Court of Chancery Amplifies Circumstances Under Which Court Will Not Enforce Advance Notice Bylaw’s Deadline—Sternlicht v. Hernandez
M&A/PE Briefing | June 28, 2023
In Sternlicht v. Hernandez (June 14, 2023), the plaintiff-stockholders sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement by Cano Health, Inc. (the “Company”) of its advance notice bylaw deadline for the nomination of directors at its then-upcoming annual stockholders meeting. The plaintiffs were three of the directors on the Company’s nine-member board, who together had resigned six weeks after the deadline for nominations had passed and then sought to make director nominations. The plaintiffs contended that it would be inequitable to permit enforcement of the deadline, due to the radical change in circumstances at the Company after the nominations deadline (namely, the fracturing of the board and the plaintiffs’ resignations). The court did not grant the plaintiffs’ request to enjoin enforcement of the nominations deadline.
Key Points
- The decision serves as a reminder that, generally, the court will enforce an advance notice deadline for director nominations unless there are “compelling circumstances.” A material change at the company occurring after the deadline has passed may—but does not necessarily— constitute compelling circumstances for this purpose.
- The court generally will not enjoin enforcement of an advance notice bylaw deadline based on post-deadline changes at the company unless: the post-deadline changes were material in the sense that they altered the “policies and direction” of the company, and, critically, the changes were caused by the board of directors (not, for example, a minority faction of the board).
Background. The Company (incorporated in Delaware, with its principal place of business in Miami, Florida) is a primary care provider that owns and operates medical centers and delivers healthcare services through affiliate relationships with other providers, focusing primarily on coordinating care to members under Medicare Advantage plans. In 2016, a healthcare-focused private equity firm invested in the Company, and its managing partner, Elliott Cooperstone, joined the board. In 2021, the Company went public through a de-SPAC transaction with a company of which Barry Sternlicht was the chairman; Sternlicht personally invested $50 million in the Company; and he joined the board. Following the de-SPAC merger, the nine-member board consisted of the Company’s CEO (Marlow Hernandez), Cooperstone, Sternlicht, Dr. Lewis Gold (an investor owning about 1% of the voting power of the Company), and five other directors. The plaintiffs—Sternlicht, Cooperstone, and Gold—collectively controlled a total of 35.7% of the voting power.
Following the merger, disputes arose among the directors regarding alleged conflicts of interest of, and alleged violations of Company policies by, the CEO (including with respect to alleged loans, pledges of Company stock, related person transactions, appointment of officers, and failures to provide disclosure to the board). During this time, the stock price of the Company fell precipitously (from $15 per share just after the merger, to less than $1 per share). The plaintiffs, ultimately asserting that the Company was on the verge of insolvency, had been strongly advocating for a sale of the Company. The Company had been in exclusive talks with a buyer, but the buyer had terminated discussions (following the disclosure of which the stock price saw its greatest drop). The plaintiffs alleged that the CEO had told the buyer, as well as another company, that the Company was not for sale.
Ultimately, Sternlicht threatened to resign from the board, and to make public the reasons for his resignation, if the board did not fire the CEO and seek to sell the Company. In response, the board formed a Special Committee (not including the plaintiffs) to respond to any public statements made by Sternlicht, to make decisions relating to communications between the Company and its stockholders, and to negotiate and make recommendations to the board regarding settlements with stockholder-directors. The Special Committee eventually made recommendations to the full board that included retaining the CEO but subject to a probationary period based on improved financial performance of the Company.
Around March 30, 2023, which was about 60 days after the deadline for director nominations under the Company’s advance notice bylaw for the June 15, 2023 stockholder meeting had passed, the plaintiffs resigned from the board and sought to nominate their own slate of director nominees. The board rejected the request for waiver of the deadline and reduced the size of the board to six directors. The plaintiffs sued for equitable relief to have the deadline waived (and to postpone the June 15 meeting). Vice Chancellor Fioravanti rejected the plaintiffs’ requests.
