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Finding Potential Caremark and Duty of Loyalty Violations, Chancery Compounds Uncertainty on Its Approach to Workplace Sexual Misconduct Cases—eXp World

Client memorandum | January 29, 2026

In Los Angeles City Employees’ Retirement System v. Sanford et al (Jan. 16, 2026) (“eXp”), Chancellor Kathaleen St.J. McCormick held, at the pleading stage of litigation, that the defendant directors and officers of eXp World, a real estate brokerage company, may have breached their fiduciary duties by having largely ignored rampant sexual misconduct at the company, covered up the information, protected the perpetrators, and retaliated against a director who turned whistleblower. Further, the court found that the plaintiff was excused from making a demand on the board to bring the derivative action. Thus, the director and officer defendants—none of whom were alleged to have engaged in the sexual misconduct—face potential personal liability to the corporation for losses that flowed from the sexual misconduct by others.

Importantly, the decision flatly rejects the court’s holding and reasoning in Brola v. Lundgren (“Credit Glory”), issued last month by Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will. In turn, Credit Glory had rejected the holding and reasoning in McDonald’s, issued in 2023 by Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster. (See our Briefing on Credit Glory: “When Is a Director or Officer Liable for Sexual Harassment Under Fiduciary Duties?”).

Key Points

  • The court’s jurisprudence on workplace sexual misconduct cases is in flux. In eXp and  McDonald’s, the court’s view was that directors’ and officers’ own sexual misconduct in the workplace, or their oversight failures with respect to workplace sexual misconduct by others, may implicate their fiduciary duties under Delaware corporate law. In Credit Glory, however, the court’s view was that workplace sexual misconduct involves “interpersonal conduct” governed by employment laws, and might implicate fiduciary duties only in rare circumstances. In eXp, Chancellor McCormick endorsed McDonald’s and rebuked Credit Glory, commenting that “reasonable trial judges can differ” and resolving such differences is the function of the appellate process.

  • When are directors or officers liable for sexual misconduct against employees based on their fiduciary duties? The answer is uncertain given the different approaches taken in eXp and McDonald’s versus Credit Glory. Pending appellate or other clarification as to which of these doctrinal approaches is the correct one, as a practical matter: (i) an officer may be deemed to have breached his fiduciary duties if he engaged in the misconduct himself, or consciously ignored red flags of the misconduct by others, and his specific corporate responsibilities included preventing sexual misconduct against employees; and (ii) a director may be deemed to have breached his fiduciary duties if he consciously ignored red flags of the misconduct by others, or if he covered up information, rewarded the perpetrators, or retaliated against whistleblowers, particularly if he directly financially benefitted from doing so.

  • McDonald’s, Credit Glory and eXp involved different types of claims and factual contexts—but the court focused on the broad doctrinal issue. McDonald’s involved a claim of breach of the duty of loyalty by an officer for his own sexual misconduct against employees; and a Caremark claim against him and the directors for their failure of oversight that permitted widespread sexual misconduct by others. Credit Glory involved only a claim of breach of the duty of loyalty by an officer-director for his own sexual misconduct against two employees, and no Caremark claim—and the unusual factual context of a company with just two shareholders, who were the company’s only directors. eXp involved no claim that a director or officer engaged in sexual misconduct, but Caremark claims against directors and officers for their failure of oversight that permitted widespread sexual misconduct by others; and a claim of breach of the duty of loyalty by an director-officer who financially benefitted from covering up the problem. Importantly, in eXp, Chancellor McCormick stated that Credit Glory, while not involving Caremark claims, was relevant to both duty of loyalty claims and Caremark claims—as Credit Glory had posited, broadly, that Delaware corporate law should not be used as a “general morality code,” nor looked to as the remedy for derivative claims arising from “workplace disputes” regulated by employment laws.

  • The especially egregious factual context in eXp may have influenced the judicial result. Allegedly, for years, eXp’s two leading real estate agents, often with the participation of other agents, systematically drugged, raped, and blackmailed the company’s agents at company events. These horrendous facts, in combination with the directors’ inaction, cover-up, protection of the perpetrators, and retaliation against a director-whistleblower, may have influenced the Chancellor to reject the Credit Glory view that workplace sexual misconduct implicates fiduciary duties only in rare circumstances.  

