Kirschner: Second Circuit Holds That Syndicated Loans Are Not “Securities”
Client memorandum | August 28, 2023
Authors: Andrew B. Barkan, Daniel J. Bursky, Mark S. Hayek, Eliza Riffe Hollander, Michael C. Keats, Meredith L. Mackey, J. Christian Nahr, Caroline Sandberg, Ezra Schneck, Adam D. Summers
Arrangers and lenders have traditionally relied on an established market view and well-settled case law that held that syndicated loans are not securities subject to federal or state securities regulations. This doctrine was recently challenged but has now been reaffirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the “Second Circuit” or the “Court”) in Kirschner v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 21-2726, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 22327 (2d Cir. Aug. 24, 2023). The Court applied federal securities law analysis to determine that the syndicated loans under scrutiny were not “securities” under Kirschner’s state law blue sky claims.
The impact of the ruling is significant: A holding that syndicated loans are securities would have subjected arranging banks and other financing sources to federal and state securities law disclosure requirements and potential liabilities in connection with loan syndication and disrupted a market that observers have estimated sees over a trillion dollars in trading activity each year. Such a ruling may also have chilled lending activity by CLOs—a major source of liquidity in the syndicated loan market—if categorizing syndicated loans as “debt securities” caused CLOs to reevaluate their ability to comply with the Volcker Rule. The Court’s decision, though, preserves the status quo and clearly rejects the premise that syndicated loans are securities subject to regulation under securities laws.
Background. The defendant-appellee loan arrangers (the “Arrangers”), JP Morgan, Citigroup, Bank of Montreal, and SunTrust Bank committed to provide a $1.775 billion syndicated term loan facility (the “Facility,” and the loans thereunder, the “Loans”) to Millennium Laboratories LLC (“Millennium”), a California-based drug testing company, and to serve as arrangers for the Facility, which closed in April 2014. JP Morgan initially funded the loans on behalf of the syndicate under a customary fronting arrangement, and subsequently assigned $1.798 billion (the initial $1.775 billion fronted by JP Morgan, plus an overallotment) to approximately 70 institutional investor groups, which in turn represented roughly 400 mutual funds, hedge funds, and other institutional investors (the “Lenders”). The proceeds of the Facility refinanced existing debt and provided funds for the payment of dividends and bonuses to Millennium’s directors, officers, and controlling shareholders.
At the time of the syndication of the Facility, Millennium was under investigation by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for federal healthcare law violations, and was also engaged in litigation with a competitor, Ameritox Ltd. Shortly after the closing of the Facility, Millennium was ordered to pay $2.755 million in compensatory damages and $8.5 million in punitive damages to Ameritox. In May 2015, Millennium disclosed that it had agreed to a $256 million global settlement with the DOJ, which was finalized in October 2015. One month after the settlement, Millennium defaulted on its obligations under the Facility and sought bankruptcy protection. The bankruptcy plan created the Millennium Lender Claim Trust (the “Trust”) and provided the Trust with the claims of the Lenders against the defendant Arrangers.
Alleged Violation of State Securities Laws. The Trust’s complaint, first filed with the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “SDNY”) on August 1, 2017, claimed that the defendant-appellees “misrepresented or omitted … material facts in the offering materials they provided and communications they made to [Lenders] regarding the legality of [Millennium’s] sales, marketing, and billing practices,” as well as “the known risks posed by a pending government investigation into the illegality of such practices.” Based on these claims, the plaintiff asserted 11 causes of action under state securities laws. In May 2020, the SDNY granted the Arrangers’ motion to dismiss the complaint, finding that the loans marketed in the syndication were not “securities” and therefore not subject to state securities regulation.[1] The Trust appealed the SDNY’s finding.
Given the potential implications for the syndicated loan market, in May 2022, the Loan Syndications and Trading Association together with other industry organizations submitted an amicus brief in support of the argument that syndicated loans are not securities. In March 2023, the Second Circuit solicited the views of the Securities and Exchange Commission, but the SEC elected to remain silent, indicating that the Commission was “not in a position to comment.”
