M&A/PE Quarterly — Q1 2025
M&A/PE Quarterly | April 1, 2025
Table of Contents:
The New DGCL Amendments: Implications, Observations, and Practice Points
Other Developments of Interest:
- Court of Chancery Orders Discovery Sanctions Where COO-Director Did Not Suspend Auto-Delete Functions on Her Personal Email Account—Facebook
- SEC Staff Issues New Guidance on Stockholder Engagement and Stockholder Proposals
- Texas Federal Court Finds Selecting a Pro-ESG 401(k) Plan Manager Violated ERISA
- Chancery Decision Underscores Difficulty in Obtaining Summary Judgment on Earnout Disputes
- Chancery Holds Two 2-Year Non-Competes Unenforceable—in Connection with Sale of a Business and Investment in a Business—Cleveland Integrity and Weil Holdings
- Earnout Not Payable, Based on Extrinsic Evidence of Parties’ Intent—Pacira v. Fortis
- Pretextual Termination of Agreement Did Not Violate Implied Covenant of Good Faith—Comcast Cable v. CX360
- Non-Independence of Board Was Insufficient Ground to Excuse Demand to Bring Derivative Caremark Claims—Harper v. Sievert
- Chancery Rejects Plaintiffs’ Claim of Demand Futility that was Based on Directors’ Appointment by the CEO-Controller–Trade Desk
- U.S. Supreme Court Holds a TRO Cannot Confer “Prevailing Party” Status for Purposes of Awarding Attorney Fees
Fried Frank M&A/PE Briefings Issued this Quarter:
- Update on DEI—Federal Court Temporarily Blocks Most of the Administration’s DEI Orders, But Uncertainty Continues
- Delaware Supreme Court Overturns Tripadvisor Decision, Providing a Clearer Path for Reincorporation
- Implications of Tornetta v. Musk II for Executive Compensation and for Stockholder Ratification
- Sponsor-Controller Did Not Face Disabling Conflicts When Selling Portco Near Expiration of Fund’s Term—Manti v. Authentix
- Practice Points Arising from Albertsons’ Claims Against Kroger for Breach of Their Merger Agreement
- Where Things Stand at the End of 2024
- Top Five Merger Agreement Considerations in Light of the New HSR Rules
- Has the Antitrust “Open Season” on Private Equity Closed?
- Competition Act Brings Important UK Merger Control Changes
- President Trump Announces “America First Policy”
- CTA Back in Effect with an Extended Deadline (With Update)
- In with the New: Executive Orders Impacting Government Contractors in Opening Weeks of Trump Administration
In Memoriam—Arthur Fleischer, Jr.
The New DGCL Amendments: Implications, Observations, and Practice Points
On March 25, 2025, significant amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (the Amendments”) were adopted that will change Delaware law relating to director “independence”; corporate “control”; conflicted-controller and conflicted-board transactions; liability of controllers; and stockholder access to books and records.
The Amendments are intended to stem a “DExit” movement that had emerged, with many existing Delaware corporations and about-to-go-public companies considering whether Delaware is still the best state in which to be incorporated (although actual DExits have been rare). The movement arose in response to recent trends in the Delaware common law that many viewed as inserting substantial subjectivity and uncertainty into the law and unduly favoring stockholders over corporate directors and controllers—while at the same time both Texas and Nevada have been adopting new corporate law statutes, developing new business courts, and aggressively recruiting companies to incorporate there.
The Amendments were hotly debated among market commentators—and even among ordinary Delaware residents, with signs posted along the state’s roadways and in front of houses, advocating “Support Senate Bill 21” or “Stop Senate Bill 21.” The Governor of Delaware championed the Amendments as “much-needed changes during an urgent time in Delaware.” The corporate bar generally supported the Amendments, on the basis that, by providing greater clarity and predictability of the law, and rebalancing stakeholder protections, they will facilitate corporate planning and transactions. The plaintiffs’ bar and institutional investors generally disfavored the Amendments as they diminish stockholder protections.
Key Points
- The Amendments significantly modify current Delaware law, by:
- limiting the circumstances under which a director’s independence with respect to a transaction (or other board act) may be challenged;
- limiting who may be deemed to be a corporate controller;
- providing easier routes to business judgment review of conflicted-controller and conflicted-board transactions (and other board acts); and
- restricting stockholder access to corporate books and records.
The Amendments are intended to reverse the judicial trends in Delaware that over recent years have expanded the circumstances under which directors could be deemed non-independent with respect to a transaction; a minority stockholder could be deemed a controller; the applicability of MFW to all conflicted-controller transactions (with increased difficulty to satisfy the MFW prerequisites to business judgment review); potential liability of controllers; stockholder entitlement to books and records investigations under DGCL Section 220; and the types of books and records a stockholder could obtain under a Section 220 demand.
- The Amendments are likely to stem the DExit movement—as they represent a significant shift in the law that benefits corporate directors and controllers. We note, however, that, arguably, the Amendments still impose higher standards on directors and controllers than is the case under current Nevada or Texas law. Therefore, some controlled companies may still consider incorporation in Nevada or Texas (or other states) rather than Delaware. For most companies, though, the Amendments are likely to end the DExit discussions. Delaware’s significant advantages include its highly expert judiciary and corporate bar, and the extensive, highly developed common law. The significant potential disadvantages of Nevada or Texas incorporation include uncertainty in light of the newness of their business statutes and courts, as well as the possibility of stronger political influences on the judiciary process in those states.
- The effect of the Amendments will be uncertain for some time. We do not expect that the Amendments will eliminate litigation over conflicted transactions—there will still be myriad litigable issues. Rather, we expect that the Amendments will significantly lessen the likelihood that challenges to such transactions will result in injunctions or very large settlements or damages awards. Most importantly, it remains to be seen how the Delaware courts will interpret the Amendments.
- We expect to see changes in board composition, transaction structures, and large stockholder stakes. As discussed below, based on the Amendments, except in unusual circumstances, it is likely that: almost every board will include at least two independent directors (meeting the new, easier-to-satisfy definition of “independence”); almost every conflicted transaction (other than a going-private) will be conditioned on special committee approval (and none on disinterested stockholders approval), and the special committee approval condition will be imposed late in the transaction process; and many large stockholders will structure their equity stakes to be below 33%, and may seek to secure contractual rights to protect against a company’s engaging in conflicted transactions.
Background
Senate Bill 21 was introduced in the Delaware legislature February 17, 2025. The proposed Bill was revised by the Delaware State Bar Association’s Corporation Law Council on March 3. The Bill, as revised by the CLC, was approved by the Delaware Senate on March 12 and the Delaware House on March 25.
Summary of the Amendments
The Amendments will be applicable to all pre- and post-enactment transactions and other actions, but will not apply to or affect any action or court proceeding that was completed or pending on or before February 17, 2025. Below, we summarize the Amendments as compared to the pre-existing Delaware law.
DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE
The Amendments codify a definition of independence that tracks existing common law, but adds a “heightened presumption” of independence if the board determines that, under applicable stock exchange rules, the director is independent from the corporation and (if applicable) the controller. The Amendments thus limit the circumstances under which a director’s independence may be successfully challenged.
Prior law: Prior to the Amendments, there was no statutory definition of director independence. The courts determined in each case whether a director was independent with respect to a transaction by engaging in a facts-intensive, “holistic analysis” that took into consideration all potentially relevant factors. Based on these wide-ranging inquiries, the courts in recent years had deemed directors to be non-independent with respect to conflicted-controller transactions based (at least in part) on, for example, a sense of “beholden-ness” or “owing-ness” by the director to the controller; an inference that the director hoped for future appointments to board seats at the controller’s other portfolio companies; or even the director’s past expressions of strong admiration, respect or affection for the controller. In many decisions, the courts found that a director who was independent under applicable stock exchange rules was not independent with respect to a transaction involving a conflicted controller.
