Chancery’s Disney Decision Provides Guidance for Boards When Responding to Political and Social Issues
M&A/PE Briefing | July 5, 2023
In Simeone v. The Walt Disney Company (June 27, 2023), a stockholder of The Walt Disney Company made a demand under DGCL Section 220 to inspect books and records of the company to investigate possible wrongdoing by Disney’s board and officers in connection with the company’s decision to speak out publicly against Florida legislation titled the “Parental Rights Act” (popularly dubbed the “Don’t Say Gay Law”). This legislation (the “Act”) restricts the discussion of sexual orientation and gender identity in Florida schools. The stockholder-plaintiff contended that Disney’s directors and officers may have breached their fiduciary duties in acting based on their own political beliefs rather than on the interests on the corporation and its stockholders, particularly as Florida’s Governor had threatened repercussions against the company if it publicly opposed the Act. Such repercussions were in fact imposed after Disney spoke out against the Act, with Disney losing the special tax status for its Disney World theme park in Orlando, following which the company’s stock price declined significantly.
The Delaware Court of Chancery rejected the plaintiff’s request for email communications among the directors and the CEO that related to the Act. The court concluded that: (i) the plaintiff had not established that he had a proper purpose to seek a Section 220 inspection; (ii) there was no basis on which the court could infer that the board had engaged in wrongdoing; and (iii) even if the plaintiff had established a proper purpose, Disney had already provided sufficient books and records in response to the Section 220 demand.
Key Points
- In the current politically-charged environment, boards should expect stockholder challenges to their decisions with respect to social and political issues—but the court generally will accord business judgment deference to such decisions. The court acknowledged that corporate speech on external policy matters (such as those involving political, social, or religious issues) involves both risks and opportunities for companies. The court emphasized that, in light of the diversity of viewpoints on these types of issues that may be held among the company’s stockholders, directors, management, employees, and other stakeholders, it is the board’s responsibility to weigh the competing corporate considerations and decide what policy is in the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders. (See “Practice Points” below.) The court made clear that a board’s significant discretion in guiding corporate strategy includes decisions as to whether to speak out or not (or take other action or not) on political or social issues. Such decisions, even if they led to negative effects on the company, generally will be subject to judicial deference under the business judgment rule; and a stockholder’s disagreement with such a decision will not, without more, provide a basis for the court to infer potential wrongdoing by the board such that the stockholder is entitled to an inspection of books and records under DGCL Section 220.
- The court found that the board’s heavy weighting of employees’ views on the political matter at issue was permissible. Disney had not initially spoken out against the legislation, but reversed course after significant backlash from its employees and creative partners. The court acknowledged that a board may conclude, in the exercise of its business judgment, that addressing interests of “the workforce that drives the company’s profits” is rationally related to building long-term value. Even the plaintiff in this case conceded that Disney’s relationship with its employees and creative talent was crucial to the company’s success.
- The opinion reinforces a recent trend in which Delaware courts have looked favorably on a company that, rather than rejecting a Section 220 demand outright, provides the relevant formal, board-level materials to the stockholder prior to any Section 220 litigation. Depending on the circumstances, a board should consider providing such materials in response to a Section 220 demand, even when it appears that the demand may be deficient.
Background. On February 24, 2022, the Florida House of Representatives passed the Act; on March 8, the Florida Senate passed it; and on March 28, it was signed into law by Florida’s Governor.
Disney (the largest employer in Florida) initially took no position on the Act, but quickly came under scrutiny for its financial backing of the legislators sponsoring the bill. On March 7, 2022, Disney’s CEO sent an internal memo to employees, stating that, notwithstanding the company’s silence about the Act, Disney continued to have an unwavering commitment to the LGBTQ+ community and would continue to be a leader in supporting organizations that champion diversity. Disney’s employees and creative partners (including actors, directors, writers and animators) expressed strong disappointment and frustration with the memo, with many demanding that the company take a public stand against the legislation.
Two days later, at Disney’s March 9 annual stockholder meeting, the CEO explained that the company had been opposed to the Act from the outset, but had hoped to use its influence behind the scenes rather than speaking out publicly. The CEO, after acknowledging that many people were upset that the company had not spoken out against the Act, stated that he had called the Governor that morning to express the company’s concern about the Act; that the company was joining a petition against similar legislation; and that the company would be supporting efforts to protect the LGBTQ+ community. On March 10, the Governor criticized Disney for being “woke.” The next day, the CEO sent an internal memo to employees, promising to become a better ally.
On March 28 (the day the Act was signed into law), Disney issued a public statement criticizing the Act and stating that the company would be supporting efforts to have it repealed by the legislature or struck down by the courts. In response, the Governor stated publicly that Disney had “crossed the line” and that he would be supporting a repeal of the 1967 law that had established a special district in Florida (the “Special District”) that permitted the Walt Disney World Resort to self-govern the area in which it was located (including with respect to the levying of taxes). A law dissolving the Special District was signed on April 22, 2022, to be effective in June 2023. The Governor also announced that he was proposing a law that would make Disney responsible for over $1 billion in debts owed by the Special District. Disney’s stock price fell from $145.70 per share on March 1, 2022 to $91.84 on July 14, 2022. On November 9, 2022 (the day after the Governor was reelected), Disney’s stock fell to $86.75 per share. (In February 2023, a law was passed that allows the Special District to continue, but effectively places it under the control of the Governor rather than Disney.)
