Blocked and Tagged: Breaking Down the EU’s Suspension of Meta’s Personal Data Transfers to the US and Billion Euro Fine
Client memorandum | June 13, 2023
Author: Michael Kleinman
For close observers, the result (but perhaps not the fine) is no surprise. After winding its way through the European Union (“EU”) General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) dispute resolution process late last month, the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (“DPC”) published its final decision following its multiyear investigation into whether the cross-border transfer of EU personal data from Meta Platforms Ireland Limited (“Meta Ireland”) to its parent, Meta Platforms, Inc. (“Meta US,” and together with Meta Ireland, “Meta”), in connection with operating Meta’s Facebook Service[1] (the “Data Transfers”) violated the GDPR. Meta now has six months to suspend its Data Transfers and five months to cease its processing and storage of EU personal data in the United States (“US”) and must pay a €1.2 billion fine. Meta has vowed to appeal this decision and seek a stay of its impact on the Data Transfers. In this memorandum, we break down the decision, the current legal landscape, and provide some considerations for companies transferring EU data to the US.
THE BACKGROUND
The Legal Issue. Chapter V (Articles 44-50) of the GDPR governs cross-border transfers of European Economic Area (“EEA”) personal data to “third countries” outside of the EEA. Article 45(1) states that a data exporter can only transfer personal data to a third country if the European Commission (“EC”) has issued an adequacy decision stating that the third country ensures an adequate level of protection under EU law (an “Adequacy Decision”). The US does not presently have an Adequacy Decision. Accordingly, exporters of personal data from the EEA to the US (i) must adopt appropriate safeguards (such as the use of standard contractual clauses (“SCCs”)) under Article 46(1) to ensure that data subject rights and effective legal remedies are enforced and available, respectively, or (ii) can, in limited circumstances, in the absence of an Adequacy Decision under Article 45 or appropriate safeguards under Article 46, rely on certain “derogations” enumerated in Article 49.
A Schrems II Refresher. In its infamous July 2020 decision, Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Ltd. and Maximillian Schrems (“Schrems II”),[2] Europe’s highest court, the European Court of Justice (“CJEU”), invalidated the EU-US Privacy Shield Framework and upheld, with serious reservations, the use of SCCs[3] as an adequate safeguard for the cross-border transfer of personal data originating in the EEA to the US and other third countries. The CJEU’s decision was heavily influenced by its critical view of US foreign surveillance laws and programs, which it deemed inadequate to protect the “fundamental” privacy rights of EEA residents under the GDPR, as read in accordance with the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights (the “Charter”). The CJEU required data importers and exporters relying on SCCs to make an individualized risk assessment with respect to each transfer of personal data to determine whether the level of protection offered by the third country is “essentially equivalent” to the protection guaranteed by the GDPR and the Charter. Where such protection is found to be inadequate, the CJEU required parties to the transfer to implement supplementary measures to compensate for any shortcomings in equivalence. But the CJEU provided scant guidance on how to do so. Following that decision, the European Data Protection Board (“EDPB”) issued recommended supplemental measures (“EDPB Recommendations”)[4] for use by parties transferring personal data that might compensate for any risks to data subject rights under the laws of the third country. The recommendations included the adoption of technical, contractual, and organizational measures, such as encryption, data minimization, and strict data security and privacy policies.
The EU’s Problem with US Surveillance Law. At bottom, the Meta Decision and the obstacles to transferring EEA personal data to the US arise out of a long-standing transatlantic disagreement regarding the balancing of EU individual privacy rights against US governmental concerns about national security. According to EU regulators and the CJEU, foreign surveillance programs authorized under US law fail to limit the scope of personal data collected from or about EEA data subjects or afford those subjects adequate redress against the US government’s use of that data. In particular, Section 702 of the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”) authorizes the collection, use, and dissemination of electronic communications content stored by US “electronic communications service providers”—internet service providers and content hosts, such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft—for national security purposes. Moreover, Section 702 authorized a program known as PRISM, under which the government can compel service providers to provide the National Security Agency with the communications content in their possession. In sum, the PRISM program theoretically allows US intelligence agencies to access personal data of foreigners from any web-based platform if access is deemed necessary to protect US national security.
