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In Novel Ruling with Potentially Broad Impact, Chancery Court Holds Grant of a Security Interest Was a “Transfer”—Commave v. Zevra

M&A/PE Briefing | January 12, 2026

In Commave v. Zevra (Jan. 2, 2026), the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the pledge of a License Agreement by Zevra Therapeutics, Inc., as part of the collateral for a bank loan, constituted an “assignment” and “transfer” to the bank of the payments under the License Agreement. The License Agreement, which grants Commave Therapeutics SA an exclusive license to use certain Zevra intellectual property to develop and commercialize specified pharmaceutical products, provides that Commave has a right of first refusal in the event that Zevra sells, assigns, or otherwise transfers to a third party any or all of its rights to receive payments under the Agreement. 

Key Points

  • The court held that Zevra’s grant of a security interest in the License Agreement constituted an assignment and transfer of the royalty payments under the Agreement. The court reasoned that Zevra’s pledge of all of its assets to the bank as collateral for the loan it obtained necessarily included an assignment and transfer of the “bundle of rights” that Zevra has under the License Agreement, including the right to payments. The court wrote that “commercial reality” dictates that a debtor’s pledge of a contract as collateral includes an assignment or transfer of the payment rights that give the contract value. Therefore, the court held, Commave’s right of first refusal under the License Agreement was triggered, and Zevra is liable for damages for violating it.

  • Practitioners have long debated whether the grant of a security interest in an asset constitutes a transfer or assignment. They often reach the conclusion that it likely does not. In reaching the conclusion that this grant did constitute a transfer or assignment, the court pointed to the specific language of the License Agreement—but that language, we would note, is only subtly different from common language used in transfer restriction provisions. Also of note, the court interpreted the parties’ specified carveout, from the definition of a “payment transfer,” of a prior collateral assignment to a different lender as evidence that the parties intended that collateral assignments (other than the one expressly carved out) were included within the definition.

  • The decision may have broad impact, as it potentially affects every secured financing and every commercial agreement containing transfer, assignment or change of control provisions. Pending further clarification of the decision (in an appeal or future decisions in other cases), drafters of agreements with transfer and assignment restrictions, and drafters of credit agreements or other agreements under which assets are pledged as security, should consider certain changes to market practice in drafting these kinds of provisions. (See “Practice Points” below.)

Background. In 2019, Commave and Zevra entered into the License Agreement, which provides Commave with a right of first refusal in the event that Zevra decides to make a “Payment Assignment.” A “Payment Assignment” is defined in the Agreement as a decision to sell, assign or otherwise transfer to a third party any or all of Zevra’s rights to payment under the Agreement. In 2024, Zevra entered into a Credit Agreement with third-party lenders to raise capital. To secure the loan, Zevra granted the lenders a first-priority perfected lien on, and security interest in, substantially all of Zevra’s assets. Zevra granted “a continuing security interest in any and all right, title and interest” in the collateral, whether then owned or later acquired by Zevra, including “all license agreements…of any Intellectual Property.” Commave asserted that the pledge of collateral constituted a “Payment Assignment” under the License Agreement that invoked its right of first refusal. Zevra disagreed. After briefing and oral argument, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will granted Commave summary judgment. The amount of damages is still to be determined.

Discussion

The License Agreement provisions. Section 15.5(c) of the License Agreement (the “Payment Assignment Provision”) provides that, if Zevra “decides to sell, assign, contribute, convey, grant or otherwise transfer to any Third Party (other than DPDF)…all or any of [Zevra’s] rights to receive payment and the corresponding royalty reports under this Agreement (each a ‘Payment Assignment’),” then, (i) Zevra must provide notice to Commave, (ii) Commave then has the right (the “right of first negotiation”) to exclusive good faith negotiations with Zevra, for 30 days, “regarding any Payment Assignment proposal which [Commave] elects to deliver to [Zevra] during such period…to acquire those rights”; and (iii) if the negotiations fail, Commave has the right, within 30 days, to notify Zevra that it agrees to enter into the Payment Assignment instead of the third party, “on the same economic terms as offered by the Third Party” (the “right of first refusal”) (collectively, the “ROFR”).  

The court held that the pledge of the License Agreement as collateral for a bank loan was an “assignment,” falling within the definition of a “Payment Assignment.” Zevra argued that pledging the License Agreement as part of the collateral pool for a loan was not an assignment of the royalty payments stream under the License Agreement, and therefore was not a “Payment Assignment.” The court disagreed. The court cited Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines an “assignment” as “the transfer of rights or property…including an assignment of property as collateral security for a loan.” The Credit Agreement fell within that definition, the court concluded, as: “By pledging all license agreements as collateral, Zevra necessarily transferred an interest in the rights arising from those contracts.... This bundle of rights includes the right to receive royalty and milestone payments. To hold that a debtor could pledge a contract as collateral while retaining the payment rights that give the contract value would be divorced from commercial reality.”