The Amendments:
- Definition of Independence. The Amendments define a “disinterested director” with respect to an act or transaction as a director who (i) is not a party to the transaction; (ii) does not have a “material interest” in the act or transaction; and (iii) does not have a “material relationship” with a person that has a material interest in the act or transaction.
“Interest” is defined as “an actual or potential benefit, including the avoidance of a detriment, other than one which would devolve on the corporation or the stockholders generally.” “Relationship” is defined as “a familial, financial, professional, employment, or other relationship.” For directors, an interest or relationship is “material” if it “would reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of the director’s judgment when participating in the authorization or approval of the act or transaction at issue.” A director’s having been designated, nominated or elected to the board by any person that has a material interest in the transaction at issue will not, of itself, be evidence that the director is non-disinterested with respect to the transaction.
- Presumption of Independence. For corporations that are listed on a national securities exchange, each director that is not a party to the act or transaction at issue will be presumed to be a disinterested director with respect to the act or transaction if the board determined that the director meets the exchange’s rules for determining director independence from the corporation; and, if a controller is involved in the act or transaction, the board determined that the director is independent from the controller under the exchange’s rules, treating the controller as if it were the corporation under such rules. The presumption was be “heightened” and only may be rebutted by “substantial and particularized facts” that the director does not meet the statutory definition of a disinterested director.
SAFE HARBORS FOR CONFLICTED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS
MFW is still be available as a route to business judgment review of conflicted transactions—but the Amendments provide for new, easier-to-satisfy safe harbors for such transactions. Most significantly, under the Amendments, for all conflicted acts and transactions (other than going-private transactions), the only prerequisite to business judgement review is approval by a special committee of independent directors (without any requirement for approval also by the disinterested stockholders). In addition, as discussed below, the Amendments make obtaining special committee approval easier than it is under MFW.
Prior Law: Under the common law, the entire fairness standard (Delaware’s most exacting standard of judicial review) applies when a conflicted-controller transaction, or a conflicted-board act or transaction, is challenged. Under entire fairness standard, an act or transaction may be enjoined or post-closing damages awarded unless the defendants prove that the act or transaction was “entirely fair” (that is, fair as to both price and process). However, if the act or transaction complied with the MFW prerequisites for business judgment review, then the deferential business judgment review standard would apply instead. The MFW prerequisites are that the transaction was approved by both (i) a special committee of independent directors and (ii) a majority of the disinterested stockholders. If only one of these approvals (but not both) was obtained, then entire fairness would apply but the burden of proof would shift to the plaintiffs to prove that the transaction was not entirely fair.
The Amendments:
- All Conflicted Acts or Transactions (other than going-privates). A conflicted-controller transaction (other than a going-private), and a conflicted-board act or transaction (i.e., where a majority of the directors on the board are not disinterested), will not be enjoined, nor give rise to damages, if it:
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- was approved by a majority of the directors on a two-or-more-person special committee comprised entirely of disinterested directors; OR
- was approved or ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the disinterested stockholders, in an informed and uncoered vote; OR
- was “fair to the corporation and its stockholders” (which, as described in the legislature’s Synopsis of the legislation, is intended to be “consistent with” the entire fairness standard).
- Going-Private Transactions. A going-private transaction will not be enjoined, nor give rise to damages, if both (i) AND (ii) above are satisfied, OR (iii) is satisfied. A “going-private transaction” is defined, for a publicly listed corporation, as a 13e-3 transaction; and, for all other corporations, as a transaction in which all shares of capital stock held by disinterested stockholders are canceled or acquired.
REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND MINORITY STOCKHOLDER APPROVALS
The Amendments make it easier to obtain the special committee and/or minority stockholder approvals to satisfy the safe harbors than is the case under the current common law requirements to comply with MFW.
Specifically:
- No ab initio requirement. For MFW compliance, under common law, the transaction must be conditioned ab initio on the special committee and minority stockholder approvals (i.e., the conditions must be imposed at the outset of the transaction process, before economic negotiations commence). Under the Amendments, however, to satisfy the safe harbors, there is no ab initio requirement. Instead, a special committee approval condition can be imposed at any time; and a minority stockholder approval condition can be imposed any time before submission of the transaction to the stockholders for their vote.
- Composition of special committee. Under both current common law and the Amendments, the committee must be comprised entirely of independent directors. The Amendments require, in addition, that the committee be comprised of at least two members.
- No requirement for special committee to be authorized to hire independent advisors. Under both current common law and the Amendments, the special committee must be fully authorized to negotiate the act or transaction and to “say no” to it. However, while under current common law the committee also must be authorized to hire its own advisors, there is no such requirement under the Amendments.
- No requirement that special committee acted effectively. Under current common law, the special committee must have fulfilled a duty of care such that it acted effectively on behalf of the minority stockholders. Under the Amendments, the committee only must act “in good faith and without gross negligence.”
- Disclosure of conflicts. The Amendments codify that all members of the board or the special committee (as the case may be) must be informed of, or must otherwise have known about, all of “the material facts” as to the act or transaction, including the interested directors’ and (if applicable) controller’s “relationship or interest,” including “any involvement in [its] initiation, negotiation, or approval….”
- Special committee approval by majority vote. Under current common law, the special committee approval must be by unanimous vote. Under the Amendments, the required vote is just a majority of the members then serving on the committee.
- Minority stockholder approval by majority of votes cast. Under current common law, the disinterested stockholder approval must be by a majority of the disinterested stockholders’ votes outstanding, in a “fully informed” and “uncoerced” vote. Under the Amendments, the approval must be by a majority of the disinterested stockholders’ votes cast, in an “informed” and “uncoerced” vote.
DEFINITION OF “CONTROL”
The Amendments codify a definition of “control” and, most notably, provide that a stockholder owning less than one-third of the outstanding voting power will not be deemed to be a controller unless the stockholder has a contractual or other right to elect a majority of the board and has power to exercise managerial authority over the corporation generally. The Amendments thus reduce the circumstances in which a minority stockholder could be deemed to be a controller.
Prior Law: Prior to the Amendments, there was no statutory definition of control, and no bright-line standard for a minimum level of stockholding necessary for a minority stockholder to be deemed a controller. Instead, the courts undertook in each case a “holistic analysis,” based on the specific facts and circumstances, to determine if a less-than-majority stockholder actually controlled the board with respect to either (a) the corporation generally or (b) the transaction at issue. In these wide-ranging inquiries, the courts took into consideration all possible sources of a minority stockholder’s influence, such as special voting rights, contractual rights, outsized influence due to having “superstar-CEO status” or holding a combination of key roles (such as founder-director-CEO), and so on.
The Amendments: The Amendments define “controlling stockholder” to mean any person that, together with such person’s affiliates and associates:
- is a majority stockholder—“Owns or controls a majority in voting power of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote generally in the election of directors”; or
- has a right to elect a majority of board—“Has the right, by contract or otherwise, to cause the election of…a majority of the members of the board”; or
- is at least a 33% stockholder, and has the functional equivalent of power to elect a majority of the board and to exercise managerial control over the corporation—“Has the power functionally equivalent to that of a stockholder that owns or controls a majority in voting power of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote generally in the election of directors by virtue of ownership or control of at least one-third in voting power of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote generally in the election of directors…and power to exercise managerial authority over the business and affairs of the corporation.”
EXCULPATION OF CONTROLLERS
Under the Amendments, a controlling stockholder will automatically be exculpated for duty of care violations.
Prior Law: Prior to the Amendments, the DGCL provided only that a corporation can opt in to statutory provisions that provide for exculpation of directors and officers from certain liability for breaches of fiduciary duty. There was no provision for exculpating controlling stockholders.
The Amendments: The Amendments provide that a controller may be liable for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty only with respect to “a. A breach of the duty of loyalty to the corporation or the other stockholders; b. Acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; or c. Any transaction from which the person derived an improper personal benefit.” There is no requirement that a corporation opt in to these exculpation provisions, and no ability to opt out.
