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Court of Chancery Holds a Corporation’s Contractual Right in a Stockholders’ Agreement Was Subject to its Efforts Obligation—Chordia v. Lee

M&A/PE Briefing | January 11, 2024

In Chordia v. Lee (Jan. 4, 2023), the Delaware Court of Chancery interpreted a Stockholders’ Agreement (the “Agreement”), between Alphonso Inc. (the “Corporation”) and its founders and other key stockholders (the “Key Holders”), which had been entered into in conjunction with the acquisition of a majority stake in the Corporation by LG Electronics (“LGE”).

Of note, the court held that the efforts clause set forth in the Agreement, requiring the Corporation to use reasonable efforts to effectuate the rights granted in the Agreement (the “Efforts Clause”), trumped the Corporation’s right to fire its officers and employees—as, under the Agreement, if no Key Holders remained as officers or employees, the Key Holders would lose their right (the “Director-Designation Right”) to designate a minority of the Corporation’s board of directors (the “Board”). Also of note, the court held that the Efforts Clause, which was stated in the Agreement as applicable to “the Corporation,” was not applicable to the Board—thus, the CEO’s firing of officers and employees breached the Efforts Clause, although the Board’s firings did not. As the Corporation (acting through the CEO) breached the Agreement, the court held that the Director-Designation Right remained intact.

Key Points

  • The court distinguished this case from those in which it has held that efforts clauses do not require parties to give up bargained-for contractual rights. The court held that, although the CEO had the right to fire employees, the Corporation had to give up that right to the extent it conflicted with the Efforts Clause. The court distinguished prior cases which have held that efforts clauses do not require the sacrifice of bargained-for contractual rights. In those cases, the court reasoned, a right was rendered “illusory,” while in this case the Efforts Clause only “tempered” the CEO’s right to fire employees.
  • The court held that the Efforts Clause bound only “the Corporation” and not the Board. The court emphasized that the Agreement itself appeared to reflect an intention to distinguish between “the Corporation” and “the Board”—with some provisions stated as applying to “the Corporation” and others as applying to “the Board.” On that basis, the court held that the Board could take actions without regard to the Efforts Clause.  
  • The case highlights typical sources of friction that can develop between an acquiror of a majority stake and the target’s former key stockholders.  (See “Practice Points” below.) 

Background. In December 2020, LGE, through its U.S. subsidiary, Zenith Electronics LLC (“Zenith”), acquired just over a 50% stake in the Corporation. In connection with the acquisition, Key Holders of the Corporation received considerable upfront payments (for some of them, several million dollars each) from Zenith; and the Key Holders and the Corporation entered into the Stockholders’ Agreement.

The Stockholders’ Agreement. Under the Agreement: (i) Liquidity Rights. The Key Holders could demand an IPO after a specified date; and Zenith agreed to conduct tender offers for the Corporation’s shares on specified dates. (ii) Director-Designation Right. The Key Holders could designate a minority of the Board (the “Common Directors”), so long as (a) at least one Key Holder remained an officer or employee of the Corporation (the “Designation Condition”) and (b) the Key Holders collectively continued to own at least a specified percentage of the shares. (iii) Veto Right. The consent of at least one of the Common Directors was required for the Board to postpone the IPO beyond a certain date; to postpone, or determine fair market value for, the scheduled tender offers; and (subject to exceptions) to enter the Corporation into related-party transactions with LGE. (iv) Firing Executive Officers. The Board had the exclusive right to fire executive officers of the Corporation.

After the acquisition, there were five Key Holders who were officers or employees of the Corporation (three of them executives, and two non-executives). The Board was comprised of four directors designated by Zenith (all of whom were affiliated with LGE); and three Common Directors. The Corporation thrived, greatly exceeding LGE’s targets and expectations. Nonetheless, friction soon developed between LGE, on the one hand, and the executive-officer Key Holders and the Common Directors, on the other hand. Among other things, LGE was concerned about proceeding with an IPO on the timetable set forth in the Agreement (or possibly at all) and wanted to amend an inventory agreement with the Corporation to make the transfer pricing more favorable to LGE, at the Corporation’s expense; and the executive-officer Key Holders and the Common Directors took numerous unauthorized actions, refused to follow corporate policies and protocols, and routinely engaged in generally unprofessional conduct.

In 2022, LGE developed a plan “to remove all control from the Key Holders” by firing all of the Key Holders who were officers or employees, so that the Director-Designation Right would become null and void. The Board fired the three executive-officer Key Holders; the Board replaced the CEO with a new, Interim CEO and, as directed by the Board, he fired the two non-executive-officer Key Holders (who were apparently exemplary and valued employees); the fired Key Holders were given buyout offers for their shares (at an apparently very low price); and Zenith then executed a written consent removing the Common Directors from the Board. 

