does not expressly prohibit the waiver of inspection rights, and, second, that the Operating Agreement at issue expressed the waiver in sufficiently clear terms. Magistrate Danielle Gibbs wrote: “The Plaintiffs freely and knowingly waived their statutory inspection rights when they executed joinders to Defendant’s Operating Agreement, and public policy does not preclude the Court from holding Plaintiffs to their bargain.”
The Plaintiffs sold their company to the Defendant in exchange for cash and membership units in the Defendant. The Plaintiffs executed Joinder Agreements, agreeing to be bound by the Defendant’s Operating Agreement. The Operating Agreement contained a provision under which the members waived inspection rights to the fullest extent permissible under Delaware law.
The Plaintiffs argued that they were not bound by the waiver because the LLC Act does not permit an operating agreement to eliminate Section 18-305’s statutory inspection rights. The Plaintiffs stressed that 18-305 (unlike other Sections of the LLC Act) does not expressly state that inspection rights may be “eliminated.” The Defendant argued, and the court agreed, that members can waive inspection rights because nothing in the LLC Act expressly prohibits them from doing so. The court noted that the Plaintiffs had framed the issue in terms of whether Section 18-305 states that inspection rights can be eliminated. The court viewed the issue, however, not to be whether the Operating Agreement eliminated a statutory inspection right but whether the Plaintiffs’ contractual waiver of a statutory inspection right was enforceable. The court wrote: “Barring sufficient public policy concerns or express statutory language prohibiting a waiver, sophisticated parties may contractually waive a statutory right in exchange for valuable consideration…. Thus, what matters…is that Section 18-305 does not expressly prohibit the waiver of its default inspection right” (emphasis in original). The court noted Manti (2021), in which the Delaware Supreme Court held that statutory appraisal rights could be waived under a stockholders agreement because DGCL Section 262 does not contain any language prohibiting such a waiver.
The court rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument that public policy concerns require that Section 18-305 not be waivable. The Plaintiffs contended that the very purpose of an inspection right “is to afford passive investors access to information that allows them to protect their financial stake in the entity.” The Plaintiffs asserted that “[s]anctioning contractual waiver… [of the inspection right] would constitute a license for an LLC’s manager to swindle other members with impunity.” The court acknowledged that “inspection rights are important tools for investors”; and noted that there is legal and academic support for the proposition that DGCL Section 220 (which is Section 18-305’s corporate analogue) confers a “mandatory” right. However, the court stressed that, “unlike the DGCL, the LLC Act expressly intends to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company agreements.” The court concluded that it was not against public policy “to hold the parties to their bargain”—where, as here, sophisticated persons, in negotiating the sale of their company, agreed to accept LLC membership units, executed Joinder Agreements agreeing to be bound by the Operating Agreement, and the Operating Agreement contained a provision waiving inspection rights to the fullest extent permitted by law.
Practice Point. Investors in LLCs and other non-corporate entities must review the governing contract’s terms carefully before investing and, in the words of the court, “not to look to the courts to save them from contracts that may appear ill-advised in retrospect.”
In Upholding MLP Conflicts Committee’s Approval of GP-Affiliated Sponsor’s Take-Private, Chancery Stressed Committee’s Good Process—Thomas v. Am. Midstream
In Thomas v. American Midstream GP, LLC (Sept. 11, 2026), the Court of Chancery held that a conflicted merger (the “Merger”) between a master limited partnership (the “Partnership”) and its sponsor (the “Sponsor”), who was affiliated with the Partnership’s general partner (the “GP”), was entitled to safe harbor protection under the Limited Partnership Agreement (the “LPA”). The court emphasized the good process the conflicts committee that approved the transaction had engaged in, from which the court concluded that the committee members acted in good faith and believed that the transaction was in the best interests of the partnership.
The LPA provided safe harbor protection for transactions in which the GP was conflicted if a conflicts committee granted “special approval.” It also provided a presumption that conflicts committee special approvals were issued in good faith.
The MLP had been facing a significantly deteriorating financial situation. When its unit price had dropped to $6.60, the Sponsor bought more units to reach a majority stake, and it then proposed an acquisition of all outstanding publicly held units that it did not already own, for $6.10 per unit. The board established a conflicts committee, comprised of three directors who were “indisputably independent, qualified, sophisticated and experienced in the oil and gas industry,” and who owned common units. The conflicts committee retained unconflicted advisors, including Evercore as its financial advisor; had twenty-eight formal meetings; considered ten financial presentations; and negotiated three price increases. The conflicts committee also ensured that updated projections were prepared, to reflect both negative and positive developments that had occurred; and it discussed the projections with management, questioning the underlying assumptions. Evercore provided a fairness opinion, and gave presentations to the board on the Partnership’s lack of access to capital and the Sponsor’s rationale for the Merger.