Further, the court stated, even if the grant of a security interest was not an “assignment,” it was a “transfer” that fell within the definition of a “Payment Assignment.” Citing Black’s Law Dictionary, the court stated that the term “transfer” includes “parting with an interest in an asset such as the creation of a lien or other encumbrance.” The granting of a security interest in Zevra’s royalty stream “was a ‘transfer’ of a property interest because it conveyed a continuing security interest in Zevra’s assets to the lenders to secure the debt,” the court wrote.

The court viewed the parties’ specific exclusion of a prior collateral assignment to a different lender as supporting the court’s interpretation. The definition of “Payment Assignment” in the License Agreement specifically carved out a prior assignment of the License Agreement as collateral to the lender DPFP. The court reasoned that, if the parties had not viewed collateral assignments as within the definition of “Payment Assignment,” they would not have had to specifically carve out the assignment to DPFP.

The court distinguished between contracts executed as a matter of “commercial law” on the one hand, and bespoke agreements on the other hand. Zevra cited In re National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts Litigation (Del. Ch. 2020), in which the court (albeit interpreting New York law) observed that “sales or assignments” and “security interests” are distinct from each other. The court acknowledged this “may be true as a matter of commercial law.” However, the court stressed that the License Agreement was a “bespoke agreement” whose specific language “govern[s] over common law defaults.” The court wrote: “The License Agreement defines Payment Assignment broadly to include any decision to ‘sell, assign...or otherwise transfer’ payment rights. By including the ‘otherwise transfer’ catch-all and explicitly carving out [the prior security interest granted to DPDF], the parties signaled their intent to capture monetization events that part with an interest in the royalty stream. That is true regardless of whether they fit the technical common-law definition of an assignment of title.”

The court rejected Zevra’s argument that the ROFR is unenforceable under the Delaware Uniform Commercial Code. Section 9-406(d)(1) of the Delaware UCC invalidates any contract term that “prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the account debtor” for an assignment. Zevra argued that the ROFR in the License Agreement “functions as a restriction on Zevra’s ability to dispose of its rights,” in violation of the statute. The court, however, noted the Official Comments to the UCC, which clarify that Section 9-406(d) “reaches only covenants that prohibit, restrict, or require consents to assignments; it does not override all terms that might ‘impair’ an assignment in fact.” The ROFR, the court stated, does not prohibit Zevra from assigning its rights or require Commave’s consent to do so—rather, “it establishes a set of procedures… [(the ROFR)] that Zevra must honor before the assignment. These obligations may create a ‘practical impairment’ to the speed or ease of a transaction. But they do not function as the type of legal restriction targeted by the UCC.” The court commented that ROFR provisions are common features of commercial contracts, and that adopting Zevra’s interpretation would mean that all such provisions are unenforceable under the UCC—a “sweeping invalidation of accepted commercial rights [that] would be inconsistent with the text and purpose of the Delaware UCC.”

The court rejected Zevra’s argument that there was no Payment Assignment because the License Agreement met the definition of an “Excluded Asset” under the Credit Agreement. The Credit Agreement excluded from the collateral pool for the loan: “[A]ny…license, contract or other agreement if the grant of a security interest in such…license, contract or other agreement…is prohibited and would result in the termination thereof or give the other parties thereto the right to terminate, accelerate or otherwise alter such Loan Party’s rights…thereunder….” Zevra argued that, as the Payment Assignment Provision “restricted” the Credit Agreement, granting a security interest in it to the lenders was “prohibited”—and  thus the License Agreement was excluded from the pledged collateral. The court disagreed, noting again that the Payment Assignment Provision does not “prohibit” the grant of a security interest, but only “establishes procedural requirements” (the ROFR) that Zevra must satisfy before such a transaction.

Our Observations:

  • Transfer definition. A common conception is that granting a security interest is not a transfer or assignment of the underlying asset (or its payment stream) unless and until there is a default and the security interest is enforced. For example, when a homeowner mortgages her house, she is still viewed as the owner of the house—that is, the mortgage is not viewed as a transfer of the house to the bank, unless and until the homeowner defaults and the bank enforces the mortgage. The court stated in Commave that pledging an agreement as collateral necessarily transfers the payment stream under the agreement that gives the agreement value—but the court did not directly address why the pledge of the License Agreement necessarily represented a contemporaneous transfer of the payment stream. The court stressed the specific language in the License Agreement—i.e., the “broad” definition of “Payment Assignment,” which included the catch-all phrase “or otherwise transfer”—but that phrase seems not designed to carry the heavy weight of rendering every kind of action to be a transfer that would not otherwise be a transfer.

  • DPDF careveout. While the court viewed the DPDF carveout as supporting its interpretation that the License Agreement definition of “Payment Assignment” included collateral assignments,  practitioners often include specific carveouts in agreements merely for the avoidance of doubt, and thus do not necessarily signal that the parties viewed the carved-out matter as otherwise coming within the definition if not carved out.