Key Holders brought suit. This post-trial decision addressed the claim that the written consent removing the Common Directors was invalid because the firing of the Key Holders who were officers or employees breached the Efforts Clause by causing the Designation Condition to become unsatisfied. In a 104-page opinion, Vice Chancellor Nathan A. Cook ruled that the written consent was invalid and the Common Directors remained in office—because the Corporation’s firing of the non-executive-officer Key Holders breached the Efforts Clause. While not necessary given that holding, the court also concluded that the Board’s firing of the executive-officer Key Holders did not breach the Efforts Clause (because the Efforts Clause did not apply to the Board). 

Discussion

The CEO’s firing of Key Holders breached the Efforts Clause. The Corporation, acting through its CEO, fired the non-executive-officer Key Holders. The court found that the CEO “exercised a power that he believed to be within the scope of the authority held by [the Corporation’]s CEO,” and may also have had a contractual right under the Agreement to fire non-executive officers. “But,” the court stated, the CEO “overlooked the express bargained-for contractual efforts obligation that [the Corporation] agreed to as a party to the [Agreement]”—requiring the Corporation to use ‘reasonable efforts’ to ‘ensure’ [the parties’] enjoyment of [the rights granted under the Agreement].” The court explained that, based on the Efforts Clause, the Agreement “never gave the CEO unfettered discretion [to fire non-executive officers]. It included an express limit on the exercise of the termination discretion to the extent such exercise could be seen to interfere with the other rights granted to the parties in the [Agreement].” Therefore, the court held, the CEO’s firings breached the Efforts Clause. 

The Board’s firing of Key Holders did not breach the Efforts Clause. The Board, exercising its exclusive right set forth in the Agreement to fire executive officers, fired the executive-officer Key Holders. The court emphasized that the Efforts Clause, by its express terms, imposed an obligation on “the Corporation,” and that did not mean that the Board was subject to the same obligation. The court stated that, while ordinarily it might have “reservations” about such a distinction, in this case “the [Agreement] itself distinguishes in various instances between [the Corporation] and the Board.” The court pointed to “instances [in which the Agreement] refers separately to the Board and [the Corporation] in the same provision.” Accordingly, the court concluded that the obligation under the Efforts Clause, which expressly applied to “the Corporation,” did not apply to the Board (nor LGE). Thus, the Board’s firings could not have breached the Efforts Clause because the Clause did not apply to the Board.

The Corporation’s obligations under the Efforts Clause trumped the Corporation’s right to terminate employees. The court distinguished Akorn v. Fresnius (2018) and Vintage Rodeo v. Rent-a-Center (2019), which had established that efforts clauses do not require the sacrifice of bargained-for contractual rights (as the concept of giving up a contract right for the benefit of another is a fiduciary standard, not a contractual one). In Chordia, the court observed that in Akorn and Vintage Rodeo “the Court’s concern was whether a party’s contract rights [were] rendered illusory” by an efforts obligation. In Chordia, by contrast, the court reasoned, the Corporation’s right to terminate employees was not rendered illusory—rather, there was a pre-condition to the Key Holders’ Director-Designation Right that at least one Key Holder remained as an officer or employee, and the Corporation was restrained by the Efforts Clause from firing Key Holders because such action would cause the condition to that right to become unsatisfied. Reading the Agreement as a whole, the court concluded: “[The Efforts Clause] imposes a frankly small obligation on the Corporation, and that limited obligation, which the Corporation voluntarily undertook, can hardly be said to have rendered the right to terminate employees ‘illusory.’ Indeed, the CEO could terminate any…employee. Only when seeking to terminate [the two non-executive-officer Key Holders], however, was the CEO required to use reasonable efforts first under [the Efforts Clause].”

In further commentary, the court drew a negative comparison with the Defendants’ approach to the Plaintiffs’ Director-Designation Right. The court wrote: “Although tempering the CEO’s employee termination ‘right’ comes nowhere near rendering the ‘right’ ineffective or illusory, the same cannot be said for Defendants’ reading of Plaintiffs’ rights under the [Agreement]. The Defendants seek to read the Director-Designation Right as, in essence, an illusory right. Or, at least, a right that LGE and [the Corporation] could terminate at their election. But that is not what the parties bargained for.”

Distinguishing features of the case. Although the court’s analysis suggests that the following features of the case were not determinative of the judicial result, we note the overall negative factual context, which may well have influenced the court. The court found that the evidence established that: LGE’s plan “was undertaken for the purpose of eviscerating the Key Holders’ liquidity rights and the limited protections they had negotiated of those rights”; the Interim CEO was appointed by the Board “as a warm body to do the dirty work that [the Board] could not” (i.e., firing non-executive officers); the Interim CEO’s own testimony indicated that he had no basis for terminating the non-executive-officer Key Holders other than “blindly following [LGE’s] instructions”; and, although there apparently were numerous instances of serious misconduct by the executive-officer Key Holders and the Common Directors, the Corporation’s recorded reasons for terminating them were “pretextual” and “backfilled” given their generic nature and the misidentification of several officers.

In distinguishing this case from others that may arise, we note also that, consistent with a recent trend in Court of Chancery opinions, the Chordia opinion included extensive dicta—with the court addressing issues and making arguments (not raised or made by the parties), and reaching conclusions, that were unnecessary given the key holding that the Corporation had breached the Efforts Clause.