The conflicts committee had decided to accept the Sponsor’s initial proposal of $6.10 per unit, but before the committee could accept it, the Sponsor withdrew it, citing the Partnership’s deteriorating conditions and poor financial performance. Two weeks later, the Sponsor made a revised offer of $4.50 per unit. The committee negotiated with the Sponsor, and ultimately agreed to accept a revised offer of $5.25 per unit. In Evercore’s fairness presentation to the board, on every valuation analysis, $5.25 was in the top half or better of the range. Each member of the committee thought the $5.25 deal was in the best interests of the unitholders. The committee granted the special approval; and the board approved the Merger.
The Plaintiff brought suit, claiming the GP breached the LPA by engaging in a conflicted transaction without proper and valid special approval. At the pleading stage, then-Chancellor Andre Bouchard had found it was reasonably conceivable that the committee did not grant the special approval in good faith. In a later ruling, Vice Chancellor Zurn declined to grant the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. After a one-day trial and post-trial argument, Vice Chancellor Zurn (sitting by designation) concluded that the preponderance of the evidence indicated that each Committee member subjectively believed the Merger was in the MLP’s best interest and, therefore, the Plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption that it was issued in good faith.
The court stressed the committee’s good process. “The members met with their advisors dozens of times, considered letters from investors, reviewed analyses from a highly qualified financial advisor, and pushed back against the Sponsor on multiple occasions. As changes emerged, the [Committee] rapidly updated projections to place the Partnership in the best light possible. Even so, each member of the [Committee] decided the Merger was the best option. Rather than offering any reason to question that the Committee members believed the Merger was in the Partnership’s best interest, the Plaintiff “zoom[ed] out, asking the Court to blame the Sponsor for the Partnership’s difficulties, then contending the [Committee]’s process failed to push back against what the Sponsor had done.” That effort was unsuccessful. Nothing in the record suggested the members did not subjectively believe the Merger was in the best interests of the Partnership, the court stated. “[T]he Conflicts Committee did not simply go “through the motions”; [i]t did not contradict itself in internal communications or hire advisors that selectively overlooked unfavorable metrics. Instead, [it] confronted each problem head on and concluded the Merger was the best option.”
The court acknowledged that the Sponsor was “opportunistic” in the actions it took. However, the court wrote, “a difficult adversary across the table does not alone impugn the fiduciary’s independence or good faith.” Despite the significant financial and market challenges the Partnership faced, the conflicts committee “negotiated strategically and intensely against the Sponsor.”
Practice Point. An MLP conflicts committee that acts in good faith can shield a conflicted transaction from judicial review—so long as the committee meets the standards for independence and good faith (and any procedures) set forth in the partnership agreement. A robust committee process will provide strong evidence of good faith.
Chancery Emphasizes Expert Resolving Working Capital Disputes Must Follow Specific Terms of the Parties’ Agreement—Viasat
In Viasat, Inc. v. L3Harris Technologies, Inc. (Sept. 29, 2026), the Court of Chancery addressed disputes regarding post-closing working capital adjustments made by L3 Harris (a publicly traded defense contractor) in connection with its $1.958 billion acquisition, from Viasat (a publicly traded satellite and secure networks systems company), of the Link-16 Data Links business (a battlefield radio systems business) (the “Business”). The parties’ asset purchase agreement (the “Agreement”) required that disputes be resolved by an independent accounting firm, acting as an expert. The expert found in L3Harris’ favor on most of the disputes. Viasat claimed that the expert had exceeded the scope of its authority granted under the Agreement and had misinterpreted the Agreement.
The court stressed that “an expert’s authority is limited to its mandate to use its specialized knowledge to resolve a specified issue of fact.” On such matters, the expert’s determination of the disputed factual issue will be final and binding. However, when an expert’s assessment depends on the resolution of legal issues, the assessment is not entitled to deference.
On one of the disputed items, the court granted Viasat summary judgment, finding that the expert had exceeded its authority by applying a different accounting standard than what was set forth in the Agreement. On two other disputed items, the court ruled in favor of L3Harris, finding that the expert acted within its authority and followed the accounting principles as set forth in the Agreement.
