EU’s Unprecedented Foreign Subsidy Regime Comes Into Force
Antitrust and Competition Law Alert® | July 25, 2023
Authors: Tobias Caspary, Valeri Bozhikov, Rebecca Ponnuthurai, Romain Girard
On July 12, 2023, the European Commission (the “Commission”) adopted the required Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1441 (the “Implementing Regulation”)[1] for its new flagship regime, the Foreign Subsidy Regulation (“FSR”).[2] Together, they constitute a novel trade policy instrument addressing a perceived legislative gap: to control non-European Union (“EU”) subsidies that distort competition in the EU’s internal market and thereby undermine its level playing field (particularly with regards to the efficient allocation of capital).[3] While the People’s Republic of China was called out as an example for providing such distortive subsidies in the Commission’s preparatory works,[4] the regime itself is country-agnostic and thus applies to all foreign subsidies including those, e.g., granted by the United States and the United Kingdom.
Given its novelty, several aspects of the FSR will require clarification. As of the writing of this note, the following can be observed:
- A distinct policy objective: Although the implementation and enforcement of the FSR regime has been left in the care of the Commission’s Directorate General for Competition, the FSR regime pursues a distinct policy objective: to regulate subsidies by non-EU countries seeking to facilitate aggressive market conduct which would not be permissible under normal market conditions. To do so, it introduces two key instruments: (i) a mandatory, standstill notification requirement (from October 12, 2023); and (ii) an ex officio investigation tool (already in effect since July 12, 2023). (see Section A.1)
- Remaining uncertainties: The FSR regime borrows concepts from merger control, state aid, and anti-subsidy rules. As such, practitioners will be able to rely on pre-existing jurisprudence and decisional practice. Yet, certain critical areas both of jurisdiction and procedure remain untested. Some uncertainty is owed to legislative vagueness and seeming discrepancies between the different legislative documents (and high-level Q&As[5] by the Commission). Notably, (i) the exact definition of “financial contribution,” (ii) the role of briefing papers, and (iii) the potential for “fix-it-first” phase I remedies are yet to be settled. It is hoped that the Commission will address these uncertainties with further guidance in the coming months.[6] (see Section A.2)
- A new regulatory hurdle for global M&A deals: The mandatory regime will generally[7] only capture “control” acquisitions (within the meaning of EU competition law) where the target business has substantial EU revenues (i.e., €500 million). It remains to be seen if the expected 30 FSR notifications per year, compared to c. 400 notifications under the EU’s merger control rules, remain realistic.[8] In any event, the significance of the FSR regime will expand beyond notified transactions, as many investors will need to consider its application well in advance of a specific deal. For all those, the regime imposes a substantial burden. (see Section B)
A. The FSR Regime – Novel and Expansive
The aim of the FSR regime is to control “foreign subsidies which distort competition in the internal market”.[9] Its framework can be summarized as follows:
Figure 1: Overview of FSR Regime

As illustrated bystrong>Figure 1, the notion of a foreign subsidy covers five aspects: (i) a—widely defined—“financial contribution” (including, e.g., capital injections, grants, loans, fiscal incentives);[10] (ii) that is granted by a third country (again, widely defined, covering government institutions or agents thereof);[11] (iii) the financial contribution provides a “non-economic-operator style” benefit (e.g., it is granted on better-than-market terms); (iv) to an undertaking active in the EU; and (v) such financial contribution was exclusive to the undertaking (or a specific industry).
It remains to be seen how the Commission will interpret these concepts going forward.
1. Elements of clarity: what is known
Notwithstanding uncertainties (covered in Section A.2 below), a few points can be noted:
- Mandatory, pre-close notification requirements. As of October 12, 2023, parties to a transaction[12] must submit a mandatory, standstill, pre-close filing if the below cumulative thresholds are met: (i) there is a change of control on a lasting basis;[13] (ii) a relevant party[14] is established in the EU; i.e., it has a subsidiary or a permanent business establishment in the EU;[15] (iii) that same relevant party generated an aggregate turnover of at least €500 million in the EU last financial year; and (iv) the relevant parties[16] received combined foreign financial contributions of more than €50 million in the last three years (from the date on which the relevant transaction agreement had signed).
- Exclusions. The jurisdictional thresholds exclude three transaction types: (i) non full-function joint ventures[17] (i.e., purely structural/non-market-facing JVs); (ii) passive investments (i.e., those investments that solely seek to maintain the value of the investment but do not aim to determine the competitive conduct or general market behavior of those undertakings); and (iii) changes of control in the context of insolvency proceedings.[18] The exact scope of application for the latter two points remains to be seen, as point 1) above (i.e., change of control on a lasting basis) already seems to exclude these two cases. Additionally, definitions of “foreign subsidy” necessarily excludes financial contributions which: (i) are provided analogous to any “economic-operator,”; i.e., on standard market terms;[19] (ii) are granted to entities which are not active in the EU;[20] or (iii) are generally available and not limited to a given undertaking or industry.