BOOKS AND RECORDS
The Amendments impose a higher standard for stockholders to obtain access to corporate books and records and restrict which types of books and records can be accessed.
Prior Law: DGCL Section 220 has provided, and continues to provide, that a stockholder has a right to access corporate books and records for a “proper purpose” (which, most commonly, has been to investigate suspected corporate wrongdoing or mismanagement involving potential breaches of fiduciary breaches by directors, officers and/or controllers). Under the common law, the stockholder had to demonstrate some “credible basis” for suspecting wrongdoing or mismanagement—which, the courts have emphasized, imposes a very low bar to meet. If the stockholder shows a proper purpose and credible basis, the stockholder has been entitled to inspect those books and records that are “necessary or essential” to investigate the suspected misconduct. In recent years, the court has, in some cases, permitted very broad access to corporate materials, including directors’ and officers’ emails, texts and other informal communications.
The Amendments: Under the Amendments, first, a stockholder will have a right to access corporate books and records only if the stockholder has described a proper purpose with “reasonable particularity” (rather than just having a “credible basis” to suspect wrongdoing or mismanagement). Second, a stockholder only can obtain access to the books and records specified on a list set forth in the Amendments—namely, the charter, bylaws, board and committee minutes, annual financial statements, certain contracts between the corporation and stockholders, and director and officer independence questionnaires. If these materials are unavailable, the court may order access to the “functional equivalent” of such materials, “to the extent necessary and essential to fulfill the stockholder’s proper purpose.” In addition, a stockholder can obtain access to “specific records” not listed in the statute if the stockholder demonstrates a “compelling need” for the records, and by “clear and convincing evidence” demonstrates that the records are “necessary and essential,” to further the stockholder’s proper purpose. The Amendments also expressly authorize “reasonable restrictions on the confidentiality, use or distribution of books and records” to which a stockholder obtains access under a Section 220 demand; and provides that the information obtained will be deemed incorporated by reference into any complaint filed by the stockholder.
Open Issues and Our Observations
It remains to be seen how the Amendments will be applied in practice. It is uncertain how the Delaware courts will interpret the Amendments (which effectively overturn decades of seminal common law decisions). We note that last year, in response to the Court of Chancery’s Moelis decision (which, significantly limited corporations’ ability to grant special stockholders governance rights in stockholders agreements, based on DGCL Section 141(a)), the Delaware legislature amended the DGCL expressly to permit the granting of rights notwithstanding Section 141(a). However, the Court of Chancery then strongly signaled in a few decisions on related issues that it will be interpreting those amendments narrowly—that is, that the court may hold that, notwithstanding those amendments, many such governance rights nonetheless still would be invalid, on the basis that they may violate sections of the DGCL other than Section 141(a). In addition, we note that how common law interacts with statutory law can be a complicated issue, and there may be areas where the court applies existing common law on the basis that it does not directly contravene the Amendments.
Notwithstanding the Amendments, there will still be myriad potential litigable issues. Although the Amendments make the law clearer and generally less subjective with respect to director independence, control, controller transactions, and access to books and records, many litigable issues will remain. These may include, for example: whether a director serving on a special committee had a “material relationship” with a person having a “material interest” in the transaction at issue; whether a special committee acted “in good faith”; whether a special committee was informed of all of the actual and potential conflicts; whether a stockholder with a stake between 33% and a majority had board and managerial control; whether a disinterested stockholder vote was informed and uncoerced (and whether the Amendments’ requirement that the vote be “informed” imposes a different standard than the MFW requirement that it be “fully informed”); whether a stockholder has articulated suspected corporate wrongdoing with sufficient “particularity” to obtain books and records under DGCL Section 220; and whether the available corporate minutes are so cursory (or so inconsistent with other books and records) that access should be permitted to directors’ or officers’ emails or texts.
The new definition of “control” represents a significant shift in the law. Under the Amendments a less than 33% stockholder (unless having contractual or other rights to elect a majority of the board) will be deemed not to be a controller—even if he has effective control over the company generally or the transaction at issue. Also, it appears that a more-than-33% but less-than-majority stockholder (unless having contractual or other rights to elect a majority of the board) will be deemed a controller only if he has and exercises managerial control over the corporation generally—and will not be deemed a controller if he has and exercises control just over the transaction at issue.
We note that the Court of Chancery had been developing a concept in recent decisions that, based on mathematical analysis, the possibility of control is inferable from a stockholding of just around 20%. At that level, the court has said, there is a significant leg-up on any stockholder vote (given that not all stockholders vote), as well as the potential for a strong voice in the boardroom. The new bright-line standard at 33% appears to upend that approach.
We note also that the new bright-line standard would have led to a different result in many of the courts’ high-profile cases in recent years. For example, in Tornetta v. Musk (Jan. 2024), the Court of Chancery found that Elon Musk—a 21.9% stockholder of Tesla at the time his $56 billion compensation package was approved by Tesla’s board—had completely controlled the process for determining his compensation (Musk even conceding at trial that he had “negotiated [the compensation] with himself”). Under the Amendments, however, Musk would have been deemed not to be controller—as he owned less than 33% of Tesla’s outstanding shares (and, moreover, there was not a finding that he controlled the corporation generally). In In re Oracle (2023, aff’d. Del. Sup. Ct. 2025), the Court of Chancery found that Larry Ellison—a 28.4% stockholder of Oracle at the time the Oracle board approved the company’s purchase of NetSuite (which was owned 40% by Ellison)—was not a controller because he had removed himself from the board’s process and a special committee had acted effectively. Under the Amendments, however, Ellison would have been deemed not to be a controller even if he had not removed himself from the process and had completely controlled the process—as he owned less than 33% of Oracle’s outstanding shares.
The presumption of director independence based on stock exchange rules represents a significant shift in the law. First, the stock exchange rules regarding independence are directed at determining which directors can serve on certain board committees (such as the audit committee)—and it remains to be seen how that frame of analysis will apply when considering independence for other purposes.
Second, with the new presumption of independence, a director, even if having some financial or other interest in the transaction, nonetheless would in the first instance be presumed to be independent if the board (even a non-independent board apparently) determined that the director was independent. Then, the presumption could be rebutted only by a showing, with “substantial and particularized facts,” that the director had a material interest in the transaction (or in someone who did). And, notably, rebutting the presumption will be made more difficult by the higher standards under the Amendments for obtaining access to books and records.
Third, we note that the Amendments are still more stringent with respect to director independence than under Texas or Nevada law. Interestingly, the Texas Senate is considering a bill that would permit directors, officers and controllers to obtain judicial advisory opinions as to whether they would be deemed to be independent with respect to a transaction for purposes of the Texas statute.
The new standards for access to corporate books and records are likely to lead to less plaintiff success in framing complaints that can survive the pleading stage of litigation. With a higher standard for establishing a proper purpose for a Section 220 demand (i.e., “reasonable particularity” with respect to suspected corporate wrongdoing, rather than just a “credible basis” for such suspicion), stockholders will less often be successful in obtaining access to corporate books and records under Section 220 demands. Also, the materials available to them generally will be limited to traditional books and records (the charter, bylaws, financial statements, minutes of meetings, and presentations to the board—and not directors’ emails, texts, or other informal communications), as the stockholder would have to provide with “clear and convincing evidence” that access to other documents is necessary for the stated purpose. We note the likely difficulty in providing clear and convincing evidence of corporate wrongdoing at an early-stage proceeding the very purpose of which is to investigate whether there is evidence of corporate wronging.
