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Court of Chancery Clarifies that Sophisticated Stockholders of a Delaware Corporation Can Waive Fiduciary Duties Under Certain Circumstances—Fugue

M&A/PE Briefing | May 5, 2023

In New Enterprise Associates 14, L.P. v. Rich (“Fugue”) (May 2, 2023), the Delaware Court of Chancery held that a contractual covenant by certain stockholders (the “Funds”) not to challenge a sale of the company that met specified criteria was enforceable (excluding only with respect to claims involving intentional breach of fiduciary duties, such as fraud or bad faith). The court emphasized that the covenant, which was contained in a drag-along provision in a stockholders’ agreement, was both narrow in scope (as it applied only to a sale meeting specified criteria) and was reasonable (as the stockholders were sophisticated and had received bargained-for consideration in exchange).

The decision is notable for Vice Chancellor Laster’s extensive analysis of the various ways that Delaware law permits the “tailoring” of fiduciary duties in the corporate context, contrary to the common understanding that fiduciary duties are alterable only in the LLC context. The decision thus highlights that the court generally is likely to be receptive to covenants-not-to-sue (which effectively are a form of waiver of fiduciary duties) agreed by sophisticated stockholders.

Key Points

  • The court rejected the argument that a waiver of duties of corporate fiduciaries is invalid on its face. Most of the opinion was devoted to an exegesis of the various ways in which Delaware statutes and common law doctrines permit, or have the effect of, “tailoring” or “shaping” fiduciary duties. The court reasoned that these statutes and doctrines, although they did not bear directly on the validity of the covenant-not-to-sue at issue in this case, had the same effect as the covenant in modifying fiduciary duties, which suggested that the covenant was not against public policy on that basis.
  • The court held that a stockholder-level waiver of corporate fiduciary duties is enforceable if, on the facts of the case, the waiver is reasonable.  The court found that “[t]his case provides an optimal scenario for enforcement” of the covenant in question. “Sophisticated repeat players consented explicitly to a clear provision in a stockholder-level agreement that applies only to a specific transaction,” the court wrote.
  • The court made clear that, while the waiver at issue in this case is enforceable, in most cases a waiver of corporate fiduciary duties would not be enforceable. The court wrote that the “use cases for a provision like the [covenant-not-to-sue at issue in this case]… are likely to be few and limited to uber-sophisticated parties….” A fiduciary waiver likely would not be upheld, the court stated, in scenarios involving, for example, an agreement binding a retail stockholder or an employee stock grant. The court also stated that the covenant at issue would not be enforceable with respect to waiver of intentional fiduciary breaches such as fraud or bad faith.

Background. The Funds were investment funds managed by sophisticated venture capital firms. The Funds had financially backed Fugue, Inc., a start-up company, for six years. They then encouraged Fugue’s management to seek a liquidity event. Fugue engaged in a six-months-long sale process but received no indications of interest. With Fugue in need of capital, and the Funds not wanting to increase their financial commitment, management told the board that the only available option was to engage in a recapitalization led by the investor George Rich (the “Recapitalization”). Rich insisted, and the Funds agreed, that (i) all existing Fugue preferred stock would become common stock; (ii) Rich and his fellow investors would receive a new class of preferred stock (the “Preferred Stock”); and (iii) the Funds and other significant investors would enter into a voting agreement (the “Voting Agreement”). The Funds were offered the opportunity to participate in the Recapitalization, but they declined.

The Voting Agreement included a drag-along right (the “Drag-Along Right”), which provided that, if Fugue’s board and the holders of a majority of the Preferred Stock (i.e., Rich and his fellow investors) were to approve a sale of the company that met a list of eight specified criteria, then the signatories of the Voting Agreement would have to participate in the transaction (the “Drag-Along Sale”). In the Drag-Along Right provision, the Voting Agreement signatories (including the Funds) covenanted not to bring suit, including claims for breach of fiduciary duty, against Rich in connection with any Drag-Along Sale (the “Covenant”).

Three months after the Voting Agreement was signed, an opportunity to sell the company materialized. The company and the acquiror negotiated a Drag-Along Sale. As explained by the court in an earlier decision in the case, the Drag-Along Sale provided a high price for the company, with the holders of the Preferred Stock receiving a return of almost 750% and option holders receiving a return of 3,200%. Those gains came at the expense of other company stockholders (including the Funds), who suffered dilution from those equity issuances in the Recapitalization and therefore received a lesser share of the merger consideration.

