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Chancery Awards Buyer Damages for Founder’s Overly Aggressive Efforts to Achieve Earnout—Saama

M&A/PE Briefing | October 13, 2026

In In re Saama Technologies Litigation (Sept. 26, 2026), the Delaware Court of Chancery held that a private equity firm affiliate (the “Buyer”), which acquired a controlling stake in Saama Technologies (the “Company”), does not owe the Company and its founder-CEO (the “Founder”) a $67.5 million earnout payment. The decision is notable for the court’s further finding that the Founder—who had continued as CEO of the Company during the earnout period—breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to the Company by taking overly aggressive actions in seeking to achieve the revenues-based earnout targets. The court ordered that the Founder pay damages of $7.3 million for the harms his actions caused the Company.

Key Points 

  • The decision highlights the potential for misaligned incentives relating to an earnout when a founder or key executive who is a potential earnout beneficiary participates in running the business post-closing. A carryover executive may be overly focused on short-term performance to achieve the earnout target, at the expense of the company’s long-term financial health and growth. Actions that such an executive takes that prioritize short-term financial metrics tied to the earnout may cross the line from a permissible, aggressive business strategy to, instead, bad faith action motivated by self-interest, for which the executive may be personally liable.

  • The case underscores the importance of oversight by a buyer during the earnout period. Particularly where a carryover executive is involved, a buyer should monitor the acquired business during the earnout period to confirm compliance with any standards and restrictions in the parties’ agreement with respect to operation of the business. If the acquired business is outperforming expectations during the earnout period, the buyer should consider reviewing the sales or other relevant processes to determine whether carryover executives are manipulating results to maximize the earnout at the expense of the company’s long-term financial health and growth. While the Buyer prevailed in this case and was awarded damages, the victory came after significant destruction of value of the Company and years of litigation.  

  • Earnout provisions should be specific and contextualized for the particular business and situation. The parties’ agreement required that the Company, a software subscription business, be operated “in good faith with respect to achieving the earnout”; and set forth certain parameters for subscriptions to count toward the revenues-based earnout target. The parties would have benefitted, however, from more specifically addressing, for example, the extent to which discounts, and free or bundled services to customers, were permissible; the distinction between signed bookings and recognized revenue; and the allocation of revenue over multi-year subscriptions.

  • The case serves as a reminder that an agreement provision requiring arbitration of earnout disputes will not necessarily avoid litigation. The merger agreement set forth a procedure for resolution of disputes through arbitration with an accounting expert. The Founder initially sued to compel arbitration of the earnout disputes, and the court granted the request. The Founder then changed his mind, and the court granted his request, instead, to amend his complaint to assert contractual and fiduciary duty claims and seek a declaratory judgment that the earnout was owed. Notably, the Founder’s strategy to shift to litigation backfired, as the court ultimately ruled against him on his claims and granted the Buyer’s counterclaims against him for breach of his contractual and fiduciary obligations.

Background. In summer 2021, the Buyer approached the Founder about acquiring a control stake in the Company based on an enterprise value for the Company of $505 million. Discussions ensued, and the Buyer conducted due diligence. In that process, the Buyer discovered certain accounting anomalies, as a result of which it revised its valuation of the Company to $435 million. The Buyer suggested an earnout to bridge the valuation gap. 
 
In mid-October 2021, the parties entered into a merger agreement (the “Agreement”), pursuant to which the Buyer acquired a 62% interest in the Company; a co-investor syndicate acquired a 13% interest; and the Company’s selling stockholders(including the Founder) rolled over the remaining 25% interest. The transaction valued the Company at $435 million. The Agreement provided for an earnout of up to $67.5 million, payable if: at the end of 2021, (i) the Company’s revenue reached $72 million (which tracked the company’s own revenue plan) and (ii) annual recurring revenue bookings for “signed contracts” (“ARR Bookings”) reached $27 million (a significant increase over the Company’s baseline of $15 million).

Even while the Agreement was being negotiated, the Founder focused the Company on aggressively seeking to meet the earnout targets. At the end of 2021, he provided the Buyer with an earnout statement showing that the targets were met. An accounting expert, reviewing the statement for the Buyer as the Buyer determined whether to dispute any items, questioned the revenue recognition practices reflected in the statement. The Buyer ultimately formally objected to the earnout statement and refused to pay the earnout. The Founder sued to compel arbitration; but later shifted to asserting claims of breach of contractual and fiduciary obligations and seeking a judicial declaratory judgment that the earnout was owed.
  
Meanwhile, the Company’s business had deteriorated significantly post-closing; and the Buyer had terminated the Founder as CEO in June 2022. In the litigation, the Buyer counterclaimed for alleged contractual and fiduciary breaches by the Founder during the earnout period, based on the actions he took in trying to maximize revenues by the end of the earnout period. After a five-day trial, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will held that the Buyer did not owe an earnout payment—and that the Founder was liable to the Buyer
for $7.3 million in damages for harm that his post-closing actions in seeking to meet the earnout targets caused the Company.