Background. eXp World was founded in 2009 by Glenn Sanford and went public in 2018. The company’s real estate agents were not employees but independent contractors. The company had a revenue-sharing arrangement under which the top real estate agents would be entitled to a share of the revenue generated by agents they had recruited. Under this arrangement, Sanford and other directors received a share (for Sanford and another director, amounting to millions of dollars for each of them, annually) of the revenue generated by Michael Bjorkman and David Golden, the company’s two top agents.

Beginning in September 2020, the survivors of and witnesses to alleged sexual assaults by Bjorkman and Golden began to report the misconduct—in a social media post that went viral, and in various detailed memoranda, emails, voicemails, and other reports to various eXp supervisors, officers, and directors. One director who received a detailed report from twenty survivors (and who was also a consultant to the company on diversity and inclusion) turned whistleblower (the “Whistleblower”). The Whistleblower  informed the full board about the alleged misconduct; urged the board, in writing, to take the matter seriously and take action; and ultimately consulted eXp’s outside legal counsel and forwarded to the board counsel’s written recommendations, including that an independent investigation be conducted. The board adopted none of the recommendations; it ultimately conducted an internal investigation, led by insiders; and  the board “did not change anything.” In early 2023, survivors filed three anti-trafficking suits against the company in federal court, and the New York Times published an exposé on the company’s rape culture.

The Plaintiff brought this lawsuit in October 2024. Chancellor McCormick, at the pleading stage, after full briefing and oral argument, declined to dismiss the case.  

Discussion

The court’s holdings. The court found it reasonably conceivable (the standard for survival of claims at the pleading stage) that: (i) eXp’s directors and the General Counsel breached their oversight obligations under Caremark by consciously disregarding the accounts of sexual assault and misconduct that were brought to their attention; and (ii) director-officer Sanford, who directly financially benefitted from Bjorkman and Golden being retained at the company (through the company’s revenue share arrangement), breached his duty of loyalty by covering up the misconduct, protecting Bjorkman and Golden, and retaliating against the Whistleblower.

The litany of horrendous facts. Over more than twenty pages of the opinion, the court provided details from various accounts, told to various eXp supervisors, officers, and directors, from dozens of eXp real estate agents, of sexual misconduct by Bjorkman and Golden, often with the participation of other eXp agents. Allegedly, beginning in 2018, Bjorkman and Golden would travel together to company events they would host to recruit new agents; and, at the events, they would work as a team, sometimes with others joining in, to drug agents and recruits; videotape them once they were incapacitated; then rape, sexually assault, and sexually harass them; and then use the videotapes to pressure them to remain silent.

Sanford’s cover-up and the directors’ inaction. Allegedly, Sanford covered up the misconduct, by withholding information from other board members; protected Bjorkman, Golden and other perpetrators of the misconduct; and retaliated against the Whistleblower. Also, allegedly, the directors consciously ignored red flags of the misconduct. For example:

  • Bjorkman. Bjorkman was fired after the Facebook post about his drugging and raping agents went viral and he was arrested by the police for raping an eXp agent—but Sanford caused the board to put special arrangements in place to ensure that his revenue sharing vested on an accelerated basis; the company continued to pay him under the revenue share arrangement; and he was allowed to continue selling real estate with a small sales team. (Bjorkman was later arrested again for rape.)

  • Golden. Sanford allowed Golden to continue at the company when Bjorkman was fired, because another top agent (in whose revenue Sanford shared) had threatened to leave if both Bjorkman and Golden were fired. Golden was allowed to stay until September 2023, when his revenue share had vested; and the company continued to pay him thereafter under the revenue share arrangement.

  • Conord. In 2021, Sanford asked one of the company’s officer-directors, Dave Conord (who was a member of the Compliance Committee), to leave the company, when Sanford learned that Conord had been having an affair with a subordinate and sending sexually explicit pictures to other subordinates to pressure them into having sex with him. Sanford did not share this information with the full board, but kept it  “hush hush”; allowed Conord to “retire”; and caused the board to approve a generous severance package for him. Another director stated that Concord, being a married man, made a mistake by being in a hotel room where eXp agents were being drugged and sexually assaulted—but not that Conord made a mistake by failing to report the misconduct. The company welcomed Conord back less than four months after his departure, with two directors sharing the news of his return by saying, “Guess who’s back. The man is back.”