On July 8, 2022, the plaintiff sent Disney a Section 220 demand to inspect corporate books and records to investigate possible wrongdoing in connection with the decision to speak out against the Act in the face of the Governor’s threats of significant repercussions to the company. While Disney responded that the stockholder lacked grounds to inspect the company’s books and records, the company nonetheless provided him with relevant board minutes and corporate policies. The plaintiff then brought suit seeking access to further books and records, including emails among the directors and the CEO and documents concerning the independence of the directors. Following a trial on a paper record, Vice Chancellor Lori Will rejected the plaintiff’s request for additional documents.
Discussion
Section 220. Delaware General Corporation Law Section 220 permits a stockholder to inspect corporate books and records for a “proper purpose” that is related to the stockholder’s interest as a stockholder (most commonly, to investigate suspected corporate wrongdoing, such as potential fiduciary breaches or mismanagement by the company’s directors or officers). The stockholder must demonstrate a “credible basis” for suspecting wrongdoing or mismanagement—which the courts have interpreted as imposing a relatively low bar to meet. If the stockholder shows a proper purpose and a credible basis, the stockholder is entitled to inspect those books and records that are “necessary or essential” to investigate the suspected wrongdoing or mismanagement.
A stockholder’s disagreement with a board’s position on political or social issues is not itself a proper purpose for a Section 220 demand nor does it provide a credible basis for suspecting wrongdoing by the board. The plaintiff’s theory was that Disney’s decision to publicly oppose the Act, despite the Governor’s warnings against doing so, may have constituted a breach of fiduciary duties, as the company lost (or at least risked losing) the benefits of the Special District and, as a result, the company’s stock price dropped significantly. The court wrote: “The plaintiff is not describing potential wrongdoing [by the board]. He is critiquing a business decision.” The court observed that stockholders and other corporate stakeholders are likely to have diverse interests and viewpoints, which may or may not align with the company’s position on political and social matters—but, the court emphasized, stockholders invest knowing that it is the board that is empowered to direct the corporation’s affairs, including establishing corporate policy on political and social matters.
There was no indication of potential wrongdoing by the board. According to the court, the evidence reflected that the board had been “actively engaged” and “held the sort of deliberations that a board should undertake when the corporation’s voice is used on matters of social significance.” At a special meeting held on March 8, 2022, the board discussed the company’s “Political Engagement and Communications,” and determined that its initial, muted response to the Act was wanting, based on “widespread backlash from its staff and talent.” On March 9, at a regular board meeting following the annual stockholder meeting, the CEO addressed “Company values, approach to Florida legislation and a planned holistic review of political engagement to be discussed at the June Board retreat.” The court noted that board members made comments and asked questions throughout the CEO’s presentation.
There was no indication that directors had conflicts of interest or were motivated by their personal interests. The plaintiff argued that the board was motivated by the personal political agenda of certain directors, including some who were members of non-profit organizations (such as the Human Rights Campaign) that adamantly opposed the Act. The court stated that membership in a non-profit organization does not itself create a conflict of interest and, in any event, that in this case there was no evidence suggesting that the directors’ personal beliefs caused them to act contrary to the interests of Disney and its stockholders. The court noted that Disney initially remained silent about the legislation; and that the plaintiff himself had testified that he had no reason to believe that any board member acted out of self-interest when Disney made comments about the Act. Books and records cannot be inspected “to search for hypothetical conflicts,” the court wrote.
The board weighed the risks of remaining silent versus publicly commenting about the legislation. The plaintiff argued that the board had “ignored a known risk of negative consequences from opposing the legislation.” The court acknowledged that the board perhaps could have avoided “political blowback” by remaining silent about the Act; however, the court noted, at the same time, remaining silent “could have damaged the company’s corporate culture and employee morale.” The board, as it should have, “weigh[ed] these key risks.” (The court also noted that, in any event, in this case, there was no evidence that Disney was warned about dissolution of the Special District or other specific potential repercussions before the company’s public announcement of its opposition to the Act. The Governor had, in the period prior to the company’s public announcement of its position, made only “vague” threats.) Given the board’s deliberations on the topic, the court ruled that it was “not for this court to “question rational judgments about how promoting non-stockholder interests—be it through making a charitable contribution, paying employees higher salaries and benefits, or more general norms like promoting a particular corporate culture—ultimately promote stockholder value.”