Discussion
The Hubbard standard for waiver of an advance notice bylaw deadline. Under the standard the Court of Chancery established in Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty (1991), a board has a duty to waive an advance notice bylaw deadline where, after the deadline had passed, the company experienced a material change that was caused by the board. The Sternlicht plaintiffs argued that their post-deadline resignations and the acceleration of the disputes on the board relating to the CEO and a sale of the Company were compelling circumstances justifying equitable relief in enjoining enforcement of the deadline so that the plaintiffs could propose a competing slate of director nominees. The court acknowledged that, under the doctrine established by the Delaware Supreme Court in Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries (1971), a company cannot “militarize the corporation machinery” and Delaware law to entrench management by obstructing legitimate efforts of dissident stockholders in the exercise of their rights to undertake a proxy contest against management. However, the court stressed that, in Hubbard, the Court of Chancery held that a board has a duty to waive an advance notice deadline (under the principles of Schnell) only when a “radical shift in position, or a material change in circumstances” occurred after the advance notice deadline had passed. The Hubbard court wrote that it would be inequitable to bar nominations under an advance notice bylaw where “the key facts upon which a stockholder would decide to nominate candidates or make proposals are inherently unknowable until after the nomination deadline had expired and the board’s actions cause this significant change of circumstances….”
In the case of the Company, the post-deadline changes at the Company were not caused by the board, but by a minority faction of the board. The plaintiffs claimed that the board’s response to the CEO’s conduct and the fissure between the plaintiffs and the other outside directors constituted fundamental changes to the Company so as to meet the standard set forth in Hubbard for equitable relief requiring waiver of the advance notice deadline. The court, however, observed that the plaintiffs were “a three-member minority of the board” who were advocating for certain changes. “They never had a majority of the board in their camp who suddenly switched allegiances and radically changed the direction of the Company.” The board majority, in fact, did not effect any change—they “did not even change the status quo, let alone radically shift board allegiances like in Hubbard,” the court wrote.
The post-deadline change of circumstances was not material in this context. The plaintiff argued that the “materiality” standard for changed circumstances that would support enjoining enforcement of an advance notice deadline is the same standard for “materiality” as applies in the disclosure context. In other words, the plaintiffs appeared to argue that the change of circumstances would be material for this purpose if there was a substantial likelihood that a stockholder would consider any of the board’s conduct after the deadline had passed as “important to know in deciding whether to run a proxy context.” The court rejected the plaintiffs’ “attempt to import the disclosure standard of materiality into Hubbard.” In the Hubbard context, the court stated, materiality relates to actions taken by the board that “substantially alter the direction of the company.” For example, the court indicated, a board’s refusal to engage with a potential, credible acquiror when its previously stated investment thesis was to sell the company could constitute a “radical change” in the board’s plans for the company that would meet the Hubbard standard.
The alleged change of circumstances was pretextual. The court observed that that plaintiffs had sought to nominate a competing slate before the occurrence of the change in circumstances they alleged; and concluded that, “[i]in pursuit of that aim, they schemed to delay pressing their proxy contest in the hopes that the board would unwittingly reopen the nomination window.” Indeed, emails among Cooperstone, Sternlight and Gold mapped out a plan of delay to further their leverage in accomplishing their objectives to have the CEO removed and replaced with someone who shared their goal of having the Company or their shares sold. For example, Cooperstone wrote: "This is my suggestion for how to proceed with the threat of a noisy resignation to secure the board votes we need”; and “No need to rush here—time is actually building some leverage for us.” The court wrote: “Plaintiffs decided to nominate a competing slate in early March, and in furtherance of that goal, launched a ploy to strategically delay and ultimately to assert claims of material post-deadline change that are both pretextual and insufficiently radical under Hubbard and Schnell. In these circumstances, relief must be denied.”
Precedent on the issue of waiver of an advance notice nominations deadline. The court reviewed the following cases, providing guidance on what constitutes action by the board and a change in circumstances that is sufficiently radical to support non-enforcement of an advance waiver deadline.
- Hubbard—the court enjoined the deadline. In Hubbard, an insurgent stockholder brought suit to enjoin an advance notice bylaw but then reached a settlement with the company that added him to the board and prevented the board from waiving or amending its advance notice requirement. The stockholder then quickly obtained the support of a majority of the other directors to take the company in his proposed new direction. The other directors (now the minority faction) sought to run their own slate of nominees and sued to enjoin the company from enforcing the agreement and the advance notice bylaw. The court stressed that this was not a case where stockholders, “unprovoked by any board action, unilaterally and belatedly changed their minds and decided to nominate a slate…. Rather, this is a case where the board itself took certain action, after the by-law nomination deadline had passed, that involved an unanticipated change of allegiance of a majority of its members.” Moreover, “[i]t was foreseeable that that shift in allegiance would result in potentially significant changes in the corporation’s management personnel and operational changes in its business policy and direction” and would “generate controversy and shareholder opposition.” Thus the shareholders should be afforded a fair opportunity to nominate an opposing slate, requiring waiver by the board of the advance notice deadline.