Of note, the Agreement set forth three “tiers” of accounting principles to be applied in determining Working Capital. Tier 1 consisted of the principles set forth in a Reference Statement that detailed how certain specific accounting issues would be handled. Tier 2 was Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Tier 3 was Viasat’s historical accounting principles, to the extent not inconsistent with the Reference Statement or GAAP. The Agreement provided that Tier 1 “shall take precedence” over Tiers 2 and 3; and Tier 2 would take precedence over Tier 3. Viasat contended that the accounting firm impermissibly interpreted the legal scope of the “shall take precedence” clause—by proceeding to consider GAAP (Tier 2) after it had concluded that Viasat complied with the Reference Statement (Tier 1) as to the three of the disputed items. The firm then rejected Viasat’s calculations for non-compliance with GAAP, “flipping” the outcome to L3Harris’s favor. L3Harris argued that the firm acted properly because, as the Reference Statement and GAAP were in different tiers, it sought to satisfy both requirements when possible. That reading, the court stated, conflicted with the plain terms of the Agreement that required that the Reference Statement’s principles take precedence.
Practice Point. The decision highlights that the precise language used in a purchase agreement will be critical when resolving disputes, and that parties must follow precisely their agreement’s terms for resolution of disputes. Drafters should seek to provide clarity with respect to the scope of authority of, and the accounting principles to be followed by, an expert when resolving the parties’ disputes.
Consents Removing Director, Obtained After Declaring Removal was Effective, Were Valid—Freiberg v. Xonar Tech
In Freiberg v. Xonar Technology Inc. (Sept. 15, 2026), the Court of Chancery held that stockholder written consents to remove a director, which were obtained after the Plaintiff had already commenced litigation challenging the previous set of consents to remove the director, would count in determining whether a majority of stockholders approved the removal. The decision elucidates differences between stockholder action by written consent as compared to stockholder action at a meeting.
On January 5, 2026, Xonar secured stockholder consents reflecting majority approval to remove the director. The board of directors passed a resolution removing the director, “effective as of January 5, 2026.” The director sued, claiming that the resolution, and thus his removal, were invalid because the consents did not reflect majority stockholder approval as the company had relied on an incorrect capitalization table. The company contended that its calculation was correct, but as a precaution, “decided to shore up the vote.” On January 27, the company obtained additional consents for the directors’ removal from two significant stockholders.
The Plaintiff claimed that the additional consents were ineffective because “Xonar necessarily ‘closed’ the consent period” by “carr[ying] out the corporate action described in the consents and remov[ing] him.” He argued that the January 5 consents and the January 27 consents thus were votes on separate actions and could not be aggregated. The court disagreed. Chancellor McCormick noted that “stockholder written consents do not operate like stockholder meetings. They are ‘in lieu of’ and ‘without a meeting’”—not, as the Plaintiff’s arguments assumed, “analogous to” a stockholder meeting. Stockholder action by written consent can be accomplished by one or multiple consents, and, if multiple consents, they need not all be signed on the same date. DGCL Section 228 “requires that all consents be obtained and delivered within sixty days…of the first date on which a consent is so delivered….” Thus, “the consent period is not ‘closed’ until the earlier of 60 days or the delivery of the requisite number of consents. The January 27 consents indisputably were delivered within sixty days of the January 5 consents, and therefore could be aggregated with them to remove the director.
Chancery Holds Delaware Officer-Consent Statute Does Not Cover a “Chief Strategy Officer”—Altigen
In Altigen Communications, Inc. v. Day (Aug. 21, 2026), the Court of Chancery held that the Plaintiff failed to establish personal jurisdiction over “RD,” who was the “Chief Strategy Officer” of a Delaware corporation. Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster concluded that Delaware’s Officer-Consent Statute did not extend to RD because he did not occupy a role identified in the statute nor a functionally equivalent role.
Under the Officer-Consent Statute, a person who serves a Delaware corporation in specified roles consents to service of process. The Statute states that it applies to a Delaware corporation’s president, CEO, COO, CFO, CLO, controller, treasurer or chief accounting officer, or a person who functionally serves in any such role although not holding the formal position.
The court held that the Plaintiff’s complaint “did not allege facts supporting a reasonable inference that [RD]’s position as Chief Strategy Officer encompassed or substantially overlapped with an identified role.” The complaint alleged that RD “was responsible for managing relationships with significant customers and meeting thrice weekly with the CEO.” RD’s employment agreement stated that he would “perform all duties and accept all responsibilities incident to such position or as assigned by [the CEO]”—but, the court stated, the agreement “[did] not spell out what those might be.” An email from the CEO to RD stated that RD “would be responsible for cultivating strategic customers in key vertical markets, overseeing talent acquisition, and employee development.” But, the court wrote, while “[t]hose functions could be part of what a CEO, president, or Chief Operating Officer might do,” they did “not support an inference that [RD] performed one of those roles or that his duties substantially overlapped with one of those roles.”