  • Investigation. The board ultimately commenced an internal investigation in April 2020, after pressure from the Whistleblower and receiving the recommendations from the company’s outside legal counsel that the Whistleblower had consulted. The board did not follow the recommendation to have an independent investigation conducted; it chose insiders to conduct the investigation. The board adopted none of counsel’s recommendations; and “changed nothing” after the investigation.

  • Retaliation. At least twice, Sanford and another director told the Whistleblower “to mind her business.” When her term expired a few months later, the Governance Committee retracted the offer it had made, before her whistleblowing, to have her continue on the board for another term.

eXp’s extensive compliance structure. The company had a Code of Business Conduct and Ethics for directors, officers, and employees; Policies and Procedures that set forth a code of conduct for agents and was incorporated into each independent contractor agreement; specific anti-harassment and anti-retaliation policies; a “Whistleblower Policy,” with an anonymous hotline and webpage to collect responses; and a set of and commitments by the company to seek to ensure that the company was free from inappropriate behaviors. The company had a dedicated Director of Agent Compliance; a management-level Compliance Committee that met regularly every two weeks; a Cultural Integrity Group to oversee moral and ethical violations; a Human Resources department; a Global Operations Coordinator charged with writing policies and procedures; and a Director of Diversity and Employee Success. The court noted, however, that there was no express structure provided in any of the policies or procedures for escalating concerns about sexual misconduct to the board.

The court’s endorsement of McDonald’s and rebuke of Credit Glory. In eXp, the court analyzed the McDonald’s and Credit Glory decisions in depth. While the types of claims made and the factual contexts were significantly different in these cases, the court focused in each case on the broad doctrinal issue. The conflict between the approach taken in eXp and McDonald’s, versus that taken in Credit Glory, awaits judicial clarification, most likely through the appellate process.

McDonald’s. In McDonald’s, the court established, first, that, under Caremark, directors and officers breach their fiduciary duties when they fail to put into place systems to oversee the risk of sexual harassment of employees, or they consciously ignore “red flags” that employees are being sexually harassed. The court found that the McDonald’s board took some actions, in good faith, to address the situation once they learned of it. Second, the court held that officers breach their duty of loyalty when they themselves engage in sexual harassment of employees, as that is “selfish” conduct (engaged in for personal gratification) that is against the best interests of the corporation—at least when the officer’s specific corporate duties included preventing sexual harassment of employees. The court thus found that the Chief People Officer of McDonald’s likely breached his duty of loyalty by sexually harassing employees. “It is not reasonable to infer that [he] acted in good faith and remained loyal to the Company while committing acts of sexual harassment, violating company policy, violating positive law, and subjecting the company to liability.”

Credit Glory. In Credit Glory, the court held that a director-officer’s harassment of two employees was “interpersonal misconduct” and did not implicate corporate fiduciary duties. The court acknowledged that such misconduct could implicate fiduciary duties under rare circumstances, when it involves subversion of the corporate office (such as in McDonald’s where the Chief People Officer, who was responsible for preventing sexual harassment, engaged in it himself). But the court considered the McDonald’s view, that sexual harassment by any officer is self-interested conduct that breaches the duty of loyalty, to go too far. Without a “limiting principle” on McDonald’s, the court stated, every “self-serving, reprehensible act by an officer”—whether “a breakroom fistfight, a defamatory social medial post, or theft of office supplies”—would constitute a violation of fiduciary duties. The court stressed that Delaware fiduciary duties govern the “internal affairs” of a corporation—that is, its corporate governance and the “integrity of the corporate decision-making process,…[by] guard[ing] against self-dealing, conflicted transactions, and bad faith conduct.” Fiduciary duties do not govern “external relationships” between managers and employees that are governed instead by employment (and other applicable) statutes.

eXp. In eXp, the Chancellor endorsed the McDonald’s view that “[d]irectors and officers breach the duty of loyalty when they abuse human resources, including by sexually harassing employees or agents of the corporation.” Also, the Chancellor strongly rejected the Credit Glory view that sexual misconduct may implicate fiduciary duties only when the misconduct involves subversion of the corporate office. The Chancellor devoted twenty pages of the eXp opinion to refuting the arguments advanced in Credit Glory—namely, that permitting a claim of sexual harassment of employees to support a duty of loyalty claim would “expand” Delaware law and lead to “doctrinal sprawl”; that fiduciary duty claims are preempted by federal and state employment laws; and that treating sexual harassment as a basis for fiduciary violations is against public policy, due to privacy concerns for survivors and their “commoditization” for corporate profit.