Discussion

The Founder prioritized his own interests in achieving the earnout over the interests of the Company. The court found that the Founder’s post-closing actions, taken to try to meet the earnout targets. Were taken in bad faith (i.e., were based on his own self-interest rather than the Company’s best interests) and harmed the Company. Specifically:

  • He shifted the Company’s standard sales practices to a strategy to “clos[e] anything in any way that [the Company] could by the end of the year.”  

  • He had the Company “abandon[] its historical pricing discipline” with respect to margins, and had the Company offer heavy discounts, which it had never before offered in a fourth quarter.  

  • He directed employees to “prioritize short-term contracts,” which “need not be sustainable.”

  • He had contracts rewritten to artificially maximize ARR Bookings. For example, a work order “to complete a custom software build” for a large customer, which would generate services revenue that would not count toward the ARR Bookings, was rewritten to be a “software license agreement” so that ARR could be claimed. Also, a four-year contract with a customer was revised to inflate the subscription fees for the first three years (the years that counted toward ARR bookings) and reduce the fourth year’s fees.  

  • He had the sales teams begin to bundle implementation services with subscription fees to inflate ARR Bookings.

  • He had the Company sell customers products that did not yet exist or were only in the early stage of development—that is, although “he knew [the Company] could not deliver on its promises” under those contracts, “[h]e made them anyway with the intent to secure the maximum earnout.”  

The court wrote: “[The Founder] gamed the system.” Most significantly: “He manipulated contract language to pull unearned revenue into the earnout window. He then leveraged [the Company]’s software products division to sign value-destructive contracts that superficially qualified for the earnout…. [This] was not a flawed business strategy; it was bad faith.” 
 
The Founder’s actions harmed the Company. The court found that the Founder’s efforts to meet the earnout targets “culminat[ed] in an unsustainable trajectory that impaired [the Company]’s product business….” The Company’s aggressive strategy of pressuring customers to enter into agreements by the year-end caused some customers to turn away from the Company. Also, the “over-commitments” with respect to under-developed or non-existent products placed “a huge burden” on the Company in trying to perform under those contracts; and, when the Company could not fulfill many of the commitments, important customers canceled and demanded their money back.
 
The Founder breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to the Company. As part of the merger, the Company became a limited liability company. The LLC agreement provided that officers would owe common law fiduciary duties and an officer would face personal liability for “loss, damage, or claim incurred by reason of such [officer’s] fraud, gross negligence, or willful misconduct.” The Buyer claimed that the Founder acted in bad faith by “signing as many contracts as possible to achieve the earnout, regardless of their economic or commercial merits, knowing it would impair the company.” The Founder responded that his sales and hiring efforts were “aggressive, ordinary-course growth initiatives he was entitled to pursue.” The court wrote: “There is a stark difference between an aggressive business strategy and a disloyal one. A fiduciary may pursue a strategy that exposes the company to risk if she believes, in good faith, that the potential benefits justify the risks. The line is crossed when the fiduciary pursues the strategy while knowing it sacrifices the corporation’s interests for another purpose.” In the earnout context, the court wrote: “[A]n officer who also serves as the sellers’ representative does not act in bad faith merely by pursuing a risk-bearing strategy to maximize the contingent payment, provided she genuinely believes the strategy also benefits the company. But that dual role does not grant the officer license to knowingly harm the company to increase the sellers’ payout.” The court found that the Founder “crossed that line and engaged in willful misconduct for which he is not exculpated.”  
 
The court rejected the Founder’s claim that the Buyer-appointed officers of the Company breached their fiduciary duties by prioritizing the Buyer’s interests. After the earnout period ended, the Buyer appointed a new CFO for the Company, and a few months later replaced the Founder with a new CEO. The Founder contended that these officers, controlled by the Buyer, had prioritized the Buyer’s interests over the Company’s interests by “depriving [the Company] of resources and focusing on M&A.” The court rejected the “conclusory argument that officers who report to a controlled board generally lack independence from the controlling investor.” With respect to the Founder’s complaint that the officers reduced employee headcount, did not ask the Buyer “to invest additional funds,” and diverted resources to consideration of an M&A transaction that was never consummated, the court wrote: “Decisions about staffing, capital allocation, and exploring strategic alternatives are quintessential business judgments,” and the Founder “presented no evidence that any such decisions were so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that they seem essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.” 
 
The court rejected the Founder’s claim that the Buyer did not act in good faith in objecting to the earnout statement. The Agreement provided that, notwithstanding anything in the Agreement to the contrary, any amount in the earnout statement that “is not disputed by [the Buyer] in good faith shall be promptly paid.” The Founder argued that the Buyer acted in bad faith by challenging the earnout statement based on “preplanned” objections. He asserted that, based on the Buyer’s internal modeling at the time the Buyer proposed the earnout, it was clear that the Buyer already at that time had planned ultimately to object to the Company’s 2021 recognition of revenue from its agreement with one of its largest customers. The court, however, stressed the Buyer’s right to object to the earnout statement. The Agreement set forth “a multistep dispute resolution process” that “contemplate[d]—and [was] predicated upon—objections” by the Buyer. The good faith clause relating to Buyer disputes with the earnout statement, the court stated, required only that the Buyer “honestly believed” that it had a basis on which to object; and “the trial record show[ed] that [the Buyer]’s objections…were grounded in legitimate factual and contractual deficiencies.”