The court acknowledged that that there was a reasonable inference that RD “was a relatively senior person who had some operational authority.” That was insufficient, however, for a conclusion that he performed one of the roles identified in the Statute or that his duties substantially overlapped with one of those roles.
Practice Point. The decision reaffirms that application of the Officer-Consent Statute does not extend to all officers, or even all senior officers, of a corporation. As the Statute covers any officer who agrees in writing to be subject to the Statute, a corporation may wish to consider specifying in an officer’s employment agreement that the officer agrees to be subject to the Statute.
Third Party’s Stock Purchase of an Indirect Parent Company Was Not a “Change of Control” as Defined in the Parties’ Agreement—Castle Tire
In Castle Tire Disposal, LLC v. Liberty Tire Services of Ohio, LLC (Sept. 24, 2026), the Court of Chancery rejected a seller’s argument that a third party’s stock purchase of an indirect parent company constituted a “Change of Control” of the indirect parent’s downstream subsidiary. The court held that, as no Change of Control occurred, the purchase did not trigger a contingent value payment under the parties’ agreement. Vice Chancellor Will stressed that the parties’ asset purchase agreement defined “Change of Control” narrowly, and that the principle of corporate separateness prevented the court from collapsing the entity structure to save the seller’s claim. The Defendant-buyer’s pleading stage motion to dismiss the case was granted.
In May 2023, Castle signed a letter of intent with Liberty Tire Services, LLC (“Liberty Services”) that contemplated a potential acquisition of Castle by a Liberty Services affiliate or subsidiary. In February 2024, Castle executed an Asset Purchase Agreement (“APA”) with defendant Liberty Tire Services of Ohio, LLC (“Liberty Ohio”)— defined in the APA as the “Buyer.” Liberty Services and Liberty Ohio were part of a complex web of entities. Through that ownership structure, Liberty Ohio was an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of Liberty Recycling Parent Inc. (“Liberty Parent”). Liberty Parent, in turn, was indirectly owned by a private equity firm (“ECP”). Under the APA, Liberty Ohio acquired substantially all the rights and assets of Castle and its subsidiaries.
In addition to $40 million in consideration paid on closing, the APA provided for a contingent value payment, triggered on the first to occur of (i) 40 months after the APA’s closing date, or (ii) a “Change of Control.” “Change of Control” was defined as: “ (i) [A]n acquisition of Buyer (or its successor) by another entity by means of any transaction or series of related transactions…, or (ii) a sale of all or substantially all of the Assets (collectively, a “Merger”), so long as in either case Buyer’s equityholders of record as of immediately following the Closing will, immediately after such Merger, hold less than fifty percent (50%) of the voting power of the surviving or acquiring entity.” Thus, a Change of Control required two elements: (1) a qualifying “Merger” (either an acquisition of Liberty Ohio or a sale of substantially all of its assets), and (2) Liberty Ohio’s “equityholders of record” as of “immediately following” the APA’s closing holding less than 50% of the voting power of the surviving or acquiring entity. Both payment triggers relied on EBITDA to calculate the contingent value payment. The time-based trigger used EBITDA generated over the twelve full calendar months ending on the last day of the fortieth full calendar month after closing. The Change of Control trigger, by contrast, used pro forma EBITDA included in or derived from marketing materials prepared in connection with the Change of Control.
In October 2025, a private equity firm (“ISC”) publicly announced that it had signed a definitive agreement to acquire “Liberty Tire Recycling” from ECP. Liberty Ohio provided certain marketing materials to Castle in connection with the sale. In November, Liberty Ohio’s Chief Strategy Officer told Castle that ISC believed the purchase of “Liberty” would not constitute a Change of Control under the APA. The acquisition closed on December 18. Liberty Ohio made no contingent value payment to Castle. On December 30, Castle sued Liberty Ohio, seeking (i) a declaratory judgment that the ISC transaction constituted a Change of Control under the APA, and (ii) specific performance requiring Liberty Ohio to make a contingent value payment. Liberty Ohio moved for judgment on the pleadings. After briefing and oral argument, the court concluded that the APA was unambiguous that a Change of Control required both a qualifying Merger and the requisite reduction in the voting power held by Liberty Ohio’s equityholders of record; and that Castle failed to plead facts showing that either requirement was satisfied.