Meta’s Post-Schrems II Activities. Following Schrems II, Meta appears to have taken all the steps available under Schrems II and the EDPB’s Supplemental Recommendations to compensate for any lack of essential equivalence under US law. Among other things, Meta performed a transfer impact assessment to identify the risks attendant to the Data Transfers, adopted new SCCs, which had been updated and approved by the EC in June 2021 to address the issues raised by the CJEU (“New SCCs”) to cover transfers of personal data to third countries, and adopted and documented supplemental technical, organizational, and legal measures cited in the EDPB Recommendations. Those measures included a range of policies and procedures, oversight, encryption, asset management controls, access controls and audit logs, and identity verification for law enforcement officials (the “Meta Supplemental Measures”).
The Irish Investigation. In August 2020, shortly after Schrems II was decided, the DPC commenced an investigation[5] into Meta’s social media processing activities on Facebook, including in particular whether the transfer of EEA personal data by Meta Ireland to Meta US carried out on the basis of using the old SCCs provided appropriate safeguards to EEA data subjects under EU law. That inquiry continued for several years and included periodic input in the form of submissions from Meta, the US government, and Max Schrems. Given the lengthy duration of the investigation, it also came to include Meta’s use of the new SCCs and submissions concerning the effect, if any, of the proposed EU-US Data Privacy Framework on the appropriateness of Meta’s safeguards (discussed below). The Meta Decision is the culmination of that inquiry.
THE META DECISION
Two Decisions in One: A Note on GDPR Procedural Law. The Meta Decision actually consists of two opinions. Under the GDPR’s procedural rules, the DPC, as the “lead supervisory authority” for Meta Ireland, first issued a draft decision ordering Meta to suspend the Data Transfers (the “Suspension Order”). The draft decision was then subject to review by the supervisory authorities in every member state due to the broad availability of the Facebook Service in Europe. Following their review of the draft decision, several supervisory authorities lodged objections asserting that the corrective measures proposed by the DPC for Meta’s past infringement of the GDPR were inadequate in two respects: (i) the DPC did not impose an administrative fine on Meta, which was necessary to deter Meta and similarly situated exporters from future violations; and (ii) the DPC failed to order the return or deletion of EEA personal data stored in the US. The DPC did not agree with the objections. In particular, the DPC determined that a fine would be disproportionate in light of the likely adverse impact on Meta’s business operations due to the Suspension Order and because the DPC held that the Data Transfers had been made in good faith by Meta.
As a result, the objections and the draft decision were reviewed by the EDPB, which issued a binding decision directing the DPC to take further action (the “EDPB Decision”).[6] The DPC then issued its final decision, which incorporated portions of the EDPB Decision (the “DPC Decision”).
The Meta Decision. In the DPC Decision, the DPC considered (i) whether, notwithstanding its use of the New SCCs and the Meta Supplemental Measures, the Data Transfers violated Article 46(1) of the GDPR and (ii) if so, what corrective measures should be put in place to remedy the violation.
On the first consideration, the DPC held that Meta Ireland’s post-Schrems II compliance measures—entering into the New SCCs with Meta US and implementing the Meta Supplemental Measures—were insufficient to compensate for the perceived inadequacies of US law. The DPC stated that while the New SCCs were “unquestionably more developed” than the prior SCCs, they did not implement any new measures to compensate for the specific deficiencies in US law identified by the CJEU and none of the Meta Supplemental Measures did anything to change the result.[7]
On the second consideration, the DPC ordered Meta to comply with the Suspension Order within five months (by October 2023). The DPC noted that suspension of data transfers is not required in all cases where Article 46 has been violated, so long as protection of data subjects can be “ensured by other means.” The DPC held that such “other means”—which it did not describe—had not been demonstrated by Meta.