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the firings breached the implied covenant of good faith. While the implied covenant is recognized “where a contract is silent as to the issue in dispute,” it does not apply when the silence is a result of the parties having “purposefully omit[ed]” terms. In this case, the court found, based on the history of negotiations, the parties had considered, but rejected, the executive-officer Key Holders having employment contracts and had rejected their having a veto over firing of the CEO. The parties rejected those terms given their understanding that LGE would control the board (“and hence all the decisions that need simple board majority”) and, indeed, that “LGE might seek to terminate the CEO for a variety of reasons,” including disagreements over strategy. “Having anticipated these points and having determined not to secure terms at the bargaining table to address them, the executive-officer Key Holders can find no refuge now in the implied covenant’s gap-filling function,” the court wrote.

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the firings were invalid under the Schnell doctrine. The court observed that the Schnell doctrine (invalidating actions affecting the stockholder franchise that were “legal but inequitable”) has almost invariably been applied in situations where a board “deliberately employed various legal strategies either to frustrate or completely disenfranchise a shareholder vote.” This case, we would note, arguably did not involve a shareholder vote, but the contractual rights of certain key stockholders. The court declined “to delve into this complex area of the law” given that it had found a breach of the Agreement and invalidated the Corporation’s actions on that basis. 

Practice Points

  • Clarity with respect to business arrangements and drafting. Chordia highlights the need for parties to develop a clear understanding of their business arrangement and to ensure that the drafting of their agreement accurately and unambiguously reflects the intended arrangement. Clarity with respect to the parties’ understandings is especially critical in connection with stockholders’ agreements, joint ventures, earnouts and other bespoke arrangements
  • Whether an efforts clause requires sacrifice of contractual rights. Based on Chordia, parties should consider including in an efforts clause a statement to the effect that the efforts obligations will not (or will) require either party to sacrifice any of its rights (or specified rights) set forth in the agreement.
  • Interplay between an efforts clause and a party’s right that is subject to a pre-condition. Based on Chordia, drafters of agreements should be mindful that, where a party’s right (such as, in Chordia, the Key Holders’ Director-Designation Right) is subject to a pre-condition (in Chordia, that at least one Key Holder was still employed by the company), an efforts clause requiring efforts to ensure effectiveness of the parties’ rights under the agreement may imbue the right-holder with protections against the company taking action such that the pre-condition would not be satisfied (in Chordia, protection for the Key Holders who were employees against their being fired). To the extent such protection is not intended, the parties should consider so stating in the agreement.
  • Distinctions between the company and the board. Drafters of agreements should keep in mind that if the agreement refers to the “company” in some provisions and the “board” in others, the court may interpret the agreement as intending a divergence between obligations or rights of the company and those of the board. The parties’ intentions in this respect should be stated clearly in the agreement. Where a distinction is intended, rather than relying only on certain provisions referring to the company and others to the board, the drafter should consider including clarifying language stating that the distinction is intended.
  • Potential sources of post-closing conflict. As highlighted in Chordia, common sources of conflict, post-closing, between an acquiror of a majority stake in a target company and the target’s founders or other key stockholders, include disagreement over the general strategic direction for the company; the timing of an IPO or other liquidity rights; related-party agreements; and the clash of corporate cultures. The more areas that have been thoroughly discussed by the parties, with clear expectations set and the parties’ understandings clearly reflected in their agreement, the less likely it is that disagreements will arise post-closing. A stockholders’ agreement should provide with specificity the parties’ rights and obligations with respect to these issues, including with respect to corporate policies, protocols, and chains of command, together with protective provisions to ensure the effectiveness of such provisions (such as a right to designate directors or board observers, veto or consent rights, and efforts obligations). The realistic timing for a post-closing IPO may require special attention by the parties, including their being mindful of the need for careful integration of the companies (such as, in Chordia, the integration of the target’s automatic content recognition technology into LGE’s smart TVs). Particular attention should be paid to the potential for a clash of corporate cultures when (as in Chordia) a more formal, traditional, hierarchical corporate entity acquires a majority stake in (or joint ventures with) a startup or other company with a more informal, free-wheeling, non-hierarchical culture.
  • Context matters. Numerous problematic actions taken by the Corporation in Chordia could easily have been rendered non-problematic. For example, there were apparently good reasons for the Corporation to have fired the executive-officer Key Holders. They apparently had engaged the Corporation in several significant activities without the Board’s required approval; ignored compliance policies set by LGE; aggressively pressed LGE to replenish the Corporation’s stock option pool beyond the limits that had been agreed pre-closing (which would have reduced LGE’s ownership below 50%); and engaged in generally unprofessional conduct toward LGE and its board-designees on an ongoing basis. But the court found that the Corporation, as part of LGE’s plan, had created a “playbook” with generic justifications for the firings that were “pretextual” and “backfilled.” As another example, the Interim CEO was hired without regard to his qualifications and abilities, and he then “blindly” followed the Board’s direction to fire executives, without any consideration at all of the issue or the possible application of the Corporation’s efforts obligations under the Agreement.

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