ISC’s acquisition of Liberty Parent was not a qualifying “Merger.” Castle contended, first, that an “acquisition” occurred when ISC acquired substantially all of Liberty Parent’s common stock, giving ISC “possession or control over” Liberty Ohio—one of Liberty Parent’s many wholly-owned subsidiaries. The court stressed, however, that the plain language of the APA limited a qualifying Merger to the “acquisition of Buyer (or its successor).” The APA defined “Buyer” solely as Liberty Ohio, necessarily excluding acquisitions of other entities from the definition. The court wrote: “Delaware corporation law is largely built on the idea that the separate legal existence of corporate entities should be respected. Because Castle chose to contract with Liberty Ohio, [the court] cannot disregard that distinction and broaden the provision to sweep in an upstream parent.” The court noted that, elsewhere in the APA, when the parties intended a provision to reach affiliates, they expressly stated so.
Sale of Liberty Parent did not transfer assets of Liberty Ohio. Castle also contended that the ISC transaction was a “sale of all or substantially all of the Assets” of Liberty Ohio, arguing that a sale of Liberty Parent included Liberty Ohio’s business. The APA defined “Assets” as “the Business, properties, assets and rights” sold by Castle to Liberty Ohio under the APA. The court stated that Castle’s argument made the conclusory allegation that all or substantially all of the Assets referenced in the APA were sold to ISC, but Castle did not plead facts showing that the ISC transaction transferred any assets owned by Liberty Ohio. Rather, Castle alleged that ECP owned substantially all of the outstanding common stock of Liberty Parent. The court responded: “In any event, the principle of corporate separateness recognizes that because a subsidiary is a separate entity, a parent and its subsidiary are not regarded as a single economic unit. The sale of a parent company’s stock is not a transfer of its downstream subsidiary’s assets.”
Beneficial owners are not the “equityholders of record.” The court stated that, even if the ISC transaction had constituted a qualifying Merger, for a Change of Control, Liberty Ohio’s “equityholders of record as of immediately following the APA’s Closing” had to have held less than 50% of the “voting power of the surviving or acquiring entity.” Viewed in context, the court stated, “equityholders of record” unambiguously referred to the record owners of Liberty Ohio’s membership interests—not the beneficial holders of interests in the broader Liberty enterprise. Thus, the acquisition of Liberty Ohio’s indirect parent did not diminish the voting power held by Liberty Ohio’s record equityholders. The court rejected Castle’s argument that the plain meaning of “equityholders of record” is the persons “with ultimate control of the entity.” Castle contended that ECP was Liberty Ohio’s equityholder of record when the APA was executed, and it was ECP that lost its voting power to ISC in the transaction. The court responded: “Castle’s reading of ‘equityholders of record’ conflate[d] beneficial ownership—the underlying owner that enjoys the economic benefits of an asset— with record ownership—the owner officially listed in the company’s records…. In the limited liability company context, ‘equityholders of record’ routinely refers to the record holders of membership interests in the entity—not an indirect parent.”
Fried Frank M&A/PE Briefings Issued This Quarter
Chancery Dismisses Claims Financial Advisor Steered Deal to a Favored Bidder—Envestnet⟶
Boeing Decision Appears to Narrow Potential Caremark Liability for Directors and Officers ⟶
Chancery Finds Buyer’s Post-Closing Actions May Have Breached Earnout Covenants—Georgia Security⟶
Chancery Dismisses Claims Financial Advisor Steered Deal to a Favored Bidder—Envestnet ⟶
Delaware Chancery Clarifies Implied Covenant Limits ⟶
Are AI Legal Chats by Non-Lawyer Officers and Directors Discoverable? ⟶
Chancery Finds Potential Liability for Blocking Company Financings Despite Contractual Veto Rights⟶
Del. Dispatch: The New 'Director Independence' Definition⟶
Chancery Finds Funds Liable for Aiding Directors’ Fiduciary Breaches⟶
Chancery Holds Specific Oral Statements About Post-Closing Plans May Exceed Mere Puffery⟶
Selected Other Fried Frank Briefings Issued This Quarter
Prediction Markets’ Risks Warrant Biopharma Compliance Measures⟶
Hybrid Metaphysics: A Primer on U.S. Tax Treaties and Fiscally Transparent Entities⟶
Trade Secrets, DTSA, and the Federal Court Splits Shaping Litigation Outcomes⟶
Private Capital's Evolving Sports Play⟶
Capitalising on an Expanding Liquidity Toolkit⟶
3 Ways The SEC's Retail Fraud Reboot Raises The Bar⟶
FTC Secures Record $12 Million Penalty for HSR Act Violations⟶
This communication is for general information only. It is not intended, nor should it be relied upon, as legal advice. In some jurisdictions, this may be considered attorney advertising. Please refer to the firm’s data policy page for further information.