Following the binding mandate of the EDPB Decision, the DPC further ordered Meta to (i) bring its processing operations into compliance with Chapter V by ceasing its processing—including storage in the US—within six months (by November 2023) (the “Compliance Order”) and (ii) pay an administrative fine of €1.2 billion for its past infringement (the “Fine”).
- Compliance. The French and German supervisory authorities wanted the EDPB to order a bulk return or deletion of personal data stored in the US. Acknowledging the potential adverse impact that deletion would have on data subjects, non-profits, and small businesses that utilize the Facebook Service in the EEA, the EDPB instead directed the DPC to issue an order requiring Meta to come into compliance with Chapter 5 by ceasing its processing activities and storage of personal data in the US. But that might be a distinction without a meaningful difference. Given the architecture of the Facebook Service, which includes heavily commingled user personal data from many jurisdictions stored in many other jurisdictions, according to Meta, the Compliance Order leaves it with no choice but to delete EEA personal data completely. Absent judicial intervention, Meta has approximately six months to find an alternative.
- The Fine. Siding with supervisory authorities from Austria, Spain, France, and Germany, the EDPB ordered the DPC to issue a fine based on (i) the large share of EEA users directly affected by Meta’s noncompliance; (ii) a determination that Meta’s infringement was “knowing,” based on its awareness that Meta and its predecessor, Facebook, had been under scrutiny of supervisory authorities for approximately ten years and subject to two previous decisions—Schrems I and Schrems II—concerning its Data Transfers.[8] In light of these factors, the EDPB deemed Meta’s infringement to be of a “high level of seriousness” and directed the DPC to calculate a fine using a starting range of 20-100% of the applicable legal maximum fine (the greater of €20 million or 4% of total worldwide turnover in preceding financial year). To calculate the fine, the DPC used Meta Platforms Inc.’s reported revenue of approximately €109 billion for the year ending 2022. Under the EDPB’s recommendation, that would have resulted in a starting fine range of between €870 million and €4.4 billion. Although, the DPC’s €1.2 billion fine falls on the lower end of that range (roughly 1.1% of Meta Platforms Inc.’s revenue), the fine is still much larger than any other issued to date under the GDPR.
META’S RESPONSE
Meta has publicly vowed to appeal the decision and the fine to the High Court of Ireland and seek a stay of the Suspension and Compliance Orders pending appeal. Meta has not publicly stated what measures it is exploring to continue providing the Facebook Service in the EU in a way that is compliant with Chapter V. Ultimately, this case may return the issue of Meta’s Data Transfers to the CJEU for a final, non-appealable decision.
WAIT…WHAT ABOUT THE EU-US DATA PRIVACY FRAMEWORK?
As a reminder, in October 2022 President Biden signed Executive Order 14086 (“EO 14086”) on “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities,” which places some limitations on data access by intelligence authorities and sets up a two-tier review system to investigate and remediate potential privacy violations. If, as expected, the changes embodied in EO 14086 serve as the basis for an Adequacy Decision, US companies that agree to abide by a set of privacy safeguards embodied in a new “EU-US Data Privacy Framework” (the “Framework”) can receive EEA personal data without any further transfer restrictions.
Meta raised EO 14086 during the DPC’s inquiry as evidence that US law now limits interception of EEA personal data by the US intelligence community and affords data subjects the right to redress any privacy violations related to foreign surveillance, curing the deficiencies found by the CJEU in Schrems II. In the DPC Decision, the DPC refused to opine on the safeguards afforded by EO 14086, finding that the changes made available under EO 14086 had not yet come into operation. In ordering a suspension, rather than a ban of the Data Transfers, however, the DPC left open the possibility that the transfers could resume if that were to change.
NOW WHAT?