Second Circuit Holding. Like the SDNY, the Second Circuit evaluated whether the Loans are “securities” using the federal securities law criteria set out by the Supreme Court in 1990 in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990), even though the Trust brought claims under state blue sky laws. Under Reves, the analysis begins with the presumption that “every note is a security” under the Securities Act of 1933.[2] To rebut that presumption, the Court applied the four factors of the “family resemblance” test from Reves: (i) “the motivations that would prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into [the transaction],”[3] (ii) “the plan of distribution of the instrument,”[4] (iii) “the reasonable expectations of the investing public,”[5] and (iv) “the existence of another regulatory scheme [to reduce] the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering application of the Securities Acts unnecessary.”[6] The Court found that three out of four of these factors indicated that the Loans were not securities, as follows:
- The first Reves factor asks “whether the motivations [of the seller and buyer] are investment (suggesting a security) or commercial or consumer (suggesting a non-security).”[7] While the Kirschner Court was quick to conclude that potential lenders could be deemed to have an “investment” motivation, the fact that the stated use of proceeds was for refinancing and a dividend pointed to Millennium’s motivation being “to advance some other commercial or consumer purpose.”[8] Noting the mixed motivations of buyers and sellers, the Court found that the application of the first Reves factor pointed to investment-driven motivations, suggesting that the Loans in question could be considered securities.[9]
- With respect to the second Reves factor (the “plan of distribution”), the Court examined whether the Loans were subject to “common trading for speculation or investment,” noting that a Loan would likely be a security if it were “offered and sold to a broad segment of the public.”[10] Here, the Court noted that the Arrangers had marketed the Loans only to sophisticated institutional entities.[11] The fact that there was a secondary market for the Loans was not determinative because of the “collective impact of the assignment restrictions” set forth in the Credit Agreement.[12] Specifically, the Court pointed to the fact that the Loans could not be sold or assigned to a natural person and that any proposed assignment would require both the seller’s (Millennium’s) and agent’s written consent.[13] Furthermore, the Court noted that the Loans’ distribution to more than 400 Lenders did not render them broadly available to the general public in these circumstances.[14]
- As to the third Reves factor, the reasonable expectations of the investing public, the Court also found that this factor weighed against the Loans being securities. Following the analysis in Banco Espanol,[15] the Court evaluated the facts and documents to determine if potential lenders were “given ample notice that the instruments were … loans and not investments in a business enterprise.”[16] The Court noted that the potential lenders received the Confidential Information Memorandum subject to the terms spelled out in its legend, which affirmed that potential lenders were “sophisticated and experienced in extending credit to entities similar to [Millennium].”[17] Moreover, once lenders receiving allocations in the syndication became party to the Credit Agreement as Lenders, they agreed to a representation that they had “independently and without reliance upon any Agent or any Lender” made their own credit evaluations based upon the documents and disclosures available to them. The Court found these affirmations by Lenders and potential Lenders evidence that they “could not have reasonably perceived” the Loans to be securities.[18] In addition, despite isolated references to “investors” in the loan documents, the Court noted that the more consistent references to “lenders” aligned with the reasonable expectation that these “experienced and sophisticated” Lenders were not investing in securities.[19]
- Finally, in considering whether factors other than a securities regulatory regime were present to reduce the risk of the Loans, the Court pointed first to the fact that the Loans were secured by a first-priority lien on substantially all of Millennium’s assets and then to the existence of another regulatory scheme applicable to syndicated loans—listing the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as regulators who have issued guidelines addressing syndicated term loans.[20] The Court was unconvinced by the appellant’s contention that these guidelines are aimed at minimizing risk to banks only, citing bank regulators’ assertions that one of the goals of safety-and-soundness standards is protection of consumers.[21]
Next Steps: The plaintiff-appellants have 14 days from the date of the Second Circuit ruling to petition for en banc review, and the right to petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.
Takeaways for Loan Market Participants.