The Amendments appear to upend the stockholder ratification ruling in Tornetta II. In Tornetta v. Musk II (Dec. 2024), the Court of Chancery established a boundary on the use of stockholder ratification—namely, that ratification will not be effective to shield directors from liability for fiduciary breaches if it comes after issuance of a post-trial judicial decision finding such breaches. Although the court found in Tornetta II that the stockholder ratification vote was not fully informed, the court made clear that the ratification would have been ineffective even if the vote had been fully informed. The court stressed that it would be unworkable to permit a framework under which, following a final court decision, the defendants can engage in a workaround to that decision by “creating new facts” such as stockholder ratification of the same action the court had struck down. The Amendments—which provide a safe harbor for conflicted-board actions that were approved or ratified by the disinterested stockholders—provides no express exception for ratification that is obtained after issuance of such a post-trial decision. Therefore, it appears that minority stockholders, perhaps without time limit, will be able to ratify conflicted-board actions that a court found in a post-trial decision involved breaches of fiduciary duty.
The Amendments do not supplant common law routes to business judgment review. The legislature’s Synopsis of the Amendments clarifies that “the [A]mendments do not displace any safe harbor procedures or other protections available at common law, including processes and procedures that comply with the pre-amendment common law but do not conform to the [new] safe harbors.” Accordingly, a conflicted controller can still obtain business judgment review by, for example, complying with the MFW requirements, or by removing itself from the board’s process with respect to the transaction at issue. However, under almost all circumstances, satisfaction of the special committee approval safe harbor will provide an easier and more certain route to business judgment deference—likely rendering MFW and controller-removal-from-the-process as relics of the past.
Practice Points
- It will be important to keep up to date on further developments. It remains to be seen how the courts will interpret the Amendments and how corporate practice will evolve in response to the Amendments. Also, the legislature may consider revisions or additions to the Amendments. For example, it might consider replicating the proposal the Texas Senate is currently considering that would permit directors, officers and controllers, in advance of a transaction, to seek advisory opinions from the courts as to whether they would be deemed independent with respect to the transaction. We note that the Delaware legislature is currently considering new legislation that would limit awards of attorney fees in certain corporate litigation cases.
- Based on the Amendments, companies should:
- strongly consider including at least two clearly independent directors on the board—so that the new special committee approval safe harbor for conflicted transactions can be utilized;
- be proactive in obtaining conflict information and disclosing it to the board (or its committee)—whenever the special committee safe harbor for conflicted transactions is utilized; and
- keep in mind the option of stockholder ratification—to “cleanse” a transaction of fiduciary breaches, even after a final court decision finding such breaches.
- Based on the Amendments, major stockholders who potentially could be deemed controllers should:
- consider keeping their stockholding below (or reducing it to get below) the 33% ownership level—so that the stockholder would not be deemed to be a controller (and therefore would obtain business judgment deference for conflicted transactions with the company even without satisfying the safe harbors and even if the stockholder actually controls the company or the transaction); and
- consider seeking protection against conflicted transactions by other major stockholders and the board under the safe harbors—for example, by obtaining special governance rights or contractual veto rights.
- Based on the Amendments, to structure a conflicted transaction to meet the special committee approval safe harbor:
- the board should select directors to serve on the special committee who clearly meet the new definition of independence;
- the board should seek to ensure that the committee is fully informed as to all actual and potential conflicts relating to the transaction; and
- the controller generally should impose the approval condition late in the process (as is permitted under the Amendments), just before the board vote (as earlier imposition of the condition is more likely to encourage competing bids).
- Still emails, emails, emails. While the Amendments lessen the risk of informal communications being accessible under Section 220 demands, we nonetheless re-emphasize that companies should have appropriate policies in place with respect to informal communications (such as emails and texts), and directors and officers should be vigilant in drafting such communications with the same care as applied to formal corporate communications. It should be kept in mind that there is still a possibility that such communications could be obtained through a Section 220 demand and, in any event, they may be obtained through discovery in litigation.
Other Developments of Interest:
Court of Chancery Orders Discovery Sanctions Where COO-Director Did Not Suspend Auto-Delete Functions on Her Personal Email Account—Facebook
In In re Facebook, Inc. (Jan. 21, 2025), the Court of Chancery ordered sanctions against a Facebook Inc. director for discovery violations in connection with derivative litigation relating to the so-called Cambridge Analytica Sandal. (The scandal involved claims that Facebook had deceived its users by telling them that their information on Facebook could be kept private but then allowing the information to be shared with third parties and making the information public). When the scandal first surfaced, Facebook issued a broad “legal hold,” instructing its executives and others to preserve and not destroy potential evidence. Shortly after the litigation was filed in 2018, the company sent a reminder to the recipients of the legal hold and had discussion with them about document preservation and collection.
In 2023, litigation discovery commenced. Discovery was extensive—with the defendants producing over 8.9 million pages from over 1.7 million documents. During the discovery process, the plaintiffs learned that the company’s COO-director and an outside director both had a practice of at least sometimes using their personal email accounts for Facebook business matters relevant to the lawsuit, and that their email accounts had auto-deleted all emails older than 30 days (for the COO) or 180 days (for the other director). The defendants undertook an extensive investigation to see if the emails could be obtained from other sources, but determined that they could not.
The plaintiffs moved for curative sanctions for spoliation of evidence. Vice Chancellor Laster granted a sanction against the COO, finding that, after she received the legal hold, she failed to take reasonable steps to preserve electronically stored information (ESI). Specifically, the court found, she acted unreasonably by failing to disable the auto-delete function on her email account or, alternatively, to back up messages before their deletion. In addition, the court found that her counsel failed to provide transparency on the issue when the plaintiffs raised it, and that this supported an inference that the COO was not simply using an auto-delete function but was picking and choosing which emails to delete. Further, the court found that the COO’s regular use of a personal email account to communicate about company business supported a conclusion that the loss of the emails constituted prejudice.
The court granted a sanction consisting of an increase by one level in the standard of proof on any issue in the litigation as to which the COO bore the burden of proof. As a result, the COO will only be able to prevail on any issue where she bears the burden of proof if she carries the burden by “clear and convincing evidence.” The court also ordered the COO to pay the plaintiffs’ fees and expenses in pursuing sanctions against her. The plaintiffs had sought, but the court rejected, sanctions against the COO that would have prevented her from moving for summary judgment, or from testifying about information received through or sent from her personal email account.
The court rejected imposing a sanction against the outside director, finding a lack of prejudice from the loss of his ESI. The court found that this director demonstrated that his lost ESI was unlikely to be responsive to the discovery demands. The court reasoned that, unlike the COO, this individual “was an outside director, not a C-suite officer, so he logically would have been less immersed in Company operations and likely received communications comparable to what other directors received.” In addition, unlike the COO, this director joined the board after the scandal and so “did not participate in those events in real time,” thus his emails relating to the relevant topics likely “would have been in the nature of after-the-fact reviews or efforts to avoid similar problems in the future.”
Also of note, the court reiterated that a company’s simply circulating a legal hold is not sufficient—rather, the company must take steps to ensure that the recipients understand and abide by the hold, and the company (as well as the relevant individuals) must suspend routine document retention and destruction policies so that evidence is not lost.
SEC Staff Issues New Guidance on Stockholder Engagement and Stockholder Proposals
On February 11, 2025, the SEC Staff issued one new and one revised Compliance and Disclosure Interpretation (C&DIs 103.12 and 103.11, respectively) with guidance relating to when a more-than-5% beneficial owner of a public company can opt to report its beneficial ownership under Schedule 13G instead of Schedule 13D. Under the new guidance, the Staff will consider a shareholder ineligible to use Schedule 13G if the shareholder engaged with the company (for example, on environmental, social or corporate governance (ESG) issues) and “exert[ed] pressure” on it to adopt any specific measures. The guidance states that, by contrast, if a shareholder simply expressed its views in discussions with the company, then Schedule 13G eligibility would not be lost. The new guidance may cause some institutional stockholders to consider whether to revise their policies on engagement with the companies in which they invest.