- Healthcor and Amylin. While noting that neither the court nor the parties had been able to identify any Delaware decision in the 32 years following Hubbard enjoining the application of an advance notice bylaw in reliance on Hubbard, the court also discussed Healthcor and Amylin, in which the court granted motions to expedite claims to enjoin the enforcement of advance notice bylaws. In both of these cases, following grant of the plaintiffs’ motions to expedite, the parties settled their disputes, and therefore the court did not rule on the merits. In Healthcor Management v. Allscripts Healthcare Solutions (Transcript, 2012), the CEO and four out of the company’s nine directors resigned after the advance notice deadline had closed. The board itself acknowledged that the events at issue would result in the board proposing to seat a very different board. The court found that these circumstances raised “a colorable equitable question about whether the board can hide behind the advance notice by-law and retain for itself the flexibility to change the shape of the board in a fundamental manner shortly before the meeting and deny the other stockholders the ability to react to it.” The compelling circumstance was the board’s unexpected decision to reject, without consideration, a company-altering buyout offer. Similarly, in Icahn Partners v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals (2012), the court held that the plaintiffs adequately alleged that the board’s refusal to engage with a potential acquiror that offered a substantial premium, at a time when the board and stockholders were contemplating a sale of the company, evinced the board’s radical change of plans for the company.
- AB Value—the court enforced the deadline. In AB Value Partners v. Kreisler Manufacturing (2014), the court found that a post-deadline distribution under a trust that radically altered the playing field for a proxy contest was not a sufficiently compelling circumstance to justify equitable relief requiring waiver of the deadline. The court noted that stockholder composition changes frequently; and stressed that the trust distribution was not an action taken by the board that substantially altered the direction of the company. The court found that post-deadline pay increases that the board approved for management also did not meet the Hubbard standard because they did not constitute a radical shift in direction as they neither changed the operations nor the business direction of the company.
Practice Points
- Boards must act reasonably when rejecting advance notice nominations. While a corporation generally can enforce the technical requirements of its advance notice bylaw, at the same time the company must act reasonably when rejecting advance notice nominations, even when they are plainly non-compliant with the bylaw requirements. (See here the Fried Frank M&A/PE Briefing, “Implications of Lee for a Board’s Decision to Reject a Nomination Notice that is Not in Compliance with the Advance Notice Bylaw.”) In other words, a board should carefully and in good faith consider its decision whether to accept or reject a nomination notice and should not unfairly interfere with a stockholder’s efforts to comply with the bylaw. Also, boards should seek to adopt advance notice bylaws on “a clear day” when possible; should seek to ensure that such bylaws are clear and unambiguous; and should seek to ensure that the bylaw requirements, including the deadline (and the stockholder meeting date, where the deadline is tied to the deadline), are accurately disclosed in the company’s proxy statement. Recent Delaware decisions indicate that the court may not enforce an advance notice deadline when the deadline was not (or related requirements were not) accurately disclosed in the company’s proxy statement.
- Stockholders should consider the risks of not timely making advance notice nominations. Lee (2022) was one in a string of recent cases illustrating the risks a stockholder takes by delivering a nomination notice at or very close to the deadline, as, even under those circumstances, there may be no opportunity to satisfy the bylaw’s requirements or cure defects in the notice after the deadline has passed.
- Stockholders may be successful in seeking non-enforcement of an advance notice deadline where, post-deadline, the company has experienced material changed circumstances. Sternlicht underscores that the changed circumstances must have been material in the sense that they led to a radical shift in the company’s policies or direction, and must have been caused by the board. The position of a stockholder seeking non-enforcement of an advance notice deadline will be strengthened to the extent that: the post-deadline changed circumstances were unanticipated; and/or it was foreseeable that the changed circumstances would generate stockholder controversy or opposition. The stockholder’s position would be weakened to the extent that it knew before the deadline that it intended to make the nominations but chose to adopt a strategy of delay.
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