- Foreign subsidies generally non-problematic. Unlike EU state aid rules, where aid granted by an EU member state is generally prohibited unless it falls within narrow exemptions or is authorized by the Commission, foreign subsidies are not generally prohibited nor result in a prohibition of a transaction that is “touched” by such foreign subsidy.[21] Rather, the Commission establishes on a case-by-case basis whether such foreign subsidy distorts the EU’s internal market.
- List of (more) problematic foreign subsidies. The FSR helpfully provides a list of four types of foreign subsidies which are deemed “most likely to distort the internal market” in the context of concentrations. In particular, that list expressly calls out subsidies “directly facilitating a concentration,” which is what the Commission considered as most problematic during its preparatory works, and where it expressly called out the People’s Republic of China.[22] Even then, the Commission must still carry out a balancing test to determine whether the negative impact of the foreign subsidy is outweighed by positive effects, such as promoting the development of a subsidized economic activity within the EU.[23]
- Ex officio investigations. Since July 12, 2023, the Commission can open ex officio investigations under the FSR. These ex officio powers allow to review both: (i) anticipated transactions (which fall under the standstill obligation); or (ii) implemented transactions (are not subject to the standstill obligation). Importantly for implemented transactions, the Commission can retrospectively investigate foreign subsidies granted up to five years prior to July 12, 2023 (i.e., any foreign subsidies granted after July 12, 2018).[24] As at the date of writing, there have been no ex officio investigations opened, but the Commission noted it expects approximately 35 to 45 cases a year.[25]
- Resemblance with EU merger control procedure. The FSR procedure resembles the procedure under the EU’s merger control regime. As such, practitioners will be able to rely on pre-existing jurisprudence and decisional practice. For example, similar to the EUMR procedure: (i) there is an informal pre-notification period; (ii) parties must submit a case team allocation request to the Commission; and (iii) there is a 25-working day period to review notifications under Phase I, followed by a further 90-working days for Phase II.[26]
A high-level flow-chart of the notification and ex officio FSR regimes, showing procedural steps, can be found at Appendix 1.
2. Elements of uncertainty: what remains to be seen
Due to the novelty of the FSR regime, it is inevitable that certain areas both of jurisdiction and procedure remain untested. However, some of these uncertainties have the potential to expand the FSR’s scope and will, therefore, need to be carefully monitored.
Regarding jurisdiction, two particular areas would benefit from further clarification by the Commission:
- Precise definition of “financial contribution”: The FSR’s language drives a potentially unreasonable wedge between the definition of “foreign subsidy” and “financial contribution”. As explained above, only “financial contributions” are relevant for the jurisdictional thresholds, whilst the FSR states that only “foreign subsidies” are relevant for the substantive assessment.[27] The consequence could be a widening of the jurisdictional threshold far beyond what the Commission intended.[28] A simple solution would be for guidance by the Commission to clearly confirm that it is wholly unreasonable to request information from investors on financial contributions which the Commission is not at liberty to review as part of its assessment.
- Turnover calculation rules: The FSR’s rules on turnover calculation are copied across verbatim from the EUMR.[29] The alignment has the unfortunate consequence of creating discrepancies with the Implementing Regulation and the Commission’s Q&As as regards the treatment of joint ventures. For example, the Q&As clarified that (i) greenfield JVs, and (ii) pre-existing JVs with less than €500 million in revenue will not meet point 3) of the jurisdictional thresholds.[30] The Commission explains those exclusions by noting that only the JV’s turnover is relevant for calculating whether point 3) is met. Conversely, Article 22(4) FSR states that revenues from the JV, its controlling parent(s), and their controlled entities be aggregated to calculate the EUR 500M threshold.[31] Helpfully, the Commission has been delegated powers to amend the thresholds in point 3).[32] It is therefore hoped for the Commission to use these to remedy the discrepancy. Alternatively, further guidance regarding the Implementing Regulation will be required.[33]
Regarding procedure, notwithstanding the superficial resemblance to the EUMR’s procedure, there are a number of important distinctions and consequent uncertainties:
- Phase I remedies unclear: Unlike under the EUMR, neither the FSR nor the Implementing Regulation expressly cater for the possibility to offer commitments within the Phase I review. On the other hand, nothing expressly excludes the parties taking steps to proactively address any concerns prior to notification (e.g., with the buyer repaying subsidies unilaterally). It is expected that such steps would lead the Commission to clear the transactions rather than lead it into a Phase II for commitments; however, the exact procedural steps remain to be tested.
