FTC Requires Extensive Commitments from a Private Equity Investor to Resolve Director Interlock and Minority Stock Ownership Issues
Antitrust and Competition Law Alert® | September 8, 2023
Authors: Bernard (Barry) A. Nigro Jr., Nathaniel L. Asker, Aleksandr B. Livshits, Megan C. Ingram
In order to permit private equity investor Quantum Energy Partners’ sale of natural gas assets to a public company, EQT Corporation, the FTC prohibited Quantum from taking a seat on EQT’s board, required Quantum to place the 11% of EQT’s stock that it would receive as consideration for the transaction into a voting trust (where a third-party trustee would vote the stock) and for the stock to be divested over a period of time, and required the parties to unwind a pre-existing joint venture and related non-competes. Although the FTC did not allege that the core transaction—EQT’s acquisition of natural gas assets from Quantum—itself presented antitrust issues, the FTC expressed concerns about continued entanglements between the parties given that Quantum would continue to own natural gas assets that competed with EQT. While the FTC’s willingness to resolve concerns through a negotiated remedy rather than litigating to seek to block the transaction is encouraging for parties considering M&A, the broad scope of relief obtained in this transaction and positions taken by the agency may require parties to be prepared to defend their transaction in court where settlement demands may be too costly to bear.
FTC Chair Lina Khan stated that the goal of this action was to “reactivate” Section 8 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits an individual or separate agents of a firm from sitting on the boards of competing corporations,[1] and to “put market participants back on notice” that unwinding interlocking directorates is a priority for the agency.[2] While the language of the statute itself applies only to competing “corporations,”[3] in this case the FTC applied the prohibition to a director interlock involving a limited partnership. In her statement, Chair Khan made clear the FTC’s position is that Section 8 applies to companies “no matter what specific corporate form their business takes.”[4]
Beginning last year, the DOJ stated that it intended to reinvigorate Section 8 enforcement, and it has since announced in three separate press releases that ten companies changed their board composition after the DOJ raised Section 8 concerns.[5] In contrast to EQT/Quantum, all the companies named in the DOJ’s Section 8 press releases were corporations, and those actions were not accompanied by consent decrees. The FTC extracted extensive commitments from Quantum and EQT to resolve the Section 8 issue, including imposing antitrust compliance monitoring and future reporting obligations, signaling that simply stepping off the board may not be sufficient to resolve a Section 8 issue in some situations.
In addition to the director interlock issue, this enforcement action marks the first time in decades that the FTC challenged a transaction under Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of competition,” without also alleging a Clayton Act Section 7 violation, which is the antitrust statute under which transactions are typically challenged. Chair Khan stated that this is a reminder to market participants “that transactions that might not strictly violate Section 7 can still pose a risk to competition,”[6] and that the FTC has other enforcement tools to challenge those transactions.
The Quantum/EQT enforcement action is another example of the antitrust agencies under the Biden Administration pursuing new and aggressive positions to challenge transactions—here board rights, small minority stock ownership received as consideration by the seller, and pre-existing joint venture entanglements. Parties contemplating transactions that may include share consideration or board rights should consider antitrust questions that may arise if the seller will continue to hold competing assets. With that said, the FTC agreeing to permit Quantum to divest its EQT stock over time while maintaining it in a voting trust, rather than litigating to block the transaction outright, provides a roadmap for how parties may structure a transaction to reduce antitrust risk where share consideration is critical to the parties getting to a deal.
[1] 15 U.S.C. § 19; 15 U.S.C. § 7.
[2] FTC, Statement of Chair Lina Khan, In the Matter of EQT Corporation, Commission File No. 221-0212, at 4 (Aug. 16, 2023) [“Statement of Chair Khan”].
[3] Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 128 (1983) (“The language of the statute is unambiguous in prohibiting interlocking directorates between ‘two or more corporations . . . other than banks.’ The most natural reading of this language is that the interlocked corporations must all be corporations ‘other than banks.’”).
[4] Statement of Chair Khan at 5. The agency had also previously stated that it would pursue interlocks that may not violate Section 8 through its authority to challenge “unfair methods of competition” under Section 5 of the FTC Act. See FTC, Policy Statement Regarding the Scope of Unfair Methods of Competition Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, Commission File No. P221202, at 3 n.16 (Nov. 10, 2022) (stating that an example of conduct that may violate Section 5 includes interlocking directors and officers of competing firms not covered by the literal language of the Clayton Act).
[5] DOJ, Two Pinterest Directors Resign from Nextdoor Board of Directors in Response to Justice Department’s Ongoing Enforcement Efforts Against Interlocking Directorates (Aug. 16, 2023); DOJ, Justice Department’s Ongoing Section 8 Enforcement Prevents More Potentially Illegal Interlocking Directorates (Mar. 9, 2023); DOJ, Directors Resign from the Boards of Five Companies in Response to Justice Department Concerns about Potentially Illegal Interlocking Directorates (Oct. 19, 2022).
[6] Statement of Chair Khan at 7.
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