On February 12, 2025, the Staff published new Staff Legal Bulletin (SLB) 14M with guidance related to when a public company can exclude a Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal under the “economic relevance” and “ordinary business” exclusions (Rules 14a-8(i)(v) and (vii), respectively). Under the new guidance, the Staff, in evaluating whether a company can exclude a shareholder proposal under these exclusions, will focus on the relevance of the subject matter of the proposal to the particular company—and not, as has been the case, on whether the proposal’s subject matter relates to issues having potentially “broad societal impact.” Environmental and social proposals therefore will be more likely to be excluded than previously.
Texas Federal Court Finds Selecting a Pro-ESG 401(k) Plan Manager Violated ERISA
Spence v. American Airlines, Inc. (Jan. 10, 2025) is the first decision of which we are aware that, on the merits, addressed the interrelationship between ESG (environmental-social-governance) objectives and the duties of retirement plan fiduciaries under ERISA. In this class action on behalf of employees of American Airlines, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that American and its employee benefits committee (“EBC”) breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty under ERISA when they selected a third-party investment manager for the company’s employee 401(k) plans that included in its investment decisions the consideration of ESG factors. The court requested supplemental briefings from the parties on issues relating to what remedy was appropriate. The court accepted the plaintiff’s assertion that the manager’s public commitments to ESG-related objectives, and its actions in furtherance of those objectives, harmed the financial interests of the 401(k) plan beneficiaries.
Chancery Decision Underscores Difficulty in Obtaining Summary Judgment on Earnout Disputes
In a letter decision in Hartfield, Titus & Donnelly, LLC v. MarketAxess Holdings Inc. (Feb. 7, 2025), the Court of Chancery denied the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment in an earnout dispute. The purchase agreement, pursuant to which HTD acquired an electronic trading platform from MKTX, provided for five tiers of potential earnout payments based on the amount of license fees generated by HTD and paid to MKTX; and an additional “Cash Top-Up Option” if the license fees paid by HTD were more than a specified amount.
The closing was supposed to occur on a specific date but was delayed by nine days. To address the impact of the delay on the earnout targets, the parties amended the purchase agreement to prorate the targets by 356/365 for the first earnout period during each annual earnout period. Although the amendment prorated the earnout targets, it did not similarly revise the Cash Top-Up Option for the first earnout period. HTD then generated an amount of license fees in the first earnout period that missed the Cash Top-Up Option threshold by just a minimal amount.
HTD brought suit, claiming that the parties had clearly intended to amend the Cash Top-Up Option to reflect the proration. Vice Chancellor Bonnie A. David found that “there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether MKTX and HTD reached a specific prior understanding to prorate the Cash Top-Up Option for the first earnout period, the resolution of which must await trial.” The Vice Chancellor noted that HTD had cited documentary and other evidence to support its position that in the course of negotiations the parties had “reached a specific prior contractual understanding to ministerially prorate all targets,” while MKTX had cited “testimony from HTD’s former outside counsel, MKTX executives, and others purportedly demonstrating the opposite.”
Chancery Holds Two 2-Year Non-Competes Unenforceable—in Connection with Sale of a Business and Investment in a Business—Cleveland Integrity and Weil Holdings
In Cleveland Integrity Services v. Byers (Feb. 28, 2025), the Court of Chancery held that a non-compete provision entered into in connection with the sale of an oil and gas pipeline inspection company was unenforceable as it was overbroad. The non-compete restricted the executive from competing with the company, anywhere in North America, for two years following termination of his employment with the company. The non-compete’s duration combined with its geographic scope was unreasonable, the court found, as it was “facially broader than necessary to protect [the company]’s U.S. business interests.” The court emphasized that, although the company may have had customers with operations or assets in Canada or Mexico, it “only service[d] such customers within the U.S.” The court stressed that: (i) the company’s business was “geographically rooted: its employees must physically see a pipeline to inspect it…” ; and (ii) while at the time of the sale of the company in 2013, the non-compete “may have been reasonable as a means to protect [the company’s] interest in expanding its services beyond the U.S. free from Defendants’ interference,” the company had not in fact expanded beyond the U.S. and had offered no evidence that it now planned to do so (thus, in 2025, at the time of enforcement of the provision, there was no evidence that the company had “a legitimate economic interest that was advanced by the geographic scope of the covenant”).
In Weil Holdings (Mar. 2, 2025), the Court of Chancery held that a non-compete provision entered into in connection with the investment by a doctor in the limited liability company employing him was unenforceable as it was overbroad. The non-compete, contained in the LLC agreement, prohibited any unit holder of membership units in the LLC from competing with the company until two years after the unitholder no longer held any units. The geographic scope included any area within 15 miles of the principal place of business of any “Affiliate” of the company. The court found that the duration, as well as the geographic scope, was unreasonable.
With respect to the duration, the court emphasized that, as the unitholders had no mandatory redemption right for any reason under the LLC agreement, the non-compete potentially was of “indefinite duration.” The court rejected the company’s argument that a definite duration could be implied given that this was a private equity investment and such investments almost invariably have a three-to-ten-year duration. Even if so, the court responded, a potentially twelve-year non-compete (ten years of the investment plus an additional to years) would be unreasonable. With respect to the geographic scope, the court stressed that the restricted area was “constantly subject to change,” as Affiliates might move or expand over time and the doctor could find himself “suddenly in breach” of the non-compete. The court rejected the company’s argument that this was merely a speculative concern. “For a person seeking stable housing and employment, [it was] unworkable,” the court wrote.
In both cases, the court declined to blue-pencil the non-competes to make them enforceable. In Cleveland Integrity, the court rejected the company’s contention that blue-penciling would be appropriate because “any overreaches were only in the margins.” The court stated that blue-penciling “creates confusion, encourages employers to overreach, and encourages litigation by building a degree of uncertainty into every employment agreement.” In Weil Holdings, the court rejected the company’s argument that equal bargaining power between the parties supported blue-penciling their agreement. The court found the facts did not indicate equal bargaining power. “[T]he Noncompete was not negotiated in the context of a sale of a business, the parties did not negotiate the Noncompete in any substantive way, and, even accepting Plaintiff’s position that Defendant was a sophisticated investor with an opportunity to negotiate the Noncompete, his position as a unitholder employee placed him in a disparate bargaining position.”
Earnout Not Payable, Based on Extrinsic Evidence of Parties’ Intent—Pacira v. Fortis
In Pacira Biosciences v. Fortis Advisors (Jan. 21, 2025), the Court of Chancery held, in a post-trial decision, that, under the merger agreement pursuant to which Pacira had acquired MyoScience, Pacira was not obligated to make earnout payments to the selling stockholders.
MyoScience’s one product was iovera, a handheld medical device used for pain relief. The merger agreement provided for a $120 million upfront purchase price, with an additional $100 million payable if specified milestones were achieved. The earnout mechanism was used to bridge the valuation uncertainty arising from the possibility of changes to the reimbursement rates health care providers would receive for use of iovera. The reimbursement rates for a medical device are determined by the “CPT code” that regulators initially set, and then update annually, for the device. While Pacira expected a wide market for iovera, the reimbursement rates applicable to iovera at the time of the merger were low. Accordingly, earnout milestones relating to $50 million of earnout payments were based on the regulators making changes to the applicable CPT code to provide for higher reimbursement rates for iovera.
After the merger, the regulators made changes in the CPT codes, but the parties disputed whether the changes were sufficient to trigger the milestones. Specifically, the parties disagreed as to: (i) whether the relevant reimbursement rate for triggering the milestones was the “national” rate or the “locality-adjusted” rate (the latter being a higher rate); and (ii) whether the reimbursement rate for a CPT code other than code 64624 could trigger the milestones.
