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M&A/PE Quarterly | September 19, 2023

Recent Delaware Decisions Indicate a Judicial Shift in Buyer Aiding and Abetting Cases and Entire Fairness Cases

Two separate emerging Delaware judicial trends suggest a shift to some degree in the courts’ approaches—(i) increasing the potential for buyers to be liable for aiding and abetting sell-side breaches of fiduciary duties and (ii) increasing the potential for controller-buyers to establish that conflicted transactions meet the stringent entire fairness standard. While there is still a high bar to plaintiff success on buyer aiding and abetting claims, and still a high bar to a controller-buyer’s success is establishing entire fairness, the Delaware courts’ recent decisions are likely to affect results in—and thus the parties’ respective leverage in negotiating settlements of—stockholder challenges to certain types of M&A transactions. Below, we discuss these developments and offer related practice points.

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Court of Chancery Again Finds a Buyer Liable for Aiding and Abetting Sell-Side Breaches of Fiduciary Duties—Columbia Pipeline

In In re Columbia Pipeline (June 30, 2023), the Delaware Court of Chancery held, in a post-trial decision, that a buyer was liable for aiding and abetting the target executives’ breaches of fiduciary duties during the target’s sale process. Columbia Pipeline follows two other recent cases—Mindbody (2023) and Presidio (2021)—in which the Court of Chancery also found the buyer liable, or (at the pleading stage) potentially liable, for aiding and abetting sell-side fiduciary breaches. In a related development, in two other cases in recent years, the court found a target’s financial advisor liable for aiding and abetting target directors’ or executives’ breaches of fiduciary duties in a sale process—Morrison v. Berry (2020) and In re Rural/Metro (affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in RBC Capital Markets v. Jervis (2015)). These decisions stand in contrast to the courts’ historic trend of virtually never holding a buyer or other third party liable for aiding and abetting sell-side fiduciary breaches.

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Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Conflicted Transaction Satisfied “Entire Fairness,” Despite Serious Sale Process Flaws—BGC Partners

In In re BGC Partners (Aug. 10, 2023), the Delaware Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, without commentary, affirmed the Court of Chancery’s post-trial decision (Aug. 19, 2022) holding that the acquisition of a company indirectly controlled by the buyer’s controller met the entire fairness standard—notably, notwithstanding the lower court’s finding that there were serious flaws in the sale process. BGC Partners follows two other decisions in recent years in which the Court of Chancery also has found entire fairness satisfied in conflicted-controller transactions despite serious flaws in the transaction process—Hsu Living Trust v. Oak Hill (2020) and ACP Master v. Sprint/Clearwater (2017). These decisions stand in contrast to the Delaware courts’ historic trend of virtually never finding, when the entire fairness standard applies, that it has been satisfied.

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Important MFW Developments

The MFW framework provides a pathway to business judgment review, rather than entire fairness review, of transactions involving a conflicted controller or a conflicted board (i.e., where a controller, or a majority of the board, has a personal interest in or will receive a non-ratable benefit from the transaction). The MWF prerequisites for business judgment review of such a transaction are that the transaction was, from the outset, conditioned on approval by both (i) an independent special committee of directors that fulfilled its duty of care and (ii) a majority of the unaffiliated stockholders in a fully informed, uncoerced vote. If such a transaction is challenged, and the MFW prerequisites were met, then any fiduciary breaches by the controller or directors are “cleansed”—with the result that any claims of breach of fiduciary duties are dismissed at the early pleading stage of litigation.

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Delaware Supreme Court Considers Eliminating MFW Prerequisites for Business Judgment Review of Conflicted Transactions Other than in the Squeeze-Out Merger Context—Match Group

Since MFW was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in 2014, the Delaware courts have expanded the doctrine to apply to a broad variety of conflicted transactions, both within and outside the M&A/PE context. In various cases, the court has applied the MFW framework to, for example, a reverse spin-off initiated by a controller, a de-SPAC merger, a charter amendment that prolonged a company’s dual class structure, a redemption of tracking stock, consulting arrangements with a controller, and a compensation package for a controller. Then-Chancellor Bouchard, applying MFW to a stock reclassification (in Ahmed v. Crane (2017)), stated that there was “no principled basis on which to conclude that the dual protections in the MFW framework should apply to squeeze-out mergers but not to other forms of controller transactions.” In the Court of Chancery’s 2022 Match Group decision, Vice Chancellor Zurn observed that, with each new application of MFW, the Delaware courts offer “incentive for controllers to embrace the procedural approach most favorable to minority investors, with the incentive of obtaining the protection of the business judgment rule standard of review.”

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A Board’s Ignoring a Superior Competing Offer Does Not Defeat Business Judgment Review for a Merger Approved Under the MFW Framework—Smart Local Union v. BridgeBio Pharma

The Delaware Supreme Court, in a decision issued August 9, 2023, affirmed the Court of Chancery’s decision, in Smart Local Unions & Councils Pension Fund v. BridgeBio Pharma, Inc. (Dec. 29, 2022), that a conflicted controller merger satisfied the MFW prerequisites for business judgment review (leading to dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims), even though a credible competing bidder made a substantially higher offer than that made by the controller and that bid was rejected by the controller and not considered by the board. The Supreme Court’s one-page decision, without commentary, upheld the dismissal based on the reasoning set forth in the lower court’s opinion.

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Other Developments of Interest

Fried Frank Briefings Issued This Quarter

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