  • Excluded Assets definition. The court stressed that the definition of “Excluded Assets” in the Credit Agreement excluded from the collateral pool only agreements that “prohibit” a transfer, while, the court stated, the License Agreement did not prohibit a transfer but only imposed “procedural requirements” (namely, the ROFR) that had to be satisfied before the transfer. The court did not address why such a “procedural requirement” would not come within the language in the Excluded Assets definition that excluded agreements that give the other party the right to “otherwise alter” Zevra’s rights under the Credit Agreement.

  • The ROFR. We would note that, in the context of the business arrangement between Commave and Zevra, the ROFR presumably was intended as a mechanism to protect Commave’s use of the intellectual property, to which it was granted an exclusive license, in the event that Zevra wanted to monetize the license and Commave therefore would end up having to make its payments to a different counterparty. It seems to us that neither Commave nor Zevra would have intended, nor wanted, the ROFR to provide Commave with the right essentially to become Zevra’s bank if Zevra decided to obtain a bank loan secured in part by the License Agreement.

In a separate ruling, the court concluded that Zevra also violated its exclusivity obligation under the License Agreement. The License Agreement grants Commave an exclusive license to develop and commercialize products containing d-MPH or its prodrug SPX; and it prohibits Commave from developing competing products, other than a product called KP879. Commave developed a product called KP1077, but contended that it is not a competing drug because it is “the same product” as the specifically carved out KP879, as the two products have the same formulation (with SPX being the sole active ingredient in both). The court found, however, that the two products are not the same, because the definition of “KP879” set forth in the License Agreement does not specify only its formulation, but also specifies its intended use in the treatment of Stimulant Use Disorder—and KP1077 is not being developed for that use. The court wrote: “If the parties intended to exclude any product containing SDX, they could have drafted the exclusion to cover the compound itself. They chose instead to define the excluded candidate (KP879) by its development path and medical indication.”

Practice Points

  • When drafting an agreement that contains a transfer or assignment restriction, consider specifying whether the granting of a security interest will, or will not, constitute a transfer or assignment under the agreement. An alternative formulation could be a provision stating that the transfer or assignment of the agreement (or the asset whose transfer is restricted) as collateral for a loan obtained in the ordinary course of business, or obtained from a bank or other conventional lender, will be deemed not to be a transfer or assignment, or mot to be a transfer or assignment unless and until there is a default on the loan and enforcement of the security interest.

  • With Commave in mind, companies may wish to review their existing agreements containing restrictions on transfer or assignment. Transfer restrictions are included in many types of agreements—for example, restricted stock agreements, asset purchase agreements, joint venture agreements, forward merger agreements, and many others. A company may wish to review its agreements and, with the Commave holding in mind, determine which of them prohibit, restrict, or give rise to rights for any parties in the event of a transfer or assignment. Depending on the facts and circumstances, the company may wish to seek the counterparty’s agreement to clarify the provisions, or to provide consent, with respect to planned or possible future actions that could be deemed to be a transfer or assignment.
  • Keep Commave in mind when entering into new agreements with restrictions on transfer or assignment. A company should seek to ensure that, under such restrictions (as they may be interpreted based on Commave), it will have the flexibility it needs to enter into planned or possible future financing transactions (or other transactions, such as joint ventures).

  • When drafting a definition of “Excluded Assets” from a collateral pool, consider whether agreements that give rise to rights for a counterparty should be specifically excluded. Most definitions of “Excluded Assets” exclude agreements that “prohibit” an assignment or transfer. Some definitions also exclude agreements that “restrict” an assignment or transfer. Consider whether to exclude, in addition, agreements that give rise to rights (such as a right of first refusal). Whether an agreement should be excluded from the collateral pool will, of course, depend on the importance of the agreement to the business of the borrower, as well as the nature of the financing facility and the negotiating leverage of the borrower and the lender.

  • When drafting a provision to carve out a specific agreement (or asset or transaction) from a definition or other provision in an agreement, consider providing further clarification so that the carveout is not interpreted more broadly than intended. For example, consider stating that the carveout is intended only for the avoidance of doubt—that is, only to make clear that the specified agreement, whether or not falling within the definition or provision, will be excluded. At the same time, if the carveout, instead, is meant to be interpreted more broadly, make that clear. For example, consider stating that it is not only the specified agreement that is to be excluded, but also any agreement that replaces it and/or other agreements that are similar to it.

  • When granting a right of first refusal, consider what the right actually covers and how it will operate. In most cases, a right of first refusal is intended to provide a party with the right to acquire an asset, on the same terms as a third party has offered to acquire the asset. If the right of refusal provision applies more broadly, to a sale or other transfer, consider carefully what that actually means and how the right will actually function in that circumstance. In Commave, the right applied to a sale or other transfer of a license agreement, but the parties presumably did not intend that a transfer of the license agreement as collateral for a bank loan would give the licensee a right to act as Commave’s bank.

  • When drafting the definition of a product or competing product (whether in a license agreement or otherwise), consider what specifications are appropriate for the definition. Keep in mind that, in Commave, the court considered a product, which was defined by both its formulation (i.e., its ingredients) and its intended use, to be different from another product that had the same formulation but was intended for a different use.

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