Practice Points 

  • A buyer should monitor the acquired company during the earnout period. Particularly if carryover employees are involved, a buyer should seek to confirm, during the earnout period, ongoing compliance with the standards and restrictions set forth in the parties’ agreement relating to post-closing operation of the business. While careful review of the earnout statement at the end of the earnout period may save the buyer from having to pay, or overpay on, the earnout, the goal should be to discover manipulative actions as early as possible to avoid destruction in the value of the business. Depending on the circumstances, a buyer should consider not relying on high-level, summary reports from company management, but instead conducting more intensive (for example, contract-by-contract) reviews. Delight with results that reflect the company is outperforming expectations should not dampen (indeed, such results potentially should heighten) the buyer’s vigilance with respect to monitoring.

  • When an earnout beneficiary will be running the business post-closing, the buyer should consider negotiating for more specific, detailed provisions governing the company’s post-closing operations. Rather than relying only on broad standards, such as “good faith,” “ordinary course,” or “typical margins,” a buyer should consider setting forth bespoke, specific, detailed parameters contextualized for the particular business and situation. The drafting and negotiation process should involve not only lawyers, but also the business people and experts who best understand the business and the potential issues. For example, for a revenue-based earnout for a software subscription business, the parties should consider specifying standards for pricing margins, discounts, free services, bundling of services, allocation of revenue across multi-year subscriptions, and so on. For clarity with respect to the issues that are the most likely to arise or that may be the most significant, the parties may wish to provide examples of hypothetical situations and how the general standards set forth in the agreement would apply in those specific circumstances. It should be clear as to which kinds of actions require consent of the buyer (e.g., offering discounts of more than X%; selling products not in at least stage X of development; etc.).

  • A very short earnout period, especially when coupled with an unrealistic target, may exacerbate a misaligned incentives problem. In Saama, the earnout period was only two and a half months long. When the agreement was signed, both parties believed, based on the Company’s operating history, that the earnout targets were, at a minimum, a significant “stretch.”  A buyer should consider whether a short time period and stretch targets may intensify the risk that carryover executives who are potential earnout beneficiaries would take extraordinary or manipulative actions, harmful to the company, to meet the targets.

  • An earnout beneficiary who continues to be employed at the acquired company post-closing must keep in mind not only his or her contractual obligations but also fiduciary duties as an officer of the post-closing company. If the post-closing company is a corporation, common law fiduciary duties apply; if it is an LLC, the fiduciary duties are as set forth in the LLC operating company agreement. In most cases, LLC agreements waive fiduciary duties, but, as Saama illustrates, that is not always the case—and, in any event, there may be contractual obligations to act in good faith. Where such obligations apply, the executive should consider the company’s long-term interests and not be “singularly focused” on achieving the earnout. The executive should carefully consider whether any unusual or uncustomary sales strategies or arrangements with customers might be deemed to improperly prioritize achievement of the earnout over the company’s longer-term interests. 

Actions that may be improper include: artificially shifting future sales into the earnout period, such as through unusual discounts, free services, pressuring customers, or changes in how revenues are allocated over the years of a multi-year contract; rewriting standard contracts so that the sales, as recharacterized, would count toward the earnout target; entering into unprecedented contracts, such as for products not yet developed or in the early stages of development, particularly if they will create a significant future burden on the company or be unsustainable; or overly aggressive cutting of expenses that will affect long-term growth, such as headcount, R&D, and marketing.

  • Earnout parties should consider establishing in their agreement a hierarchy of accounting principles to be applied. We note that another recent Court of Chancery decision—Viasat (Sept. 29, 2026)—highlights the benefits of setting forth in the parties’ agreement a hierarchy of accounting principles to be applied with respect to an earnout (although Viasat related to a post-closing working capital adjustment, not an earnout). In Viasat, the parties’ agreement stated that, for purposes of determining working capital, priority would be given first to the specific accounting policies, practices, methods, and procedures that were set forth in the agreement; second priority would be accorded to accounting principles under GAAP; and third priority would be accorded to the target company’s historical accounting policies, principles, methods, and procedures used in its past financial statements. Earnout parties may wish to consider providing for a similar hierarchy for the accounting principles to be applied in determining whether financially-based earnout targets have been met, including providing as the first priority the application of business- and deal-contextualized accounting principles explicitly set forth in the agreement. 

This communication is for general information only. It is not intended, nor should it be relied upon, as legal advice. In some jurisdictions, this may be considered attorney advertising. Please refer to the firm’s data policy page for further information.