After the Drag-Along Sale closed, Rich became the company’s controlling stockholder and individuals affiliated or associated with him comprised a majority of the board. The Funds brought suit claiming that Rich and the directors breached their duty of loyalty by engaging in the Drag-Along Sale. The defendants argued that, in light of the Covenant, the claims had to be dismissed. Vice Chancellor Laster held that the Covenant was enforceable and dismissed the fiduciary claims (other than those alleging fraud or bad faith, which were not dismissed).

Discussion

The court held that a provision in a stockholders’ agreement waiving breaches of duty by corporate fiduciaries is not invalid on its face. The court emphasized that, contrary to the common understanding, corporate fiduciary duties are “not immutable, mandatory terms but rather [are] freely modifiable defaults.” The court pointed to numerous Delaware statutory provisions and common law doctrines that have the effect of limiting fiduciary duties or liability for their breach—which, the court reasoned, supported a view that a waiver of fiduciary duties would be within the bounds of Delaware public policy and not facially invalid.

The court referred, for example, to the authorization under DGCL Section 1227(17) of advance renunciation of corporate opportunities, which is equivalent to a covenant not to sue for usurpation of the renounced opportunities—and, the court noted, “the Covenant operates similarly.” The court also pointed to the common law doctrine of contractual preemption of fiduciary claims, which, the court stated, “indicates that the [contractual] Drag-Along Right may already foreclose a [fiduciary] loyalty claim.” The court also cited the common law doctrine of advance ratification by stockholders, which forecloses litigation over a specific transaction—as, the court noted, the Covenant also does. The court cited the common law doctrine of laches, which, the it observed, “shows that the Funds simply agreed in advance to do something they could do of their own volition: give up their claims by declining to sue.”

The court also stressed that the contractarian nature of Delaware law—which emphasizes the right of parties to freely contract and to rely on the enforceability of their agreements—supports the view that fiduciary duties can be tailored by agreement. The commitment to contractarianism should be at its height, the court stated, “when stockholders enter into agreements about how they will exercise stockholder-level rights, because at that level, individual owners are bargaining over their private property.”

The court held further, however, that a waiver of corporate fiduciary duties is enforceable only if, under the facts of the case, the waiver “survive[s] close scrutiny for reasonableness.”  The court interpreted Delaware precedent—namely, the Delaware Supreme Court’s 2021 Manti decision, and the Court of Chancery’s 2019 Altor Bioscience decision—as requiring, on a case-by-case basis, an evaluation of the reasonableness of a waiver of corporate fiduciary duties. Based on Manti and Altor Bioscience, the court articulated a two-part test for determining whether a stockholder-level agreement to waive corporate fiduciary duties is reasonable.

First, “the provision must be narrowly tailored to address a specific transaction that otherwise would constitute a breach of fiduciary duty”—with the level of specificity similar to what would pass muster for advance authorization in a trust or agency agreement, for advance renunciation of a corporate opportunity under DGCL Section 122(17), or for advance ratification of an interested transaction like self-interested director compensation. “If the provision is not sufficiently specific, then it is facially invalid,” the court wrote. The Covenant met this part of the test, the court found, as it only applied to one of three types of transactions that, under the Voting Agreement, would qualify as a “Sale of the Company”; and the terms of the transaction then had to meet eight specific criteria necessary for it to qualify as a Drag-Along Sale. The Funds “agreed not to sue over a specific transaction with specific characteristics,” the court stated.

Second, there must be indicia of reasonableness. The Covenant met this part of the test, as many of the factors that the court found in Manti pointed to reasonableness in that case (of a contractual promise not to assert appraisal rights) were also present in this case. Those factors included “(i) a written contract formed through actual consent, (ii) a clear provision, (iii) knowledgeable stockholders who understood the provision’s implications, (iv) the Funds’ ability to reject the provision, and (v) the presence of bargained-for consideration.”

The court articulated the relevant inquiry for whether a contractual waiver of fiduciary duties conflicts with the DGCL or the company’s charter or bylaws. The court wrote: “Does the contractual provision address an action that a stockholder individually or a group of stockholders collectively could take? If yes, then a stockholder can contract over that action in advance…. The DGCL, charter, and bylaws specify what rights are appurtenant to the shares and available for the stockholders to exercise. The stockholder gets to choose whether to exercise those rights and can agree contractually to constrain its exercise of those rights.” Just as a stockholder can covenant not to sell shares or how to vote shares, the court wrote, a stockholder “should be able to covenant not to sue.”