The board had already provided sufficient documents to the plaintiff. Notably, although the court rejected the plaintiff’s demand for additional documents on two separate, independent grounds—namely, lack of a proper purpose and no basis on which to infer potential wrongdoing by the board—the court went on to hold that no further production would be necessary in this case even if the plaintiff had established a proper purpose, as “the Board maintained formal records of its actions” and they had already been provided to the plaintiff. “Formal board-level documents are often the beginning and the end of a Section 220 production where a plaintiff aims to investigate possible mismanagement,” the court wrote. Disney had already provided the stockholder with all board-level documents related to: the Act; Disney’s response to the Act; the potential loss or modification of the Special District; and Disney’s policies on charitable and political giving. The court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that he also needed to inspect three years of emails and correspondence between and among board members and the CEO on these topics. The court cited the Delaware Supreme Court as having instructed that the court should not order production of emails “when other materials (e.g., traditional board-level materials, such as minutes) would accomplish the petitioner’s proper purpose.”
The court may be skeptical of a Section 220 demand that appears to be “lawyer-driven” for political purposes. The court found that this case presented the “rare circumstances” in which a Section 220 inspection should be denied because “the purposes for the inspection belong[ed] to the stockholder’s counsel rather than the stockholder himself.” The plaintiff was solicited to make the Section 220 demand by lawyers associated with a non-profit organization that supports conservative causes, and it was revealed in pre-trial discovery that this organization was advancing the plaintiff’s legal fees. The court observed that such organizations “are entitled to their beliefs [and] entitled to pursue litigation in support of those beliefs. But [a books and records] suit, which is designed to address the plaintiff’s interests as a stockholder, is not a vehicle to advance them.” Furthermore, the plaintiff revealed in his testimony that he himself had only one interest in conducting the inspection, which was to discover and make public the names of the Disney directors who had made the decision to oppose the Act. The court concluded that this purpose (which appeared to be political in nature) was not stockholder-related. The court also noted the plaintiff’s lack of involvement—citing his testimony that he did not recall having read the draft Section 220 demand before it was made, and that he had read but made no comments on the draft Complaint before it was filed.
Practice Points
- A board should be prepared to respond to stockholder challenges to its decisions relating to political, social and ESG-related issues. Challenges are likely to be more prevalent in the current divisive political environment and may take many forms, including more traditional methods such as proxy solicitations and publicity campaigns, as well as fiduciary duty claims (e.g., inspection demands, litigation demands, and lawsuits). As discussed, however, fiduciary duty claims are not likely to be successful where an independent board, acting in good faith, made a reasoned business decision—even if the company suffered negative effects from the decision. In conjunction with any such decisions, a board should develop and implement an effective communications plan—which emphasizes the corporate interests at stake and is proactive in addressing the potential for these types of issues to create divisiveness among corporate stakeholders.
- In deciding whether or not the company should speak out publicly (or should or should not take other action) with respect to a political, social or ESG-related issue, a board should:
- be guided by the interests of the corporation and its stockholders (not the personal beliefs of the directors);
- carefully consider and weigh the competing corporate interests, opportunities and risks presented;
- not abdicate to management the board’s responsibility for setting corporate policy on such matters;
- identify and (as appropriate) address any actual or potential conflicts of interest any board members have with respect to the topic at issue; and
- contemporaneously maintain a formal record—such as in board minutes and supplements thereto—of the board’s deliberations, decisions and actions (and we note that recent Delaware decisions have strongly suggested that, as a general matter, board minutes should be “substantive,” i.e., indicating the issues and considerations addressed and actions taken, rather than short-form, i.e., stating only that a specified topic was discussed).
- A board should consider providing formal, board-level documents to a stockholder making a Section 220 demand, even if the demand appears to be deficient. Recent decisions suggest that when companies produce such documents in response to a Section 220 demand rather than rejecting the demand outright, the court may be less likely to order production of further corporate books and records (such as emails and other electronic communications) in subsequent Section 220 litigation. The decision whether to provide such documents in response to a Section 220 demand is a critical strategic decision that should made in consultation with legal counsel.
- Emails, emails, emails. While the court did not order production of emails in Disney, we note again, as we consistently do, that care must be taken in the drafting of emails, keeping in mind the potential that they may have to be produced in Section 220 or other litigation. Appropriate use of and attention to emails should be a routine part of corporate training for directors and officers—with regular reminders of the need for professionalism and avoiding ambiguity in emails, notwithstanding the informal feel of these communications.
- A stockholder making a Section 220 demand should know, and be able to articulate, the stockholder-related purpose for making the demand. Political or personal reasons for making a Section 220 demand (such as to be able to identify and publicly name directors who held certain beliefs or reached certain decisions) generally will not be viewed as constituting a valid purpose that is related to the stockholders’ interests.
- We note the court’s emphasis, again, on the interests of employees. This emphasis has been seen also in other recent Delaware decisions in other contexts—for example, in the McDonald’s decisions where the court stated, broadly, that “employees’ welfare” is a mission-critical risk for companies and a board’s failure to oversee that risk (in that case, in the context of alleged pervasive sexual harassment of employees at the company) may lead to liability under the Caremark doctrine.
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