With respect to (i), the court determined that the definition of “CMS Reimbursement” rate in the parties’ merger agreement was ambiguous as to whether it referred to the national or locality-adjusted reimbursement rates. The court found that both parties advanced reasonable interpretations of the CMS Reimbursement definition in their agreement, but that extrinsic evidence “overwhelmingly” confirmed that the parties had intended to use the national reimbursement rate. The court noted that, throughout the parties’ pre-merger negotiations, they had discussed and considered national reimbursement rates, but never locality-adjusted rates. In addition, post-merger, both parties, relying on the national reimbursement rate, had acknowledged that the milestones had not been met; and it was several months later that the seller and its consultant, had devised a new interpretation of the agreement, relying on the locality-adjusted rate. With respect to (ii), the court determined that the merger agreement unambiguously provided that the milestones could be triggered by an applicable reimbursement rate for a CPT code other than code 64624, but that reimbursement under a different CPT code required that the code cover a procedure for which iovera was actually used. The court found that Pacira did not prove that iovera had been so used.
The case highlights the need for clear, specific, detailed language in earnout provisions, contextualized for the specific product or business acquired, in an effort to avoid post-closing disputes. The crafting and drafting of earnout provisions requires close collaboration among the lawyers, business people and scientific (or other) experts. Notably, the parties in this case disputed a host of additional issues that also could have been avoided by more specific and contextualized language. Those issues included whether: proof of actual reimbursement was required; it was relevant that certain CPT codes exceeded the milestones’ monetary thresholds before the merger agreement was signed; multiple CPT codes should be “stacked”; and the facility and physician fee should be stacked when calculating reimbursement rates. The court declined to address these issues, explaining that even if they all were resolved in the defendant’s favor, it would not change the court’s outcome. These issues illustrate, though, the kinds of disputes that earnout parties must anticipate; and underscore the level of specificity needed in earnout provisions to avoid disputes.
The decision also indicates that the court may rely on the parties’ history of negotiations and contemporaneous communications when determining how to interpret ambiguous contract provisions. Accordingly, each party should maintain a careful record of pre- and post-merger discussions that could bear on interpretation of the earnout provisions. Of note, the merger agreement in this case expressly provided that prior drafts and course of performance could not be used to interpret the agreement. The court, respecting this provision, did not rely on prior drafts nor the course of performance (e.g., Myoscience’s having accepted an undisputed milestone payment based on the national reimbursement rate). However, the court ruled that the provision did not exclude the court from relying on the parties’ pre-merger discussions and the seller’s after-the-fact communications, which indicated that the seller’s interpretation was developed by its consultants for purposes of the litigation.
Also of note, at the pleading stage of litigation, Pacira had contended that the earnout was not due because three individuals (who were former stockholders and former or current key employees of the acquired company) had themselves lobbied regulators for the code changes that would trigger the milestone payments. The regulators had then issued more favorable CPT codes (although, as discussed, it was not clear whether they were sufficient for achievement of the milestone). The court, in a decision issued Oct. 25, 2021, had dismissed Pacira’s claim that the three individuals had breached the merger agreement by taking steps to try to ensure achievement of the milestone. The court noted in that decision that the agreement contained no restrictions whatsoever on the selling stockholders and that it spoke only of their “sole and exclusive right” under the earnout provision to receive milestone payments that became payable. The court stressed that if the parties had wanted to impose restrictions on the sellers, they easily could have set them forth in the agreement. It should be noted that the sellers’ post-closing actions with respect to the CPT code process were seemingly limited and benign, without any obvious conflict with the buyer’s common objective to obtain more favorable CPT codes.
Pretextual Termination of Agreement Did Not Violate Implied Covenant of Good Faith—Comcast Cable v. CX360
In Comcast Cable v. CX360 (Dec. 31, 2024), the Delaware Court of Chancery, in a post-trial decision, held that CX360 was entitled to terminate the master services agreement (“MSA”) pursuant to which it had been providing customer support services to Comcast. CX360 had a right to terminate the MSA “for convenience” (i.e., without cause). It exercised that right after Comcast informed it that Comcast would not be renewing the MSA at the expiration of its term. Based on the nonrenewal, CX360 was contractually obligated to negotiate a transition services agreement (“TSA”) to provide services to Comcast while Comcast transitioned to a new vendor. CX360 conceded that it had terminated the MSA in order to increase its leverage in negotiating the TSA.
The court rejected Comcast’s argument that CX360, by terminating the MSA for a pretextual reason, had violated the implied covenant of good faith under the MSA. The court viewed CX360 as having acted to protect its vital business interests. Comcast was replacing CX360 with Google, onto whose cloud platform CX360 had migrated its technology in order to improve its services to Comcast under the MSA; and Comcast’s proposed terms for the TSA contemplated CX360 incurring substantial costs while surrendering its database and processes (the essential value of the company) essentially for free.
The decision highlights that, under the implied covenant of good faith, contract parties, when exercising discretion that is contractually granted to them, must exercise such discretion in good faith. However, whether a good faith requirement applies, and if so what constitutes good faith, when a party exercises contractually granted discretion, may well be uncertain where the contract confers an express, unrestricted right (such as, in this case, a right to terminate for convenience). The court found the answer “debatable”—and did not reach a conclusion as it found that, in any event, CX360’s actions did not fall “outside the bounds of good faith.”
Non-Independence of Board Was Insufficient Ground to Excuse Demand to Bring Derivative Caremark Claims—Harper v. Sievert
In Harper v. Sievert (February 17, 2025), the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s decision (May 31, 2024) dismissing claims against directors of T-Mobile US, Inc. for alleged breach of fiduciary duties. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant-directors acquiesced to a plan by T-Mobile’s controlling stockholder, Deutsche Telekom AG, that provided no benefit to T-Mobile yet risked exposing T-Mobile’s data to computer hackers. The data then in fact was hacked, resulting in significant liabilities for T-Mobile. The Court of Chancery dismissed the claims at the pleading stage of litigation on the basis that the plaintiff failed to establish that it was futile to bring demand on the board to bring the derivative claims against the directors.
Demand is futile when the court determines, based on a director-by-director analysis, that a majority of the directors could not have made an objective decision about whether to bring the claims. Among other factors, the court will consider whether the directors lacked independence from someone who received a material personal benefit from the alleged misconduct that would be the subject of the litigation demand or who faced a substantial likelihood of liability on any of the claims that were the subject of the litigation demand. The defendants conceded that a majority of the T-Mobile directors were non-independent of DTK; therefore, the issue before the court was whether DTK had received a material benefit or faced a substantial likelihood of liability.
Vice Chancellor Glasscock found that the plaintiff had merely asserted that DTK received a material benefit and faced a substantial likelihood of liability—specifically, that DTK “forced” T-Mobile to “implement [DTK’s] unilateral business interests…at the expense of foreseeable corporate trauma to T-Mobile.” The Vice Chancellor emphasized that there were no “specific allegation[s]” supporting (i) that DTK had instructed T-Mobile to aggregate its data, let alone in a risky way, (ii) that T-Mobile’s board had considered the data consolidation plan without regard to its risks to the company, let alone at DTK’s direction, nor (iii) that DTK had made any use of T-Mobile’s consolidated data, let alone use that constituted a non-ratable benefit for DTK.
Chancery Rejects Plaintiffs’ Claim of Demand Futility that was Based on Directors’ Appointment by the CEO-Controller–Trade Desk
In re The Trade Desk (Feb. 14, 2025) was a derivative action in which certain stockholders of The Trade Desk, Inc. challenged the grant of 10-year performance-based equity compensation to the company’s CEO-and-controlling-stockholder that, if fully realized, would total 4% of the company’s outstanding stock. The grant had been approved by the board but not submitted to a stockholder vote. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims for failure of the plaintiffs to plead demand futility—that is, failure to show that at least half of the directors on the board likely could not respond objectively to a demand that the board bring the claims on behalf of the corporation, as the directors received a material benefit from the transaction, lacked independence from the CEO, or faced a substantial likelihood of liability arising from the award. The court granted the motion to dismiss for failure to plead demand futility.