The court rejected public-policy based arguments for facial invalidity of the Covenant. The court rejected arguments that (i) the right to sue for breach of fiduciary duty is “too important to waive”; (ii) enforcement of a provision like the Covenant would “threaten[] Delaware’s corporate brand” that promises standardization with respect to protections offered by Delaware corporation; and (iii) acceptance of a provision like the Covenant would “collapse[] the distinction” between corporations and limited liability companies (LLCs). As to (i) above, the court observed that many other important rights are waivable under Delaware law without violating public policy, including “fundamental rights associated with [one’s] personal liberty” (such as waiver of a jury trial). As to (ii) above, the court stated, among other things, that Delaware’s brand includes flexibility for private ordering. As to (iii) above, the court stated that a stockholder-level agreement does not risk blurring the distinctions between corporations and LLCs because those distinctions exist at the level of the governing statutes and the constitutive documents. Further, the court noted fundamental distinctions between the constituent documents of corporations and LLCs—such as the ability under an LLC agreement, but not a corporate charter, to fully eliminate fiduciary duties; to provide indemnification unconstrained by any statutory standards; and to fully eliminate any and all liabilities (other than for bad faith breaches of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).

The court made clear that the Covenant would not necessarily have been upheld under different facts. The court noted, for example, that a provision like the Covenant would not be upheld if presented as a “take-it-or-leave-it provision in a pre-IPO charter.” Also, the court noted (in a footnote) that the Covenant might not be binding on signatories to the Voting Agreement other than the Funds (depending on the facts relating to those signatories). The court also noted numerous specific scenarios in which the court likely would not uphold a provision such as the Covenant—including: “An agreement binding a retail stockholder. An employee stock grant. A  dividend reinvestment plan. An employee stock option plan. A stock transmittal letter. A transaction that offered an election between base consideration and incremental consideration plus a covenant not to sue.”

Practice Points

  • If stockholders agree not to challenge a transaction (including by not bringing claims of breach of fiduciary duties), the company should seek to ensure that:
  • the commitment is contained in a written stockholder agreement;
  • the provision as drafted is clear and unambiguous;
  • the provision relates only to a specific transaction or narrowly defined type of transaction;
  • the type of circumstances under which the provision would be invoked can be predicted (such as, in Fugue, Rich and the board approving a Drag-Along Sale);
  • the stockholders making the commitment are sophisticated and represented by counsel;
  • the stockholders making the commitment understand the provision (and, optimally, are involved in the negotiations);
  • the stockholders making the commitment are not “coerced” into making it and have “bargaining power”;
  • the company (or its controller) does not have relevant “secret information” unknown to the stockholders; and
  • the stockholders making the commitment do so in exchange for “valuable consideration.”
  • Possible stockholder waiver of other rights. A corporation’s board and management should keep in mind that, based on the holdings in Fugue, Manti and Altor Bioscience, under certain circumstances (such as those outlined above), stockholder rights provided under the DGCL may be eliminated or restricted by contract or in the company’s charter. A company considering elimination or restriction of stockholder rights, depending on the circumstances, should consider, in addition to legal issues with respect to enforceability, the potential reaction of stockholders generally, as well as proxy advisory firms’ reaction and any possible effect on the company’s reputation or the marketability of the company’s securities.
  • Drag-along rights. A minority stockholder agreeing to a drag-along right should consider whether to seek bespoke provisions designed to protect their interests in the specific situation. In Fugue, the plaintiff-stockholders believed that Rich had breached his duty of loyalty by agreeing to the Drag-Along Sale, which provided an unexpectedly high sale price that primarily benefitted Rich and his fellow investors who had acquired shares in the Recapitalization—while the plaintiff-stockholders’ stakes had been diluted in the Recapitalization (although they had been offered but declined the opportunity to participate in the Recapitalization). In negotiating drag-along rights, stockholders, depending on the facts and circumstances (and assuming sufficient negotiating leverage), may want to seek, for example, to have prior, recent liquidation or recapitalization events taken into consideration when allocating the proceeds of a drag-along sale; or to require a guaranteed  minimum price or rate of return over a given time period before the drag right can be exercised.

This communication is for general information only. It is not intended, nor should it be relied upon, as legal advice. In some jurisdictions, this may be considered attorney advertising. Please refer to the firm’s data policy page for further information.