- Legends, Exculpation, and Disclaimers. The Court relied heavily upon language included in legends, disclaimers, and exculpatory provisions in marketing and loan documents wherein Lenders and potential Lenders labeled themselves as “sophisticated institutional entities” capable of making their own credit assessments and not in reliance on any agent or arranger institution. Lenders and borrowers should focus on the wording and inclusion of these legends in all marketing materials, including those contained in click-through agreements.
- Terminology Matters. The Court was swayed by the prevalence of references to “lenders” (in lieu of “investors”) in its finding that experienced and sophisticated recipients of the marketing materials for the Loans or the definitive loan documents could not reasonably have expected that extending the Loans would constitute an investment in securities. This use of the word “lender” serves as a reminder that consistency of “lender” terminology across marketing materials and loan documents can act as a signpost for potential lenders that they are not participating in a securities offering.
- Syndication Process. The Second Circuit pointed to the “sophisticated” and “institutional” nature of the potential Lenders invited to participate in the syndication of the Facility. Market participants can conclude that a narrowly-tailored audience for loan marketing materials helps to dispel the notion that a loan syndication process could constitute a broad-based sale to the general public.
- Credit Support and Use of Proceeds. The Court viewed the fact that the Facility was secured by a first lien on Millennium’s assets as key to its view that sufficient protection existed for lenders without the imposition of a securities regulation regime. The fact that the use of proceeds for the Loans specified in the Credit Agreement was primarily for refinancing existing debt and making a dividend payment and not for investments in Millennium’s business or financing other investments convinced the Court that Millennium’s motivation in incurring the Loans was not investment. A question that arises from the Court’s opinion, then, is how its application of the Reves test would be impacted by an unsecured syndicated loan or a loan incurred to finance acquisitions or capital expenditures.
- Transfer Restrictions. The Court honed in on the transfer restrictions under the Facility as particularly “loan-like” features. In particular, the Court noted that the assignment provisions in the Credit Agreement contained limitations on the identity of potential new Lenders, prohibited any assignments to natural persons, included a $1 million minimum hold amount for any Lender and granted Millennium and the Administrative Agent rights to consent to certain secondary trades. These and other prevalent restrictions on the identity of potential Lenders under a credit facility (including use of “Disqualified Lender” lists) constitute one of the key practical differences between a syndicated loan and a high-yield bond.
Participants in the syndicated loan market will no doubt observe that several of the features listed above and emphasized by the Court are familiar and their use is widespread in loan agreements and syndication processes. While loan market participants can take comfort from the reinforcement in Kirschner of the established market practice of not regarding syndicated loans as “securities,” the specificity of the terms, language, and provisions identified by the Court as dispositive serves as a reminder that any choice of words in a loan agreement or marketing materials could have significant interpretive impact.
Special thanks to Andrew Charpentier, Enia L. Gyan, Morgan E. Humphrey, and Zachary Ness for their valuable assistance in the research and drafting of this client memorandum.
[1] Kirschner v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90797 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2020).
[2] Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 65 (1990).
[3] Kirschner, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 22327, at *20 (quoting Reves, 494 U.S. at 66).
[4] Id. at *22 (quoting Reves, 494 U.S. at 66).
[5] Id. at *24 (quoting Reves, 494 U.S. at 66).
[6] Id. at *26 (quoting Reves, 494 U.S. at 67).
[7] Id. *20, quoting Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., 27 F.3d 808, 812 (2d Cir. 1994).
[8] Id. at *21.
[9] Id. at *22.
[10] Id. (quoting Reves, 494 U.S. at 68).
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at *23-24.
[13] Id. at *23.
[14] Id. at *24.
[15] Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat’l Bank, 973 F.2d 51, 55 (2nd Cir. 1992).
[16] Kirschner, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 22327, at *24, (quoting Banco, 973 F.2d at 55).
[17] Id. at *25.
[18] Id.
[19] Id. at *26.
[20] Id. at *27.
[21] Id. at 27-28 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 262, App. A (2021)).
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