The plaintiffs alleged that four of the eight directors lacked independence from the CEO-controller. The court rejected that allegation with respect to three of the four directors, on the basis that plaintiffs cannot rebut the presumption that a director can objectively consider a demand “simply by alleging the director was elected or appointed by…a controller or other interested party.” Vice Chancellor Fioravanti wrote: “[T]here must be coupled with the allegation of control such facts as would demonstrate that through personal or other relationships the directors are beholden to the controlling person.” The court found that the plaintiffs established such a relationship only with respect to one of the four directors at issue—a director who was highly compensated as the Chief Technology Officer of another corporation controlled by the CEO and had a longstanding business relationship with the CEO. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the other three directors at issue were non-independent of the CEO-controller because he could take away their compensation from company. The court stated that the compensation was insufficient to render the directors non-independent as their compensation was not plainly excessive.
U.S. Supreme Court Holds a TRO Cannot Confer “Prevailing Party” Status for Purposes of Awarding Attorney Fees
Generally, the “prevailing party” in a litigation is eligible for court award of attorney fees. Plaintiffs have been considered the prevailing party for these purposes when they have achieved obtaining a temporary restraining order (including, for example, against a law or governmental policy that they have challenged as unconstitutional). However, in Lackey v. Stinnie (Feb. 25, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, held that plaintiffs who achieve issuance of a TRO will no longer be considered to be a prevailing party for these purposes. Only litigants achieving a “final judgment” will be eligible for such status and thus eligible for court award of attorney fees. (Justice Sotomayor dissented, with Justice Jackson joining.)
The Supreme Court majority viewed TROs as representing only a “transient victory.” As they “do not resolve the rights of parties on the merits,” they do not represent an outcome that is both “judicially sanctioned and enduring,” the court wrote. The decision is likely to discourage advocacy groups from bringing litigation to challenge the constitutionality of laws or government policies, because, even if they achieve issuance of a TRO, they will not be eligible for attorney fees unless and until there is a final judgment. We note that amicus briefs arguing against such result were filed by both liberal-leaning and conservative-leaning advocacy groups that often institute civil rights cases. We also note that issuance of a TRO in many cases, as a practical matter, ends the litigation—in which case, under this ruling, there would be no opportunity even for a later award of attorney fees. The Supreme Court stated in the opinion that if Congress “determines that the rule we adopt today is unwise,” it can amend the statutory language.
Before this decision, every U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals had held that a TRO could be the basis for prevailing party status (although the standards among the Circuits varied). The Fourth Circuit, for example, which held in favor of the plaintiffs in this case, had adopted a rule that a preliminary injunction can be the basis for prevailing party status for a plaintiff if the it (a) provides concrete, irreversible relief on the merits by materially altering the parties’ legal relationship, and (b) becomes moot before a final judgment such that it cannot be reversed, dissolved or otherwise undone by a later decision.
This case arose from a challenge—brought by the nonprofit Legal Aid Justice Center and a law firm—of a Virginia law that required automatic suspension of a driver’s license if the driver failed to pay traffic fines. The plaintiffs, on behalf of indigent taxi drivers in Virginia, argued that, due to the law, nearly one-sixth of Virginia’s residents (about one million people) were caught in a trap of being unable to work because they had not paid traffic fines, but unable to pay the fines because they could not work. The plaintiffs won a TRO that effectively suspended enforcement of the law for 16 months while the litigation continued. The Virginia legislature then repealed the law; and the case was dismissed as moot. The Supreme Court wrote: A plaintiff who wins a transient victory on a preliminary injunction does not become a ‘prevailing party’ simply because external events convert the transient victory into a lasting one.”
Fried Frank M&A/PE Briefings Issued this Quarter:
Update on DEI—Federal Court Temporarily Blocks Most of the Administration’s DEI Orders, But Uncertainty Continues
On February 21, 2025, a federal court in Maryland issued a temporary restraining order blocking implementation, for now, of parts of the Executive Orders that the U.S. Administration issued relating to diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) practices, including at private sector companies. Notwithstanding the TRO, uncertainty continues for companies as to what actions, if any, they should take with respect to their DEI policies, programs and practices. While the TRO temporarily blocks “enforcement actions” against private sector entities relating to their DEI policies and practices, it does not block the President’s directive to the U.S. Attorney General to develop a specific plan to eliminate “illegal DEI” in the private sector.
In this Briefing, we discuss: the DEI-related Executive Orders (EOs); internal government memoranda relating to implementation of the EOs (the “Memoranda”); the TRO temporarily blocking parts of the EOs (issued in NADHOE v. Trump); the other pending lawsuit challenging the EOs (National Urban League v. Trump); a False Claims Act issue arising under the EOs; a statement by the attorneys general of 16 states encouraging employers to continue DEI “best practices”; statements by proxy advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis; and steps that some private sector companies have been taking in response to the EOs. We also offer practice points for private sector companies in responding to the EOs.
Delaware Supreme Court Overturns Tripadvisor Decision, Providing a Clearer Path for Reincorporation
In a much-anticipated decision, Maffei v. Palkon (“Tripadvisor”) (Feb. 4, 2025), the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Tripadvisor, Inc. board’s decision to reincorporate the company from Delaware to Nevada is subject to the deferential business judgment rule standard of review—and not the significantly more onerous entire fairness standard. The decision reverses the Court of Chancery’s holding that Tripadvisor’s reincorporation was subject to entire fairness review because the company’s directors and controller may have received a material, non-ratable benefit from the transaction—namely, reduced exposure to litigation liability, as Nevada law may provide lower standards for fiduciaries as compared to Delaware law. The Court of Chancery also had suggested that, for the reincorporation to have been entirely fair, it may be that some form of consideration had to be paid to the minority stockholders to compensate them for the reduction in their “litigation rights” under Nevada law. Under business judgment review, however, the claims against the directors and the controller for breaches of fiduciary duty in approving the reincorporation almost certainly will be dismissed. In this Briefing, we discuss the decision, note circumstances under which reincorporation may still be subject to entire fairness review, note that the decision may stimulate further interest in considering reincorporation from Delaware. We also offer practice points relating to considering reincorporation.
Implications of Tornetta v. Musk II for Executive Compensation and for Stockholder Ratification
In this Briefing, we discuss Tornetta v. Musk II (Jan , in which the Court of Chancery reaffirmed it previous decision (Jan. 30, 2025) ordering rescission of the 10-year equity compensation plan for its chief executive, Elon Musk, that had been approved by the purportedly independent directors of Tesla, Inc. and (twice) by the stockholders unaffiliated with Musk. Importantly, Tornetta II establishes a boundary on the use of stockholder ratification. The court held that stockholder ratification of a board action will not be effective to shield directors from liability for fiduciary breaches if the ratification comes after issuance of a post-trial judicial decision rejecting the board’s action on the basis of such breaches. And the court indicated in Tornetta II that this would be the result even where the board’s action was approved by independent directors and the stockholders’ ratification vote was fully informed and non-coerced. In this Briefing, we discuss that some have viewed the Tornetta decisions as reflecting the court’s substitution of its own judgment for that of Tesla’s board and stockholders, but that the decision could be read as flowing from the combination of the court’s view of that the amount of the compensation was so extraordinary (the highest by far ever awarded in the history of the public markets) and its view that Musk had an extraordinary level of influence at the company (at least with respect to the compensation process). We also offer related practice points relating to executive compensation and stockholder ratification.