Demand futility. The court held in eXp that the plaintiff was excused from making demand on the board to bring the derivative litigation as it would have been futile. In McDonald’s—notwithstanding the finding that a director-officer likely breached his duty of loyalty by engaging in sexual harassment—the court ultimately dismissed the case on the basis that demand on the board to bring the litigation would not have been futile and therefore was not excused. Notably, in eXp, the court stressed that the demand futility doctrine provides a significant limitation on success for derivative claims against directors and officers for fiduciary breaches, in the context of sexual misconduct or otherwise. However, in eXp, the court held that demand would have been futile, as it was reasonably conceivable that Sanford and at least two other directors on the six-person board could not make an impartial decision about bringing the litigation, given their own potential liability due to their knowledge of the misconduct and, in one case, that a majority of the director’s income came from her employment at eXp.

Red flags. The eXp defendants conceded that the defendant directors were aware of the sexual misconduct at least as late as April 2022, when one of the company’s agents emailed the board about it and the Whistleblower became active. The defendants contended, however, that the board was unaware of the issues prior to that time, and that the board took action in good faith after becoming aware. The court concluded, however, that the Facebook post in 2020 that detailed sexual misconduct at eXp and went viral constituted a “red flag” for the board for Caremark purposes. The court acknowledged that directors should not be deemed to have knowledge of every social media post about the company, but this post was “not some everyday status update, GIF, or meme.” Rather, it “accused a top eXp [agent] [(Bjorkman)] of drugging and raping an eXp recruit at an eXp event. And the post, generated hundreds of responses, including by many other women who stated that they had had the same experience.” The court wrote: “Shortly after the post, top-agent Bjorkman was arrested [for rape] and eXp terminated his contract. It is hard to believe that no one thought to tell any of the eXp Board members about the accusations in the post, Bjorkman’s arrest, or the reasons for Bjorkman’s termination.”

Central compliance risk. Notably, the eXp defendants did not dispute that the misconduct at issue—"the harassment, drugging, assault, and rape of real estate agents in a real estate company”—posed a central compliance risk for the company that implicated Caremark oversight duties.

Practice Points

  • Anti-harassment policies and oversight. State-of-the-art systems and policies should be in place,  implemented well, and regularly reviewed and updated. A procedure for elevating harassment concerns to the board should be specified. Most critically, the board must take sexual harassment issues seriously. eXp highlights that extensive policies and procedures and compliance structures are meaningless if directors ignore or coverup information they receive about sexual misconduct, withhold such information from the board, protect the perpetrators, or retaliate against whistleblowers.

  • Weak board reaction. The court will not give partial credit to a board for weak responses to sexual harassment issues, or responses that punish the perpetrators in part but also reward them. In eXp, the court wrote that the board’s “responses [we]re so weak as to support the inference of a bad-faith decision not to take meaningful action, not the opposite.”

  • Recognizing red flags. A board should keep in mind that a social media post detailing corporate misconduct, especially if it goes viral, may be deemed by the court to be a red flag for Caremark purposes. A board should consider having a monitoring system in place that alerts it to such posts.

  • Silence in corporate minutes. eXp is another in a series of recent decisions in which silence in the corporate minutes has not been protective for directors. The eXp defendants contended that, as the minutes of board and committee meetings did not reflect discission of the sexual misconduct reports or issues, it could not be inferred that the directors knew about the misconduct. The court responded that the silence simply reflected “[e]ither those issues were not discussed or that discussion was intentionally omitted from the minutes.”

  • Ignoring recommendations. If recommendations from outside counsel with respect to sexual misconduct allegations are not implemented by the board, the reasons for not implementing them should be documented. If an investigation is conducted, the results should be documented, and if the board takes no actions in response, the reasons for not taking action should be documented.

  • Acting based on corporate profit concerns. When making decisions, a board should not necessarily prioritize the economic interests of the company nor, especially, of the directors—particularly where the health and safety of employees or others is involved.

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