In the last few years, the CJEU, data supervisory authorities, and the EDPB have consistently taken the position that it is nearly impossible under current US law for electronic communications service providers, like Meta, that are subject to the FISA Section 702 PRISM program to provide any supplemental measures that would safeguard the rights and freedoms of EEA data subjects under EU law. With its billion euro fine and Suspension Order, the EU put the squeeze on Meta despite Meta’s undisputed good faith efforts to comply with the GDPR. It is too early to tell whether the EU’s singling out of Meta is a warning shot or the product of a decades long tussle with a particular company.
WHAT DOES THE META DECISION MEAN FOR YOUR COMPANY?
Given the intractable conflict between US and EU views on potential surveillance of EEA individuals by the US government, there are no easy answers at this time for companies that rely on transfers of EEA personal data to the US. Instead we offer several insights and considerations for risk mitigation.
- Are you Transferring Data to an Electronic Communications Service Provider? Unfortunately, this can be a difficult question to answer. The DPC Decision makes clear that it applies to any “internet platform falling within the definition of an electronic communications service provider subject to the FISA 702 PRISM program.”[9] FISA Section 701 contains a broad definition of “electronic communications service provider,” which may go so far as to include companies that merely provide their employees with email access. The DPC had no need to opine on this question because Meta Ireland conceded that PRISM applied to its processing activities. On one end of the spectrum, to the extent a US-based importer of EEA personal data has received even one FISA request, the answer is yes. The Meta Decision makes clear that there is no de minimis exception for situations where the risk of the US government accessing EEA personal data is extremely remote. Indeed, Meta claimed that the access requests it received affected only 0.00094% of all accounts globally across all of Meta’s services—not just the Facebook Service.[10] Companies that have a history of receiving governmental data access requests, especially those that receive sensitive or special category data that needs to be processed in the clear (i.e., not in encrypted form) should prioritize a study of their data flows, business needs, and determine whether they can stand up infrastructure and operations in the EEA, the UK, or another adequate jurisdiction. They should ask the same of their third-party processors. A fix may be relatively simple—switching third-party processors for some operations—but can be a lot more complicated, in particular, with respect to intracompany transfers. Additional considerations may include:
- Data localization or regionalization (if at all realistic). Hosting and processing EEA data subjects’ personal data only within the EEA or within countries where the EC has issued an Adequacy Decision will avoid the uncertainty of Schrems II and the Meta Decision and avoids waiting around to see if EO 14086 leads to an Adequacy Decision that survives a judicial challenge in a Schrems III. The cost to localize may be prohibitively expensive, depending on, among other things, a company’s geographic footprint and customer mix. But be forewarned that impossibility is no excuse. In ordering suspension, the DPC gave no credit to Meta’s argument that without the Data Transfers, Meta could not offer the Facebook Service in the EEA. Instead, the DPC found that the problem was one of Meta’s own making arising out of Meta’s design choices with respect to the architecture of its systems used to deliver the Facebook Service.
- Investment in privacy-enhancing technologies such as multiparty computation. Although the Meta Decision focused on intracompany transfers within the Meta group, it should apply with equal force to transfers to nonaffiliated third-party processors who have, but may not actually need, any access to personal data in the clear. If such processors do not have the technical ability to access encrypted personal data in the US because, for example, they do not have decryption keys, then they cannot be compelled to provide it to government officials. The EDPB has cautioned, however, that this would not prevent the government from copying an encrypted data set and decrypting it on its own at a later time once its technological capabilities have advanced.
- Do your research. Certain supervisory authorities have issued guidance on cross-border transfers of personal data, including potential technological measures that may, under the right circumstances, avoid a violation of Chapter V.[11]
- Conducting a data business continuity test. Meta contended that it could not offer the Facebook Service if it was required to remove all EEA personal data from the US and was seemingly unable to offer the DPC any technical solutions to avoid the Suspension Order. Consider running a test to determine the effects of deletion, removal, or transfer of personal data hosted in the US and what measures might be put in place to mitigate potential operational and financial losses from business interruption.