- Scope of jurisdictional briefing papers unclear: the general principle of sound administration should entail that the Commission would be open to discussing cases with parties prior to notification. That sentiment is echoed by the recitals of the FSR which state: “undertakings should be able to request pre-notification consultations with the Commission [ . . . ], with the aim of receiving guidance on whether the thresholds for notification are met”. Such pre-notification consultation would likely resemble a “briefing paper” (i.e., a short form submission used in merger control). In that light, it is unclear whether Q&A #18 affirms or amends this principle, as it suggests no mechanism exists outside of pre-notification dialogue (which could potentially still require preparation of a full notification).
- Confidential information receives less protection: Confidentiality rules under the Implementing Regulation are qualified to allow the Commission to: (i) disclose confidential information where it considers there is an “overriding interest in its disclosure”; and (ii) use and disclose “to the extent necessary” information showing the existence of a distortive foreign subsidy.[34] These exemptions may allow a de facto “name and shame” process whereby the Commission publicly reveals information identifying the nature and extent of foreign subsidies given or received. It is hoped the Commission will use these powers restrictively and conscientiously and only where there has been a deliberate attempt to distort competition in the internal market.
- Unclear whether early Phase I clearance is possible: The FSR operates under a US-style waiting period.[35] However, there is no formal mechanism for “early termination,” meaning parties may need to wait the full 25 working days. The Commission is not excluded from issuing an earlier notice to the parties that it will not initiate a Phase II (under Article 10(4) FSR); and such is its practice under the EUMR (where Phase I clearance can be obtained between day 18 and 25 of the review period). Given the fact that the same authority will administer the FSR regime, some alignment on procedural flexibility can be expected, but remains to be seen.
- Unclear use of discretion in granting waivers: The Implementing Regulation expressly provides the Commission with discretionary powers to grant derogations to parties as regards certain procedural requirements;[36] including the need to provide certain information in Form FS-CO. It is hoped the Commission will use these powers generously, but this remains to be seen.
- Unclear use of discretion for stopping the clock: The Implementing Regulation gives the Commission discretionary powers to suspend the review period where parties (including third parties) fail to respond to a request for information (“RFIs”) within the specified time, including in Phase I.[37] On that basis, if the Commission requests information from (e.g.) a third-country government, and that government fails to respond in time, then the Commission could potential delay clearance of the notified transaction. The Implementing Regulation helpfully states that the Commission should only use that discretion “exceptionally”.[38] It is therefore expected that the Commission will show appropriate restraint in using these powers.
B. How to Prepare for the Regime
As with any new regulatory regime, investors will have to navigate the legal and practical challenges associated with the new FSR regime. The impact ultimately depends on the type of transactions that are carried out. For instance, some investors will find their M&A activity/transaction is unlikely to trigger the regime (e.g., non-controlling acquisitions, or targets with the limited EU nexus). Conversely, investors carrying out M&A activity involving large EU targets will need to closely investigate whether they exceeded €50 million combined financial contributions. With respect to private equity investors, specifically, financial contributions need be recorded across all controlled portfolio companies and across all funds on a rolling basis (to ensure the information across the three-year period prior to the notification is readily available when conducting the assessment).
To that end, the implementation of an effective recording and reporting system will be critical to ensure companies can provide the information required to submit complete notifications. Helpfully, the Commission has provided some guidance through the Implementing Regulation:
- Potential de facto simplified filing: Notifying parties are not required to report financial contributions (i) received by other funds within the wider fund structure, other than the direct fund doing the investment;[39] and (ii) which do not exceed a combined €45 million from a single third country.[40] Taken together, these exemptions can potentially result in a de facto “simplified” filing (i.e., where no information on the financial contributions is required) for most private equity investors.
- Reporting floor: Although there is no de minimis amount of financial contributions for the purpose of calculating the €50 million thresholds, once an investor is clear that they exceed the threshold, then they only need to record financial contributions which are individually in excess of €1 million. Such reporting floor is a welcomed guardrail against excessive reporting requirements.
- Avoiding bad language in internal documents: The Form FS CO requires submitting internal documents, like under the EUMR procedure. As such, it will be important for investors to monitor internal document creation in the lead up to a transaction and avoid any language around foreign subsidies (and in particular of the sort listed as more problematic, as discussed above).
Foreign Subsides Regulation – Procedural Flowchart

[1] Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1441 of July 10, 2023 on detailed arrangements for the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market.
[2] Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of December 14, 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market.