Sponsor-Controller Did Not Face Disabling Conflicts When Selling Portco Near Expiration of Fund’s Term—Manti v. Authentix
In Manti v. Authentix, the Court of Chancery, in a post-trial decision, reaffirmed that, generally, a private equity sponsor and its affiliated directors will not have liability for timing a portfolio company’s exit in alignment with expiration of the term of the fund invested in it—at least where the sponsor received pro rata consideration in the sale and the record does not establish that the sponsor and the board failed to seek to maximize value in the sale. The court emphasized that the sponsor in this case, as would usually be the case for a sponsor-controller selling its portfolio company to a third party, had the same interest as the other stockholders in maximizing stockholder value on the sale—therefore, the transaction was not a conflicted-controller transaction, and business judgement review, rather than entire fairness, applied. Manti reaffirms the line of cases (including Synthes (2012) and Larkin (2016)) holding that although the private equity investment model contemplates liquidity for the sponsor after a certain investment period, the model in and of itself does not create a conflict for the sponsor such that entire fairness review applies. Rather, a liquidity-based conflict arises only where the particular sponsor at issue has a particular exigent need for immediate liquidity (not just a desire to sell the portfolio company to be able to close out a fund or to start a new fund), and, generally, in addition, the sale process indicates that the sale was in the nature of a fire sale.
Practice Points Arising from Albertsons’ Claims Against Kroger for Breach of Their Merger Agreement
Two courts, on antitrust grounds, enjoined the planned $24.6 billion merger pursuant to which Kroger was to acquire Albertsons. After the injunctions were issued, Albertsons terminated the parties’ Merger Agreement and filed suit against Kroger in the Delaware Court of Chancery. Albertsons alleges that, post-signing, Kroger had a case of buyer’s remorse; and then, to derail the deal, willfully breached its obligations under the Merger Agreement to seek to obtain the antitrust approvals needed to close the deal. Albertsons is seeking the $600 million reverse termination fee (“RTF”) delineated in the Merger Agreement, as well as all legally available damages (including the lost merger premium). Kroger, in turn, has asserted that Albertsons breached the Merger Agreement and is not entitled to the RTF. While some or all of the allegations in the Kroger/Albertsons dispute may or may not be found to be true, they prompt consideration as to how a target company can best protect itself against the possibility that a buyer may not timely and effectively comply with its obligations to pursue the necessary regulatory approvals for a deal. In this Briefing we discuss how the typical merger agreement provisions relating to obtaining regulatory approvals may not operate effectively in the case of a buyer who becomes not fully eager to close, due to a post-signing change of heart about the deal for any reason; and circumstances under which a target may wish to consider negotiating for additional, less usual agreement provisions to protect against such scenarios.
Where Things Stand at the End of 2024
2024 was a watershed year for Delaware corporate law. The Court of Chancery issued several decisions that some market participants viewed as upending longstanding, common corporate practices. Those decisions led to amendment of the Delaware General Corporation Law. In addition, those decisions, together with decisions in recent years reflecting increased judicial skepticism of decision-making by purportedly independent directors, heightened skepticism of controlling stockholders, and a more technical approach to interpreting the DGCL as well as contract provisions, have stimulated debate at some Delaware corporations about potentially reincorporating to other states. In this Briefing, we discuss key 2024 developments with respect to: the 2024 DGCL amendments; reincorporation from Delaware; governance rights in stockholder agreements (Moelis); board approval of merger agreements (Activision); lost merger premium damages (Crispo); executive compensation for controllers (Tornetta); MFW; who may be deemed to be a controller; controller fiduciary duties; buyer aiding and abetting liability; advisor conflicts; earnouts; Caremark; antitrust; corporate charters; amendment of LLC agreements; general partner good faith’ “dual hat” issues; entire fairness; non-competes; SPACs; indemnification; and arbitration.
Antitrust Alerts:
Top Five Merger Agreement Considerations in Light of the New HSR Rules
The new Hart-Scott-Rodino Act rules, which have fundamentally changed the HSR filing process, took effect on February 10, 2025. Transacting parties now should: (1) Consider how the new rules will impact HSR filing deadlines; (2) strengthen cooperation covenants to address who will lead HSR strategy and require pre-filing, privileged, exchange of draft HSR filings and documents; (3) analyze the impact of the new disclosure requirements before agreeing on antitrust risk-shifting covenants; (4) consider whether carveouts to confidentiality covenants are needed to allow parties to contact their customers prior to potential antitrust agency inquiries; and (5) ensure that LOI and term sheet filings sufficiently describe the material terms of the contemplated transaction.
Has the Antitrust “Open Season” on Private Equity Closed?
In this Alert, we discuss one of the final actions by the Biden Administration’s FTC, a settlement with private equity firm Welsh, Carson; and note the expected shift under the Trump Administration away from singling out private equity sponsors for antitrust enforcement. targeting private equity simply because it is private equity.
Competition Act Brings Important UK Merger Control Changes
In this article, we discuss key takeaways from the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, which came into force on January 1, 2025 and introduced significant changes to the U.K.’s merger control regime.
Other Fried Frank Alerts:
President Trump Announces “America First Policy”
On February 21, 2025, President Trump issued a National Security Presidential Memorandum (Feb. 21, 2025) announced an “America First” investment policy, which seeks to promote investment from “allies and partners,” while restricting inbound investment from, and outbound investment to, China and other foreign adversaries. The NSPM does not require any immediate change in law or policy, but it indicates that significant changes to U.S. inbound and outbound investment rules may be on the horizon. Some of the policies announced would break new ground, such as extending CFIUS jurisdiction to greenfield investments and creating an explicit policy of denial for Chinese investment in certain U.S. sectors. The specific manner in which the policies will be implemented, and their timing, will depend on agency rule-making and in some cases Congressional action.
CTA Back in Effect with an Extended Deadline (With Update)
This Briefing discusses Smith v. U.S. Department of the Treasury (Feb. 18, 2025), in which the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas lifted the last remaining injunction against enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”); and FinCEN’s extension of the filing deadline to March 21, 2025 for the vast majority of reporting companies. [Update: FinCEN announced on March 21, 2025 an interim final rule that U.S.-based companies no longer will be required to report beneficial ownership information under the CTA. Therefore, only foreign entities registered to do business in the U.S. will still need to meet the CTA’s reporting requirements.]
In with the New: Executive Orders Impacting Government Contractors in Opening Weeks of Trump Administration
In this Briefing, we discuss Executive Orders and policy changes (effective as of February 10, 2025) that could significantly affect the community of government contractors.
In Memoriam—Arthur Fleischer, Jr.
Fried Frank mourns the loss of our esteemed friend and partner, Arthur Fleischer, Jr., who passed away on March 21, 2025.
Arthur joined Fried Frank as a summer associate in 1957, became a partner in 1967 and later served as co-chairman in 1989. Over his 65-year career, he was recognized as one of the greatest deal lawyers of his generation—a pioneer in hostile takeovers and corporate defense strategies. He led our Mergers and Acquisitions Practice for more than 40 years and was a trusted advisor on negotiated and contested transactions.
Beyond his work at the firm, Arthur served as Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission from 1961 to 1964. He co-authored Takeover Defense: Mergers and Acquisitions (Wolters Kluwer/Aspen, 9th edition, 2021) and Board Games: The Changing Shape of Corporate Power (Little Brown & Company, 1988), along with numerous articles on securities regulation.
Arthur’s contributions extended far beyond corporate law. A champion of pro bono work and the arts, he was honored by Her Justice for his dedication to public service. He played a pivotal role in shaping Fried Frank’s art collection and championed investments in emerging artists—many of whose works still line the firm’s New York office today. He was also a board member and active participant in leading professional and cultural institutions, including the American Bar Association, American Law Institute, American Stock Exchange, Association of the Bar of the City of New York and The Whitney Museum.
“Arthur’s legacy is extraordinary. Without him, Fried Frank would not be the outstanding institution it is today,” said Chairman Kenneth Rosh. “We are profoundly grateful for his dedication, loyalty and friendship, and we know that so many of us will feel this loss very deeply.”
Arthur earned his JD from Yale Law School in 1958, where he was elected to the Order of the Coif, and his BA from Yale University in 1953.
Arthur’s impact on our firm, the legal community and the arts will endure for generations to come.
This communication is for general information only. It is not intended, nor should it be relied upon, as legal advice. In some jurisdictions, this may be considered attorney advertising. Please refer to the firm’s data policy page for further information.