- Considerations with Respect to Administrative Fines. The Meta Decision makes clear that fines for past violations of Chapter V are squarely on the table for all infringers. Indeed, even if an Adequacy Decision is granted, both the EDPB and the Irish DPC pointed out that any changes to US law will not apply retroactively to past processing activities in violation of Chapter V, so residual risks (including potential fines or deletion orders) remain. The Meta Decision together with the EDPB’s Guidelines on the Calculation of Administrative Fines[12] provide extensive guidance on how to think about potential fines. While fines may not be avoidable, some thought can be given to the range of expectations.
- Consider your place in society. Consider the extent to which your service or platform may affect civil society and the level of sophistication of your EEA data subjects. The EDPB found that Meta’s “increasingly larger role in areas as diverse as access to information, public debate” and “civil security” and the fact that the Facebook Service was provided to many users who do not have legal or technical knowledge meant that Meta had a “high degree of responsibility” with respect to GDPR compliance, justifying the decision to issue an administrative fine.[13]
- Do not overstate the protections afforded under US law. Acknowledge in transfer impact assessments that US law does not offer essentially equivalent protections to EEA data subjects. The Meta Decision faulted Meta for reaching the conclusion that US law was “essentially equivalent” and for employing supplementary measures that aimed to “mitigate” rather than “compensate” for the inadequate protection provided by US law. On appeal, Meta may argue that this is merely an issue of semantics. Indeed, although Meta proceeded to put in place the same level and type of supplemental measures provided in the available guidance, the EDPB nonetheless found that Meta Ireland’s aim to “mitigate” and not “compensate” for the deficiencies in US law led to Meta acting with a “very high degree of negligence,” which further supported an administrative fine.
[1] The scope of the decision covers the social network service available at the website www.facebook.com and via applications for mobile telephones and other devices (the “Facebook Service”).
[2] The EU-US Privacy Shield had been developed to replace the EU-US Safe Harbor Framework after its invalidation by the CJEU in 2015 in a related case (“Schrems I”).
[3] SCCs are a set of European Commission-adopted standard contractual clauses for use by data importers and exporters that allow companies to transfer data out of the EEA to a third country in exchange for assurances by the exporter that adequate privacy protections would be met by the importer.
[4] The EDPB is an independent body responsible for ensuring consistent application of the GDPR by the national data protection authorities in the EEA. See https://edpb.europa.eu/system/files/2021-06/edpb_recommendations_202001vo.2.0_supplementarymeasurestransferstools_en.pdf.
[5] Unlike Schrems II, which was initiated by a complaint made by privacy activist Maximillian “Max” Schrems, the DPC’s 2020 investigation was commenced as an “own volition inquiry.”
[6] See https://edpb.europa.eu/system/files/2023-05/edpb_bindingdecision_202301_ie_sa_facebooktransfers_en.pdf.
[7] Decisions of the EC are subject to judicial oversight.
[8] Although all concerned supervisory authorities agreed that Meta had acted in good faith, the Austrian, Spanish, French, and German authorities insisted that a fine was necessary to deter Meta and others who might otherwise find that the cost of continuing to violate the GDPR outweighs the cost of coming into compliance with the law.
[10] EDPB Decision ¶ 94 n.216.
[11] See e.g., https://www.cnil.fr/en/google-analytics-and-data-transfers-how-make-your-analytics-tool-compliant-gdpr.
[12] See https://edpb.europa.eu/system/files/2022-05/edpb_guidelines_042022_calculationofadministrativefines_en.pdf.
Special thanks to Elizaveta Shcherbakova, Summer Law Clerk, for her valuable assistance in the research and drafting of this client memorandum.
Additional Resources
A Pessimist’s Assessment of the Proposed EU-US Data Privacy Framework Under ‘Schrems II’ EU Cross-Border Data Transfers after Schrems II: EU’s Highest Court Sends Cross-Border Business Partners Back to the Negotiating TableThis communication is for general information only. It is not intended, nor should it be relied upon, as legal advice. In some jurisdictions, this may be considered attorney advertising. Please refer to the firm’s data policy page for further information.