[3] Commission White Paper, COM (2020) 253 final (the “White Paper”), page 9.
[4] White Paper, footnote 10 which mentions the Sino-CEEF fund.
[5] See questions and answers (“Q&As”) as prepared by the Commission, last updated on July 12, 2023.
[6] The Commission is under an obligation to publish guidance within three years of the adoption of the FSR (i.e., by 2026 at the latest), see Article 46 FSR.
[7] The one exception is in the case of legal mergers, where the jurisdictional thresholds can be met by the buyer alone. Under EU merger control rules (which the FSR is expected to also adopt), mergers capture only cases where two independent undertakings merge with only one legal entity surviving. It does not capture mergers where the buyer creates a wholly-owned SPV for the target to merger into; those transactions would be treated as acquisitions of control (see Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01), para 9-10, and footnote 8).
[8] Commission Impact Assessment, SWD (2021) 99 final, page 85; and the Commission Statistics on Merger Control.
[9] The concept is similar to EU state aid rules (which prohibit aid granted by member states which distorts competition in the internal market) (see, e.g., Article 107 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), but borrows the concept of “subsidy” from the EU anti-subsidy regulation (see Article 3 Regulation 2016/1037).
[10] The FSR provides a non-exhaustive list: (i) the transfer of funds or liabilities, such as capital injections, grants, loans, loan guarantees, fiscal incentives, the setting off of operating losses, compensation for financial burdens imposed by public authorities, debt forgiveness, debt to equity swaps, or rescheduling; (ii) the foregoing of revenue that is otherwise due, such as tax exemptions or the granting of special or exclusive rights without adequate remuneration; or (iii) the provision of goods or services or the purchase of goods or services (Article 3(2) FSR).
[11] Article 3(2), second sentence FSR.
[12] There is a parallel regime for public procurement where mandatory notification is required if the value of the contract is equal to or greater than €250 million; and the economic operator was granted financial contributions in the three years prior to the notification equal to or greater than €4 million per third country.
[13] Control is defined by reference to “decisive influence” (Article 20(5) FSR), and the Commissions Q&A notes that the concept of control (and decisive influence) should be interpreted in line with the one used under Regulation (EC) 139/2004 (the “EUMR”) (as well as the related guidance), see Q&A #6 as at July 12, 2023.
[14] Point ii) requires one of the merging parties (for legal mergers), the target undertaking, or the JV itself, to be established in the EU (Article 20(3)(a) FSR).
[15] See footnote 7 of Implementing Regulation, Annex I.
[16] Point iv) looks at the combined financial contributions for both merging parties (for merger), the target and buyer(s) (for M&A), the JV parents and the JV itself (for JVs) (Article 20(3)(b) FSR).
[17] Full-functionality is a concept borrowed from EU merger control which requires joint ventures to be performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity (Article 20(2) FSR).
[19] White Paper, Annex I; also, recital 13 FSR.
[23] Article 6(1) FSR. In all other cases, the factor which will be relevant to find a distortion include: (i) the amount and nature of the subsidy (including any conditions attached to the subsidy); and (ii) the size of the undertaking and the markets concerned and the amount of dynamism on the markets concerned; see Article 4(1) FSR.
[25] See footnote 7. These are not limited to ex officio review of concentrations, but also public procurement and other market behavior the Commissions deems necessary to investigate.
[26] Even the name of the notification form (“Form FS-CO”) closely mirrors the “Form CO” under the EUMR.
[27] Article 19, second sentence, FSR.
[29] See Article 22(4) FSR compared to Article 5(4) EUMR.
[33] At present, the Q&As are unhelpfully caveated as “not binding the Commission”; whereas, formal Commission guidance has been held by EU courts as binding the Commission.
[34] Article 19(6) and (7) Implementing Regulation. Conversely, under the EUMR, confidentiality is expressed in absolute terms.
[35] Like the EUMR, the FSR has a standstill obligation which prevents the parties from implementing their transaction during the Phase I review (i.e. 25 working days from notification); see Article 24 FSR. However, unlike the EUMR, the Commission must only take a decision if it intends to open a Phase II in-depth investigation.
[36] Recitals 8-11 Implementing Regulation.
[37] Article 24(5) FSR. In comparison, RFIs under the EUMR only “stop the clock” during the Phase II review.
[39] See Implementing Regulation, Annex I, Table 1, para 7. Notably, it requires that there are no inter-fund commercial relationships.
[40] See Implementing Regulation, Annex I, FS-CO sections 5.2 and 5.3; and Table 1 para 3. Notably, it requires that the financial contributions do not fall within Article 5(1)(a)-(d) of the Implementing Regulation.
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